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8 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valdes v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076 ; see also Brown v. State, 189 So. 3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ("Because appellant was charged and convicted under two separate statutes, the degree variant exception does not apply."). 2022See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076 (“It is not necessary for the Legislature to use the word ‘degree’ in defining the crime in order for the degree variant exception to apply. | 4 | 6 |
Wilfred A. Brown v. State of Floridagreen2 sentences2025See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076 ; see also Brown v. State, 189 So. 3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ("Because appellant was charged and convicted under two separate statutes, the degree variant exception does not apply."). 2018See Brown v. State, 189 So. 3d 837, 840 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015). | 2 | 2 |
MICHAEL ANGUILLE v. STATE OF FLORIDAgreen1 sentence2022The lone difference between the two offenses, as Judge Emas explained below, is the final aggravating conduct—the seriousness of the resulting harm, which “when viewed in the context of section 316.193, most clearly establishes that the instant offenses meet the degree-variant exception and compels the conclusion that felony DUI serious bodily injury and DUI bodily injury/property damage are merely aggravated forms of the basic DUI offense.” Velazco, 305 So. 3d at 87-88 (Emas, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Anguille, 243 So. 3d at 415 (“The separation of the enhance | 1 | 1 |
State v. Reardongreen2 sentences2018Section 775.021(4)(b)2. prohibits multiple convictions and sentences for “[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute.” (Emphasis added.) Tambriz-Ramirez’s argument here fails because burglary, assault, and sexual battery are not different degrees of “the same offense.” See Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1076 (holding that the degree-variant exception applies “only when the statute itself provides for an offense with multiple degrees”); State v. Reardon, 763 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“[T]he two offenses [burglary with a battery and aggravated battery] are not degree 2018Section 775.021(4)(b) 2. prohibits multiple convictions and sentences for "[o]ffenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute ." (Emphasis added.) Tambriz-Ramirez's argument here fails because burglary, assault, and sexual battery are not different degrees of "the same offense." See Valdes , 3 So.3d at 1076 (holding that the degree-variant exception applies "only when the statute itself provides *1096 for an offense with multiple degrees"); State v. Reardon , 763 So.2d 418 , 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) ("[T]he two offenses [burglary with a battery and aggravated battery] are n | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paulred2 sentences2018In Valdes, we held that section 775.021(4)(b)2. “prohibits separate punishments only when a criminal statute provides for variations in degree of the same offense, so that the defendant would be punished for violating two or more degrees of a single offense.” 3 So. 3d at 1076 (quoting State v. Paul, 934 So. 2d 1167, 1177 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., specially concurring)). 2018In Valdes , we held that section 775.021(4)(b) 2. "prohibits separate punishments only when a criminal statute provides for variations in degree of the same offense, so that the defendant would be punished for violating two or more degrees of a single offense." 3 So.3d at 1076 (quoting State v. Paul , 934 So.2d 1167 , 1177 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., specially concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Floridared2 sentences2006Last year, in State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941 (Fla.2005), following Gordon , we held that two crimes could be punished separately because each had its own "primary evil." Id. at 949. 2006Last year, in State v. Florida, 894 So.2d 941 (Fla.2005), following Gordon , we held that two crimes could be punished separately because each had its own "primary evil." Id. at 949. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gibbs v. State
green
1 sentence2006Thus, "if prosecution is for the same conduct under both statutes, a conviction under more than one of the statutes is a violation of double jeopardy principles." Id. at 1210 . [5] I do not mean to imply that the Legislature must use the magic word "degree" in defining the crime in order for the degree-variant exception to apply. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gordon v. State
red
2 sentences2006They were right. [6] In Gordon, 780 So.2d at 17 , we even revived Carawan's language, refusing to apply the degree-variant exception because "the separate evils [of the crimes] are sufficiently distinct that they warrant separate punishment." Id. at 23 . 2006They were right. [6] In Gordon, 780 So.2d at 17 , we even revived Carawan's language, refusing to apply the degree-variant exception because "the separate evils [of the crimes] are sufficiently distinct that they warrant separate punishment." Id. at 23 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.