correction error in Utah

2012See Morton Int'l, 814 P.2d at 587-88 ("[The term 'erroneous' connotes a correction-of-error standard ...."); see also Esquivel, 2000 UT 66, ¶ 14 , 7 P.3d 777 .

2007Id. at 1291. '' 'Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a statutory term.' '' Id. at 1286 (quoting Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 ). 113 McGee argues that the Commission must be afforded discretion in interpreting and applying Utah Code section 34A-2-413 because the statute both explicitly and implicitly grants such discretion.

1993We then concluded that because constitutional challenges under subsection (4)(a) constitute general law questions, and because we had previously determined that general law questions are subject to correction of error review, Savage Indus, v. Tax Comm’n, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991), constitutional challenges would likewise be reviewed under a correction of error standard.

1993D.Subsection (4)(d) We decided in Savage that under subsection (4)(d), just as under pre-UAPA law, a correction of error standard applies to appellate review of agency interpretations of “general law,” also described as those laws that the “appellate court is as well suited to decide ... as is the agency.” 811 P.2d at 668 .

2005Servs., 658 P.2d at 608; see also Employers’ Reinsurance Fund v. Industrial Comm’n, 856 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah Ct.App.1993).

1992Id.

1999This fairness argument is intertwined with his mens rea argument, as defendant goes on to argue that “[p]articularly where the trial court imposed no burden on the prosecution to establish that the defendant was aware or should have been aware that the victim was under age, it would be manifestly unjust to permit the felony conviction to stand.” ¶ 13 We review the trial court’s legal conclusion that the Shondel doctrine does not apply to this case “under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court’s ruling.” State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah Ct.App

1999This fairness argument is intertwined with his *305 mens rea argument, as defendant goes on to argue that "[p]articularly where the trial court imposed no burden on the prosecution to establish that the defendant was aware or should have been aware that the victim was under age, it would be manifestly unjust to permit the felony conviction to stand." ¶ 13 We review the trial court's legal conclusion that the Shondel doctrine does not apply to this case "under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah C

1993Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

1993Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070 .

2012However, embedded in Barron's argument is a claim that the Commission made an error of law in interpreting the statutory presumption. "[Albsent a grant of discretion, an agency's interpretation or application of statutory terms should be reviewed under the correction-of-error standard." Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, ¶ 14 , 7 P.3d 777 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-408(4)(d) (2011).

2012However, embedded in Barron's argument is a claim that the Commission made an error of law in interpreting the statutory presumption. "[Albsent a grant of discretion, an agency's interpretation or application of statutory terms should be reviewed under the correction-of-error standard." Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, ¶ 14 , 7 P.3d 777 ; see also Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-408(4)(d) (2011).

2011In Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court announced a three-tier approach to review the imposition of rule 11 sanctions: "(1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, ¶ 10 , 973 P.2d 422 (citing Sutliff, 846 P.2d at 1234-35 ).

2011In Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court announced a three-tier approach to review the imposition of rule 11 sanctions: "(1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard; and (3) the type and amount of sanction to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, ¶ 10 , 973 P.2d 422 (citing Sutliff, 846 P.2d at 1234-35 ).

1994In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), recognizing a bifurcated standard of review of a trial court's determination of voluntary consent, the supreme court held that deference is to be given to findings of fact, but that ultimate conclusions of law are to be reviewed under a correction of error standard.

1993See id. (“each new opinion narrows the universe of unsettled questions”); see also Richardson, 843 P.2d at 524-25 (Bench, P.J., concurring) (if injustice occurs because of disparate treatment of similar facts by different trial courts, “the field of inquiry should be restricted by adjusting the governing law”). *476 We do not, however, apply the correction-of-error standard to every aspect of a trial court’s finding of ultimate fact.

2007STANDARD OF REVIEW 113 We review the legal determinations of the Labor Commission Appeals Board under a correction-of-error standard, ceding the board no deference as appellate courts have "the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted).

1998“Under the correction-of-error standard, this court affords no deference to the agency’s interpretation or application of statutory terms.” Allred, 914 P.2d at 1174 . *345 Whether the Board erred in.refusing to revoke EG & G’s permit in light of accidents and mishaps at TOCDF involves the Board’s application of law to fact, see Drake v. Industrial Comm’n, 939 P.2d 177 , 181 & n. 6 (Utah 1997); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-939 (Utah 1994), subject to the intermediate standard of review we discussed above.

