59 California opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2025 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nino v. Coreygreen2 sentences1973In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court expressly approved ’ the following statement in In re Corey (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], and In re Steven F. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 603, 604 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 887 ]: “ ‘Where the commission of a crime is alleged as the jurisdictional fact and the allegation is disputed, the court’s error in [reviewing] the social study before the jurisdictional hearing goes so directly to the fairness of the hearing that the resulting adjudication is not saved by article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution.’ ” (In re Gladys R., supra, 1973In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court expressly approved ’ the following statement in In re Corey (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], and In re Steven F. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 603, 604 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 887 ]: “ ‘Where the commission of a crime is alleged as the jurisdictional fact and the allegation is disputed, the court’s error in [reviewing] the social study before the jurisdictional hearing goes so directly to the fairness of the hearing that the resulting adjudication is not saved by article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution.’ ” (In re Gladys R., supra, | 2 | 3 |
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.green2 sentences2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d 2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d | 2 | 2 |
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.green2 sentences2017(See Mills, supra, 559 A.2d at p. 1279 [“ ‘[b]ecause the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative . . . .’ ”].) Plaintiff invokes the entire fairness standard, contending that attaches as a substantive rule of law to protect the directors and their business decisions. 2017(See Mills , supra , 559 A.2d at p. 1279 [" '[b]ecause the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative ....' "].) Plaintiff invokes the entire fairness standard, contending that DeWalt's self-interest and the flawed merger process deprived McAfee shareholders of "a 'neutral decision-making body' " due to "the manipulation of the disinterested majority by an interested director." ( Cinerama, supra , 663 A.2d at p. 1170 , f | 2 | 2 |
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.green2 sentences2013All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.’ [¶] [(Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (Del. 1983) 457 A.2d 701, 711 .)] Thus, the entire fairness standard requires the board of directors to establish ‘to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.’ [(Cede, supra, 634 A.2d at p. 361 .)] In this case, because the contested action is the sale of a company, the ‘fair price’ aspect of an entire fairness analysis requires the board of directors to demonstrate ‘that the price offered was the highest val 2013All aspects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.’ [¶] [(Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. (Del. 1983) 457 A.2d 701, 711 .)] Thus, the entire fairness standard requires the board of directors to establish ‘to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.’ [(Cede, supra, 634 A.2d at p. 361 .)] In this case, because the contested action is the sale of a company, the ‘fair price’ aspect of an entire fairness analysis requires the board of directors to demonstrate ‘that the price offered was the highest val | 2 | 2 |
In Re Robbinsgreen2 sentences2012He next claims we should review claims Nos. 1 and 3 due to “inadequate representation by trial, appellate and prior habeas counsel,” referring the reader to the claims in which he contends trial counsel was ineffective. 36 (Petitioner, however, makes no specific allegations concerning the actions and omissions of prior appellate and habeas corpus counsel.) But although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are independent arguments that are not barred by the Lessard/Sterling rule (cf. In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 34 [discussing the intersection of the Waltreus rule and 2012He next claims we should review claim Nos. 1 and 3 due to ―inadequate representation by trial, appellate and prior habeas counsel,‖ referring the reader to the claims in which he contends trial counsel was ineffective.36 (Petitioner, however, makes no specific allegations concerning the actions and omissions of prior appellate and habeas corpus counsel.) But although claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are independent arguments that are not barred by the Lessard/Sterling rule (cf. In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 814, fn. 34 [discussing the intersection of the Waltreus rule and a | 2 | 2 |
Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bankgreen2 sentences2001Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 48 Cal. App.3d at p. 139 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 637 [party objecting to proposed class settlement, even opt-out party, is party aggrieved by judgment who may appeal]; see also Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 220 Cal. App.3d at p. 1131 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 844 ["there will be review if any aggrieved parties desire it; all they have to do is appear as objectors at the fairness hearing and then take an appeal"]; Torrisi v. Tucson Electric Power Company, supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1375, fn. 2.) Appellants also argue that appellate standing exists based upon their significant involvement 2001Sav. & Loan Assn., supra, 48 Cal. App.3d at p. 139 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 637 [party objecting to proposed class settlement, even opt-out party, is party aggrieved by judgment who may appeal]; see also Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, supra, 220 Cal. App.3d at p. 1131 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 844 ["there will be review if any aggrieved parties desire it; all they have to do is appear as objectors at the fairness hearing and then take an appeal"]; Torrisi v. Tucson Electric Power Company, supra, 8 F.3d at p. 1375, fn. 2.) Appellants also argue that appellate standing exists based upon their significant involvement | 2 | 2 |
Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.green2 sentences2024Because the court appeared to find certification appropriate on the ground that the settlement was fair, we 5 The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has questioned whether a presumption of fairness should ever apply under federal law, particularly given “Congress’ 2018 codification of standards for evaluating whether a proposed class settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’ ” (SFBSC Management, supra, 944 F.3d at p. 1049, fn. 12 [a presumption of unfairness “is very likely inappropriate under the standards now codified”].) 34 conclude that the court’s flawed presumption of fairness undermined bot 2006(See Wershba v. Apple Computer (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 235 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 ] [“Class members who appear at a final fairness hearing and object to the proposed settlement have standing to appeal.”].) Here, if anything, there is an even stronger public policy in allowing the one party who unequivocally represents the public interest in Proposition 65 litigation to have standing to appeal based on objections to a proposed settlement. | 1 | 4 |
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.green2 sentences2017(Del. 1994) 663 A.2d 1134 , 1162 ( Cinerama ) ["Where ... the presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted, the board of directors' action is examined under the entire fairness standard."].) The concept of entire fairness under Delaware law has two aspects: fair dealing and fair price. ( Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc . 2017(See Mills , supra , 559 A.2d at p. 1279 [" '[b]ecause the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative ....' "].) Plaintiff invokes the entire fairness standard, contending that DeWalt's self-interest and the flawed merger process deprived McAfee shareholders of "a 'neutral decision-making body' " due to "the manipulation of the disinterested majority by an interested director." ( Cinerama, supra , 663 A.2d at p. 1170 , f | 1 | 2 |
Nino v. Steven F.green2 sentences1973In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court expressly approved ’ the following statement in In re Corey (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], and In re Steven F. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 603, 604 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 887 ]: “ ‘Where the commission of a crime is alleged as the jurisdictional fact and the allegation is disputed, the court’s error in [reviewing] the social study before the jurisdictional hearing goes so directly to the fairness of the hearing that the resulting adjudication is not saved by article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution.’ ” (In re Gladys R., supra, 1973In this frame of reference, the Supreme Court expressly approved ’ the following statement in In re Corey (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 295, 299 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 115 ], and In re Steven F. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 603, 604 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 887 ]: “ ‘Where the commission of a crime is alleged as the jurisdictional fact and the allegation is disputed, the court’s error in [reviewing] the social study before the jurisdictional hearing goes so directly to the fairness of the hearing that the resulting adjudication is not saved by article VI, section 13, of the California Constitution.’ ” (In re Gladys R., supra, | 1 | 2 |
People v. Davisgreen1 sentence2025(Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 57; Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 534–535.) But the waiver must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633 .) It remains “an unsettled . . . question whether a waiver by defense counsel is effective.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 (Mendoza).) “At a minimum,” however, “there must be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing so.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 (Davis).) Failing to procure a valid waiver of a defendant’s ri | 1 | 1 |
People v. Mendozagreen1 sentence2025(Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 57; Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 534–535.) But the waiver must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633 .) It remains “an unsettled . . . question whether a waiver by defense counsel is effective.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 (Mendoza).) “At a minimum,” however, “there must be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing so.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 (Davis).) Failing to procure a valid waiver of a defendant’s ri | 1 | 1 |
