fact-based merger analysis in District of Columbia

2018"For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate when there is an appreciable length of time between the acts that constitute the two offenses, or when a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one." Sanchez-Rengifo v. United States , 815 A.2d 351 , 354-55 (D.C. 2002) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2007“For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate when there is an appreciable length of time ‘between the acts that constitute the two offenses, or 4 when a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one.’ ” Sanchez-Rengifo at 354-55 (quoting Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C.1985)) (emphasis added); see generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

2017Nevertheless, “a lesser offense will merge into a greater offense if guilt of the lesser offense ‘is necessarily established by proof of the greater offense.’ ” Ball v. United States, 429 A.2d 1353 , 1360 n.13 (D.C. 1981) (quoting Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1228 (D.C.

2015See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 388 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C.1978) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where victim was inveigled into an automobile at gunpoint and driven twenty-five blocks, because such confinement was not "approximately coextensive or a necessary incident to the crime of robbery’’); Beck v. United States, 402 A.2d 418, 423 (D.C.1979) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where defendant forced victim from the street into a nearby house at. knifepoint before raping and robbing her); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1215-16 (D.C.1988) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where

2015See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 388 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C.1978) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where victim was inveigled into an automobile at gunpoint and driven twenty-five blocks, because such confinement was not "approximately coextensive or a necessary incident to the crime of robbery’’); Beck v. United States, 402 A.2d 418, 423 (D.C.1979) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where defendant forced victim from the street into a nearby house at. knifepoint before raping and robbing her); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1215-16 (D.C.1988) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where

2015See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 388 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C.1978) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where victim was inveigled into an automobile at gunpoint and driven twenty-five blocks, because such confinement was not "approximately coextensive or a necessary incident to the crime of robbery’’); Beck v. United States, 402 A.2d 418, 423 (D.C.1979) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where defendant forced victim from the street into a nearby house at. knifepoint before raping and robbing her); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1215-16 (D.C.1988) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where

2010“There is [ ] no double jeopardy bar to ‘separate and cumulative punishment for separate criminal acts,’ even if those separate acts do happen to violate the same criminal statute,” Ellison v. United States, 919 A.2d 612, 614 (D.C.2007) (quoting Brown, supra note 3, 795 A.2d at 63), but here we do not find “separate criminal acts.” Where a defendant has been convicted of two violations of the same statute, we have employed a “fact-based analysis” to determine whether “separate criminal acts have occurred.” For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate w

2007“For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate when there is an appreciable length of time ‘between the acts that constitute the two offenses, or 4 when a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one.’ ” Sanchez-Rengifo at 354-55 (quoting Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C.1985)) (emphasis added); see generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

2007“For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate when there is an appreciable length of time ‘between the acts that constitute the two offenses, or 4 when a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one.’ ” Sanchez-Rengifo at 354-55 (quoting Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C.1985)) (emphasis added); see generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

2007“For purposes of this fact-based merger analysis, criminal acts are considered separate when there is an appreciable length of time ‘between the acts that constitute the two offenses, or 4 when a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one.’ ” Sanchez-Rengifo at 354-55 (quoting Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 853 (D.C.1985)) (emphasis added); see generally Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

2005An interval of time between two criminal episodes may be quite brief but still show that a “defendant had reached a ‘fork in the road’ or had acted in response to a ‘fresh impulse.’ ” Spain v. United States, 665 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C.1995).