2014"Our review under the Shondel rule focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah Ct.App.1997).

2009Review under the Shondel doctrine "focuses on the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review under a correction-of-error standard, according no particular deference to the trial court's ruling." State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 8 Second, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to send the case to the jury on the more serious charge of attempted sodomy on a child.

2002Further, Lester challenges the trial court's causation instruction, arguing that "it was the functional equivalent of an accomplice liability instruction." 1 "Determining the propriety of the instructions submitted to the jury presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court's instructions under a correction of error standard." Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah Ct.App.1998).

1997The determination of the propriety of a trial court’s communication with a jury during deliberations is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard, and the trial court will be reversed only if the error is “substantial or prejudicial ... such that the result would have been different had it not taken place.” Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979); accord Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah.Ct.App.1993).

1992However, we review the trial court's legal conclusions in regards thereto under a correction of error standard.” State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah App.1992) (citing State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991)).

1992“However, as for the trial court’s legal conclusions in regards thereto, the correction of error standard applies.” Steward, 806 P.2d at 215 (citation omitted).

2019“When a trial court bases its ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of defendant’s Miranda rights, upon essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of an officer’s colloquy with defendant, its conclusions present questions of law which we review under a correction of error standard.” State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified). ¶17 Second, Smith asserts that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of compulsion. “[W]e review a court’s ruling on a proposed jury instruction for correctness . . .

2018"When a [district] court bases its ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of [a] defendant's Miranda rights, upon essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of an officer's colloquy with [the] defendant, its conclusions present questions of law which we review under a correction of error standard." State v. Gutierrez , 864 P.2d 894 , 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotation simplified). ¶12 Gardner also contends the district court exceeded its discretion when it rejected "the plea agreement reached by the parties." Gardner asserts that this issue was preserved below when the cou

1994State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah App.1992).

1994State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah App.1992).

1997“As we did prior to UAPA, we review agency interpretations of general law ‘under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency’s decision.’ ” King v. Industrial Comm’n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah.Ct.App.1993) (quoting Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991)).

1993As we did prior to UAPA, we review agency interpretations of general law “under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the agency’s decision.” Questar Pipeline Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991).

2003The findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous," and "we review [the] trial court's conclusions of law under a correction of error standard." Id. at 139 (quotations and citations omitted). *1018 "11 The Grobergs next argue, for the first time on appeal, that HOI breached its contractual duty to sell house two for $138,000.

1992Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989); accord Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

1997STANDARD OF REVIEW On our review of the Commission’s formal adjudicative proceedings, we “grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue.” Utah Code Ann. § 59 -l-610(l)(b) (1996); see also Cache County v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 922 P.2d 758, 763 (Utah 1996).

1997Supreme Court shall ... grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 ; see also Cache County v. Property Tax Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 922 P.2d 758, 763 (Utah 1996).

1994State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah App.1992).

1994State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Utah 1991); Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah App.1992).

1992On the other hand, “absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statutory term.” Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 ; see also Mor-Flo Indus, v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App.1991).

1992Where there exists a grant of discretion, “we will not disturb the Board’s application of its factual findings to the law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.” Pro-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah App.1989). “[Ajbsent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-error standard is used in reviewing an agency’s interpretation or application of a statutory term.” Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 ; see also Mor-Flo Indus. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328, 330 (Utah App.1991).

1997“Whether certain evidence is relevant ... is a question of law, which we review under a correction-of-error standard.” State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct.App.1991).

1997"Whether certain evidence is relevant... is a question of law, which we review under a correction-of-error standard." State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct.App.1991).

1998We review the conclusion “as to whether society is ‘willing to recognize the individual’s expectation of privacy as legitimate’ ... under a correction of error standard.” Id. (quoting United States v. McBean, 861 F.2d 1570 , 1573 n. 7 (11th Cir.1988)).

1992We "review the ultimate conclusions drawn from those findings as a matter of law, under a correction of error standard, affording no deference to the trial court." State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App.1991).

1993However, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions in regards thereto under a correction of error standard.” State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah App.1992) (quoting State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah App.1992)).

1992However, we review the trial court's legal conclusions in regards thereto under a correction of error standard.” State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah App.1992) (citing State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991)).

1991Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 , (Utah 1989).

1989See, e.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) ("rulings of a trial court regarding statutory construction are not entitled to particular deference."); Forbes v. St.