Sarah Murphy v. Sfbsc Management, LLCgreen2 sentences2024The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has “never endorsed applying a broad presumption of fairness, but ha[s] actually required that courts do the opposite—by employing extra caution and more rigorous scrutiny—when it comes to settlements negotiated prior to class certification.” (SFBSC Management, supra, 944 F.3d at p. 1049 .) Many other federal courts have similarly demanded greater scrutiny of such settlements. 2024Because the court appeared to find certification appropriate on the ground that the settlement was fair, we 5 The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has questioned whether a presumption of fairness should ever apply under federal law, particularly given “Congress’ 2018 codification of standards for evaluating whether a proposed class settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’ ” (SFBSC Management, supra, 944 F.3d at p. 1049, fn. 12 [a presumption of unfairness “is very likely inappropriate under the standards now codified”].) 34 conclude that the court’s flawed presumption of fairness undermined bot | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Tejadagreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Bluetooth Headset Products Liabilitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Devlin v. Scardellettigreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. State of Alabamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. City of Hialeahgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilder v. Bernsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Lodge 93 of the Fraternal Order of Policegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Herrera v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| San Antonio Hispanic Police Officers' Organization, Inc. v. City of San Antoniogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ruth Durrett v. Housing Authority of the City of Providencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. State Of Oregongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education School District No. 205, and Rockford Education Association, Intervenors-Appellantsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ronald N. Ashley v. City of Jackson, Mississippigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Brennangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hemphill v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Bolgergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rice Growers Assn. v. First National Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 656623green | 1 | 1 |
| Research Corporation v. Asgrow Seed Company, Asgrow Seed Company International Asgrow Kilgore Company and United Hagie Hybrids, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
7-Eleven Owners For Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp.
green
2 sentences2022(See Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 129-130; 7-Eleven, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 .) Rather, trial courts consider the range of potential outcomes on such issues in the course of the broader fairness analysis. 2022(See Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 129-130; 7-Eleven, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 .) Rather, trial courts consider the range of potential outcomes on such issues in the course of the broader fairness analysis. | 5 | 2014–2022 |
Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022(See Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 129-130; 7-Eleven, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 .) Rather, trial courts consider the range of potential outcomes on such issues in the course of the broader fairness analysis. 2022(See Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 129-130; 7-Eleven, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 .) Rather, trial courts consider the range of potential outcomes on such issues in the course of the broader fairness analysis. | 3 | 2009–2022 |
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d 2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d | 3 | 2013–2017 |
Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner
green
2 sentences2022Code, § 456 [“If the trial court denies a request to take judicial notice of any matter, the court shall at the earliest practicable time so advise the parties and indicate for the record that it has denied the request”]; Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910 , 918–919.) 41 one of the recognized factors that has been held to be relevant to the fairness analysis. 2022Code, § 456 [“If the trial court denies a request to take judicial notice of any matter, the court shall at the earliest practicable time so advise the parties and indicate for the record that it has denied the request”]; Aaronoff v. Martinez-Senftner (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 910 , 918–919.) 41 one of the recognized factors that has been held to be relevant to the fairness analysis. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
green
2 sentences2022(See Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 478 .) In sum, Defendants have not presented a compelling case that the Missouri court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was unfair or unreasonable. 2022(See Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 478 .) In sum, Defendants have not presented a compelling case that the Missouri court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction was unfair or unreasonable. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Emerald Partners v. Berlin
green
