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13 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2024July 20, 2022) (quoting Green, 238 A.3d at 176) (“[T]he mere fact that a post-conviction claim might bear some resemblance to a formerly adjudicated claim does not trigger Rule 61(i)(4)’s bar.”). 2024July 20, 2022) (quoting Green, 238 A.3d at 176) (“[T]he mere fact that a post-conviction claim might bear some resemblance to a formerly adjudicated claim does not trigger Rule 61(i)(4)’s bar.”). 9 accept the guilty plea in this case. | 4 | 4 |
Skinner v. Stategreen2 sentences2015R. 61(i)(1) (providing that an untimely motion may be considered when the movant asserts a newly recognized retroactively applicable right); Id. at (i)(4) (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered “in the interest of justice”); Id. at (i)(5) (providing that the procedural bars of (i)(1), (2) and (3) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation). 21 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990)). 9 motion for postconviction relief was timely filed 2014R. 61(i)(4) (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered "in the interest of justice"). "[A] defendant is not entitled to have a court re-exarnine an issue that has been previously resolved "simply because the claim is refined or restated."’ Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990)). 16 sane v. Maymz, 2014 WL 2537000 (Del. | 3 | 3 |
Riley v. Statered2 sentences2015R. 61(i)(1) (providing that an untimely motion may be considered when the movant asserts a newly recognized retroactively applicable right); Id. at (i)(4) (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered “in the interest of justice”); Id. at (i)(5) (providing that the procedural bars of (i)(1), (2) and (3) shall not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation). 21 Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990)). 9 motion for postconviction relief was timely filed 2014R. 61(i)(4) (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered "in the interest of justice"). "[A] defendant is not entitled to have a court re-exarnine an issue that has been previously resolved "simply because the claim is refined or restated."’ Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del. 1990)). 16 sane v. Maymz, 2014 WL 2537000 (Del. | 3 | 3 |
Weedon v. Stategreen2 sentences2015R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (permitting reconsideration of a formerly adjudicated claim “in the interest of justice”). 20 Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527 (Del. 2000) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990)). 21 Evans v. State, 77 A.3d 271 (Del. 2013) (“We reject Evans‟ contention that Martinez v. Ryan required the Superior Court to consider the merits of his formerly adjudicated claims.”). 22 See Weedon, 750 A.2d at 528 (discussing the scope of the “interests of justice” exception); see also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 986 (Del. 2014) (discussing the distinction between the “intere 2015R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (permitting reconsideration of a formerly adjudicated claim “in the interest of justice”). 20 Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527 (Del. 2000) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990)). 21 Evans v. State, 77 A.3d 271 (Del. 2013) (“We reject Evans‟ contention that Martinez v. Ryan required the Superior Court to consider the merits of his formerly adjudicated claims.”). 22 See Weedon, 750 A.2d at 528 (discussing the scope of the “interests of justice” exception); see also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 986 (Del. 2014) (discussing the distinction between the “intere | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Stategreen1 sentence2023When cross-examining Campbell, Kanu’s roommate at the time of the crime, Trial Counsel attempted to introduce the fact that drug paraphernalia was found in Campbell’s room, but upon the State’s objection, the Court ruled that evidence was “too far afield.”202 After the Court took a recess for the day, Trial Counsel reargued that she should be allowed to “call in the officer who actually found those materials.”203 The Court repeated that the drug paraphernalia evidence was too far afield and failed under D.R.E. 403.204 Furthermore, the Due Process claim embedded within Appiah’s ineffective assi | 1 | 1 |
Malloy v. Stategreen1 sentence2022R. 61(i)(1), (m)(2). 76 Malloy v. State, 2011 WL 1135107, at *2 (Del. Mar. 28, 2011). 77 238 A.3d 160 (Del. 2020). 78 See State v. Thompson, 2022 WL 1744242 , at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2022). 79 Green, 238 A.3d at 176. 14 default rule reserving those claims for post-conviction proceedings.80 The Supreme Court thus cautioned: “the mere fact that a post-conviction claim might bear some resemblance to a formerly adjudicated claim does not trigger Rule 61(i)(4)’s bar.”81 Put differently, the Supreme Court in Green ruled that a prior adjudication of the error underlying an ineffective assistan | 1 | 1 |
Flamer v. Stategreen1 sentence2015R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (permitting reconsideration of a formerly adjudicated claim “in the interest of justice”). 20 Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527 (Del. 2000) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990)). 21 Evans v. State, 77 A.3d 271 (Del. 2013) (“We reject Evans‟ contention that Martinez v. Ryan required the Superior Court to consider the merits of his formerly adjudicated claims.”). 22 See Weedon, 750 A.2d at 528 (discussing the scope of the “interests of justice” exception); see also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 986 (Del. 2014) (discussing the distinction between the “intere | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Piercegreen1 sentence2015R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered in the “interest of justice”). 15 Woods v. Pierce, 967 F.Supp.2d 1013, 1029 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Stategreen1 sentence2015R. 61(i)(4) (2013) (permitting reconsideration of a formerly adjudicated claim “in the interest of justice”). 20 Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521, 527 (Del. 2000) (quoting Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990)). 21 Evans v. State, 77 A.3d 271 (Del. 2013) (“We reject Evans‟ contention that Martinez v. Ryan required the Superior Court to consider the merits of his formerly adjudicated claims.”). 22 See Weedon, 750 A.2d at 528 (discussing the scope of the “interests of justice” exception); see also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 986 (Del. 2014) (discussing the distinction between the “intere | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Younger v. State
green
2 sentences2014We also encourage Brown to be mindful of subsection (j) of Rule 61.24 21 See id. (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be reconsidered in the interest of justice). 2014Ct. R. 61(i)(4) (barring a formerly adjudicated claim). 11 Id. (providing that a formerly adjudicated claim may be considered “in the interest of justice”). “[A] defendant is not entitled to have a court re-examine an issue that has been previously resolved “simply because the claim is refined or restated.’” Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del.1992) (quoting Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 721 (Del.1990)). 5 counsel claims, are without merit for the reasons provided in the Commissioner’s report as adopted by the Superior Court.12 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Supe | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Cabrera v. State
green
1 sentence2015Cabrera maintains that if the State had disclosed the Patterned Belt Buckle-Injury Presentation and Mathis at the time the Trial Court ordered disclosure, then Cabrera Trial Counsel could have formulated a defense strategy that took the entirety of the State’s Patterned Belt Buckle-Injury Presentation and Mathis testimony into consideration. 199 Id. at 1263–65. 63 Cabrera’s claim is merely a renewal of a formerly adjudicated claim and is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Evans v. State
green
1 sentence2014Those claims, therefore, are defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3) unless Evans can demonstrate that an exception to the procedural bar should apply.13 On appeal, Evans has not demonstrated that either claim warrants review because of a constitutional violation so substantial that it constitutes a “miscarriage of justice” undermining the “fundamental legality . . . or fairness” of Evans’ conviction under Rule 61(i)(5)14 or a newly recognized retroactively applicable right under Rule 61(i)(1).15 Delaware law does not require the court to give a voluntariness instruction after the court has found a defe | 1 | 2014–2014 |