fairness inquiry in District of Columbia

2018The Supreme Court has clarified that materiality is not a "sufficiency of [the] evidence test." Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 , 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).

2018The Supreme Court has clarified that materiality is not a "sufficiency of [the] evidence test." Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 , 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).

2016OTR complied with OAH’s order, submitting motions addressing collateral estoppel in which it argued (1) that offensive non-mutual collateral es-toppel does not apply to the District government or its entities or, in the alternative, (2) that it would be unfair and an abuse of discretion to apply offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel in these cases, citing the fairness factors identified by this court in Modiri v. 1342 Rest Grp., Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 400 (D.C.2006).

2016Grp., Inc., 904 A.2d 391, 400 (D.C. 2006). ________________ (…continued) dismissed its petition for review in this court of OAH’s order granting Microsoft summary judgment on the ground that OTR’s use of the Chainbridge methodology was “arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.” Id.

2016As a result, OAH’s application of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel against OTR was an abuse of discretion, see Ford v. Chartone, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 84 (D.C. 2006) (“A discretionary judgment must be founded upon correct legal principles, and a court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” (internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted)),10 and we therefore must remand the case for OAH to address this question.

2016Thus, OAH’s determination regarding the fairness factors in these cases does not answer the different question of whether there are exceptional circumstances warranting application of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel against OTR. 16 supra note 3, and OAH did not address the question of whether exceptional circumstances exist in these cases.

2006Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990 , 235 Ill.Dec. 974 , 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether “the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped” (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (‘When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, proce

2006Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990 , 235 Ill.Dec. 974 , 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether “the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped” (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (‘When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, proce

2006Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990 , 235 Ill.Dec. 974 , 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether “the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped” (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (‘When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, proce

2006Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990 , 235 Ill.Dec. 974 , 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether “the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped” (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (‘When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, proce

2006Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990 , 235 Ill.Dec. 974 , 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether “the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped” (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (‘When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, proce

2006Ins. v. Dulceak, 302 Ill.App.3d 990 , 235 Ill.Dec. 974 , 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1999) (inquiring whether “the minimum elements of the doctrine are satisfied and it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party being estopped” (emphasis supplied)); DeLisle v. Avallone, 117 N.M. 602 , 874 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App.1994) (‘When the movant has made a prima facie showing [establishing the foundational requirements for applying collateral estoppel], the trial court must consider the countervailing equities including, but not limited to, prior incentive for vigorous defense, inconsistencies, proce

1987While normally a defendant need not foresee the precise injury, or have notice of the particular method in which the harm is brought about in order for the plaintiff to establish proximate causation, Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., 98 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 387 , 236 F.2d 673, 682 (1956), we held in Lacy that a school had no duty to act to protect the student from a sexual assault by a school janitor unless this particular harm was foreseeable.