2 sentences2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d 2017If a court cannot make the requisite determination as a matter of law on a pre-trial record, then it becomes necessary to hold a trial and evaluate each director's potential liability individually." ( Chen , supra , 87 A.3d at pp. 676-677.) Plaintiff's reliance on Emerging Communications is misplaced, because the transaction in that case (a " 'going private' acquisition of a corporation's minority stock by its majority stockholder") dictated the standard of review for entire fairness. ( Emerging Communications , supra , 2004 WL 1305745 at *9-10, 2004 LEXIS 70 at *35-36.) As the Delaware Suprem | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2017(Del. 1985) 493 A.2d 946 , 954 ( Unocal ).) Unless the board determines it is in the corporation's best interest to avoid a change in control, "obtaining the highest price for the benefit of the stockholders should [be] the central theme guiding director action." ( Revlon, supra , at p. 182.) "When shareholders challenge actions by a board of directors, generally one of three standards of judicial review is applied: the traditional business judgment rule, an intermediate standard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, or the entire fairness analysis." ( Emerald Partners v. Berlin (Del. 2001) 787 A.2d 2017Since we proceed from the starting point of the business judgment rule (or enhanced scrutiny in connection with actions taken when merger negotiations began, see Lyondell , supra , 970 A.2d at p. 242 ), invocation of McAfee's *275 section 102(b)(7) charter provision "can obviate a trial pursuant to the entire fairness standard, even if the presumption of the business judgment rule is successfully rebutted by a duty of care violation ...." ( Emerald Partners , supra , 787 A.2d at p. 92 .) Inasmuch as a breach of the independent directors' duty of care cannot serve as a basis for their personal | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Donkin v. Donkin
green
2 sentences2016Regardless how the no- contest clause is interpreted and enforced, Peter could not have violated that clause because he is not a will beneficiary. (§ 21310, subd. (c) [“ ‘No contest clause’ means a 6 Section 21315 creates a presumption regarding the applicability of the current law to instruments that became irrevocable after January 1, 2001, which is subject to a “fairness” exception codified in section 3, subdivision (h). ( Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 432-433.) That exception applies when “a party can show that a different result would obtain under the former law on which the transferor 2015That exception applies where “application of the former law would compel a different conclusion as to enforceability of a no contest clause and it is established that the trustor(s) of the trust instrument drafted the no contest clause in reliance on the former law.” (Donkin, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 416 .) Judge Cowan concluded the fairness exception was not applicable because the result would be the same under several of the public policy exceptions found in former section 21305, subdivision (b). | 2 | 2015–2016 |
Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015Clarke relies on Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 387, 395-396 , for the following exception to the general rule: "A class member who appears at a fairness hearing and objects to a settlement affecting that class member has standing to appeal an adverse decision notwithstanding the fact that the member did not formally intervene in the action." (Id. at p. 395.) 23 For at least two reasons, this authority does not help Clarke. 2006The appellate court easily batted that argument down: “A class member who appears at a fairness hearing and objects to a settlement affecting that class member has standing to appeal an adverse decision notwithstanding the fact that the member did not formally intervene in the action.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 395 .) *1207 Again, given that private-enforcement Proposition 65 actions are brought “in the public interest” (Health & Saf. | 2 | 2006–2015 |
Dunk v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2014(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subds. (d)-(g).) To approve the settlement, the court must determine that “‘the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’” (Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801 .) “[A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in simila 2014(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769, subds. (d)-(g).) To approve the settlement, the court must determine that “‘the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.’” (Dunk, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1801 .) “[A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in simila | 2 | 2014–2014 |
San Diego Police Officers' Ass'n v. San Diego City Employees' Retirement System
green
2 sentences2014The amount at stake in the prior litigation was not "nominal" In the prior litigation, the imposed change to the retiree health benefit involved a change in service eligibility that "established service qualifications of 10 years for a 100% benefit and 5 years for a 50% benefit." (SDPOA v. SDCERS, supra, 568 F.3d at p. 739 .) Dailey asserts that because a City employee cannot retire until he or she has at least 10 years of service, a 50 percent reduction in the retiree health benefit for police officers who only have five years of service would result in little to no impact on any member of th 2013The amount at stake in the prior litigation was not nominal In the prior litigation, the imposed change to the retiree health benefit involved a change in service eligibility that “established service qualifications *257 of 10 years for a 100% benefit and 5 years for a 50% benefit.” (San Diego Police Officers’ Assn., supra, 568 F.3d at p. 739 .) Dailey asserts that because a City employee cannot retire until he or she has at least 10 years of service, a 50 percent reduction in the retiree health benefit for police officers who only have five years of service would result in little to no impact | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013A. Fair Dealing Analysis An important factor in the fair dealing aspect of the entire fairness analysis is whether the transaction was an arm’s-length negotiation. “[A]rm’s-length negotiation provides ‘strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.’ [Citations.]” (Cinerama, supra, 663 A.2d at p. 1172 ; see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra, 457 A.2d at p. 711 [no fair dealing where, among other things, negotiations, were “modest at best”].) Here, as we have discussed above, the court specifically found an absence of arm’s- length negotiation. 2013A. Fair Dealing Analysis An important factor in the fair dealing aspect of the entire fairness analysis is whether the transaction was an arm’s-length negotiation. “[A]rm’s-length negotiation provides ‘strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.’ [Citations.]” (Cinerama, supra, 663 A.2d at p. 1172 ; see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., supra, 457 A.2d at p. 711 [no fair dealing where, among other things, negotiations, were “modest at best”].) Here, as we have discussed above, the court specifically found an absence of arm’s- length negotiation. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Cunningham
