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8 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Luis Born-Suniaga v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2024Ironically, over thirty years ago we specifically removed, as antithetical to the rule’s purpose, the very remedy of immediate discharge that the majority writes back in with its anti-textual “interpretation.” Born-Suniaga v. State, 256 So. 3d 783, 791 (Fla. 2018) (Lawson, J., dissenting) (citing Fla. R. | 1 | 1 |
Cann v. CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICESgreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., Cann v. Dep’t of Children and Family Services, 813 So.2d 237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (noting that the five-day mailing extension provided under Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.103 did not apply where the agency notice required a response within a specific time period); cf. Bell v. U.S.B. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 593 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1994This result is rendered no less than self-evident (a) by the express terms of the rule, which applies only to "person[s] charged with a crime by indictment or information, " Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1); (b) by the fact that the trial court, in the absence of a charging document, had no jurisdiction over the cause so that the motion for discharge must be deemed a nullity, see State v. Anderson, 537 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1980) [sic]; and (c) by the common sense of the situation: the state can hardly be required to bring a defendant to trial in a case which does not conceptually or actually even exist. 1991This result is rendered no less than self-evident (a) by the express terms of the rule, which applies only to "person[s] charged with a crime by indictment or information," Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1); (b) by the fact that the trial court, in the absence of a charging document, had no jurisdiction over the cause so that the motion for discharge must be *1370 deemed a nullity, see State v. Anderson, 537 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1980); and (c) by the common sense of the situation: the state can hardly be required to bring a defendant to trial in a case which does not conceptually or actually even exist. | 2 | 1991–1994 |
PALM BEACH CTY. SCHOOL BD. v. Miller-Neal
green
1 sentence1996In relying upon the language of the above rule, the E/C cites Palm Beach County School Board v. Miller-Neal, 674 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Florida v. Buford
green
2 sentences1988Batie's claim to the contrary is predicated on our holding in Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 , 102 S.Ct. 1037 , 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982), that death is not a permitted punishment for a conviction of sexual battery because it would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime. 1988Batie's claim to the contrary is predicated on our holding in Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 , 102 S.Ct. 1037 , 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982), that death is not a permitted punishment for a conviction of sexual battery because it would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Buford v. State
green
1 sentence1988Batie's claim to the contrary is predicated on our holding in Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 , 102 S.Ct. 1037 , 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982), that death is not a permitted punishment for a conviction of sexual battery because it would be cruel and unusual punishment for the crime. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. White
green
1 sentence1987We noted that the right to appeal was found within the express terms of rule 3.850 which provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for writ of habeas corpus." 470 So.2d at 1378 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.