green
1 sentence2025(Basler, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 57; Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 534–535.) But the waiver must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 633 .) It remains “an unsettled . . . question whether a waiver by defense counsel is effective.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 899 (Mendoza).) “At a minimum,” however, “there must be some evidence that the defendant understood the right he was waiving and the consequences of doing so.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 532 (Davis).) Failing to procure a valid waiver of a defendant’s ri | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 534 [“[T]he defendant’s right to be present at this critical hearing is based not just on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; defendant’s presence significantly contributes to the fairness of the hearing as a matter of due process.”]; People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 , 59 [“Basler had state and federal constitutional rights to be personally present at his section 1170.95, subdivision (d) resentencing 8 hearing, or else provide a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights.”].) The Supreme Court in People v. Lewis (2021) | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Fedalizo
green
1 sentence2024Similarly, we reject his contention that he had a right to be personally present at the 2023 hearing. “[I]t is well established that a represented defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to be present to address purely legal questions or where his or her ‘presence would not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.’” (People v. Fedalizo (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 98, 109 .) No facts were disputed, and whether or not he was present would not have contributed to the fairness of the hearing. 23 III. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Watson
green
1 sentence2024(See People v. Quan, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 534 [“[T]he defendant’s right to be present at this critical hearing is based not just on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; defendant’s presence significantly contributes to the fairness of the hearing as a matter of due process.”]; People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46 , 59 [“Basler had state and federal constitutional rights to be personally present at his section 1170.95, subdivision (d) resentencing 8 hearing, or else provide a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights.”].) The Supreme Court in People v. Lewis (2021) | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Marriage of Tamraz
green
1 sentence2023The primary effects of entering the judgment nunc pro tunc were to establish a substantial arrearage in child support and recognize the husband’s unfulfilled obligation to account for the receipts from his law practice. ( Tamraz, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744–1745.) In this case, the purpose was even more compelling—to avoid compounding the tragedy of Judit’s unforeseen death with the injustice that would otherwise occur by distributing the community property of a couple who had been separated for more than six years, in contravention of the Agreement they reached before the traffic accide | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Anthony
green
1 sentence2023(People v James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 610; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156-1157 .) But the defendant’s right to be present at this critical hearing is based not just on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; the defendant’s presence significantly 11 contributes to the fairness of the hearing as a matter of due process. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Garibotti v. Hinkle green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Safety National Casualty Corp. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Kentucky v. Stincer green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Negrete v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Andersen v. Regents of the University of California green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Doe v. University of Southern California green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Paterno v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Villacorta v. Cemex Cement, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Birks green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In Re White green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| cluster 421653 green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Johnson v. Norman green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| cluster 777462 green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| cluster 345722 green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Local Number 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Laskey v. International Union green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| cluster 467507 green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re Harris green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.