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20 California opinions name it 2 courts 1864–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Beckergreen2 sentences1976(People v. Becker, 80 Cal.App.2d 691, 695 [ 181 P.2d 958 ].)” An order for the correction of such an error may be.made by a reviewing: court (People v. Crittenden, 14 Cal.App.2d 589, 593 [ 58 P.2d 680 ]). 1976(People v. Becker, 80 Cal.App.2d 691, 695 [ 181 P.2d 958 ].)” An order for the correction of such an error may be.made by a reviewing: court (People v. Crittenden, 14 Cal.App.2d 589, 593 [ 58 P.2d 680 ]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Crittendengreen2 sentences1976(People v. Becker, 80 Cal.App.2d 691, 695 [ 181 P.2d 958 ].)” An order for the correction of such an error may be.made by a reviewing: court (People v. Crittenden, 14 Cal.App.2d 589, 593 [ 58 P.2d 680 ]). 1976(People v. Becker, 80 Cal.App.2d 691, 695 [ 181 P.2d 958 ].)” An order for the correction of such an error may be.made by a reviewing: court (People v. Crittenden, 14 Cal.App.2d 589, 593 [ 58 P.2d 680 ]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2025(See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“ ‘It is not open to question that a court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts.’ ”].) Nor has Eric demonstrated he was prejudiced by the typographical error on the special verdict form or the correction of the error. | 1 | 1 |
Sea World, Inc. v. County of San Diegogreen2 sentences2006Rev. & Tax.Code (1998 ed.) foll. § 51.5., p. 24, italics added.) Section 51.5 was enacted in response to Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 1174 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 285 ( Dreyer's ). ( Sea World, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1399, fn. 13 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 194 ( Sea World ).) Dreyer's involved "escape assessments" [3] and "whether the four-year statutory bar prescribed for escape assessments begins to run from the time when the base year value of the property was originally determined under Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. 2006Rev. & Tax.Code (1998 ed.) foll. § 51.5., p. 24, italics added.) Section 51.5 was enacted in response to Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 1174 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 285 ( Dreyer's ). ( Sea World, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1399, fn. 13 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 194 ( Sea World ).) Dreyer's involved "escape assessments" [3] and "whether the four-year statutory bar prescribed for escape assessments begins to run from the time when the base year value of the property was originally determined under Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Faresgreen2 sentences1993To paraphrase the court in People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 957 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 ], we are disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of error in the abstract of judgment has required the formal appellate process. 1993To paraphrase the court in People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 957 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 ], we are disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of error in the abstract of judgment has required the formal appellate process. | 1 | 1 |
Ariana v. Parkergreen2 sentences1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not 1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not | 1 | 1 |
Brewer v. Second Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not 1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Roathgreen2 sentences1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not 1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not | 1 | 1 |
Mears v. Mearsgreen2 sentences1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not 1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not | 1 | 1 |
Swall v. Andersongreen2 sentences1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not 1968As we said in Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 [ 197 P.2d 713 ] : “The appellate courts have power to order a retrial on a limited issue, if that issue can be separately tried without such confusion or uncertainty as would amount to a denial of a fair trial.” We further pointed out, “The issue of exemplary damages is separate and distinct from that of actual damages, for they are assessed to punish the defendant and not to compensate for any loss suffered by the plaintiff.” (Italics added.) Other cases illustrating the principle that acceptance of the benefits does not | 1 | 1 |
Kyne v. Eusticegreen2 sentences1964Appellants have not shown that they suffered any prejudice thereby and furthermore, their failure to call this irregularity to the attention of the trial court permitting a correction of the error, constitutes a waiver of the section (Kyne v. Eustice, 215 Cal.App.2d 627, 635 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 391 ].) Judgment reversed. 1964Appellants have not shown that they suffered any prejudice thereby and furthermore, their failure to call this irregularity to the attention of the trial court permitting a correction of the error, constitutes a waiver of the section (Kyne v. Eustice, 215 Cal.App.2d 627, 635 [ 30 Cal.Rptr. 391 ].) Judgment reversed. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shortsgreen2 sentences1961Its objective is not the correction of error, the enforcement of legal right, or the reversal of the trial court; it seeks only groundless delay, and to that extent defeat of justice, in the execution of a valid final judgment.” (People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502, 517 [ 197 P.2d 330 ]; Williams v. Duffy (1948), 32 Cal.2d 578, 583 [ 197 P.2d 341 ].) Inasmuch as no appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 1239 of the Penal Code is pending, the final judgment of death, which has been affirmed by this court, is one which for a “reason other than the pendency of an appeal pursuant to subd 1961Its objective is not the correction of error, the enforcement of legal right, or the reversal of the trial court; it seeks only groundless delay, and to that extent defeat of justice, in the execution of a valid final judgment.” (People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502, 517 [ 197 P.2d 330 ]; Williams v. Duffy (1948), 32 Cal.2d 578, 583 [ 197 P.2d 341 ].) Inasmuch as no appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 1239 of the Penal Code is pending, the final judgment of death, which has been affirmed by this court, is one which for a “reason other than the pendency of an appeal pursuant to subd | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Duffygreen2 sentences1961Its objective is not the correction of error, the enforcement of legal right, or the reversal of the trial court; it seeks only groundless delay, and to that extent defeat of justice, in the execution of a valid final judgment.” (People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502, 517 [ 197 P.2d 330 ]; Williams v. Duffy (1948), 32 Cal.2d 578, 583 [ 197 P.2d 341 ].) Inasmuch as no appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 1239 of the Penal Code is pending, the final judgment of death, which has been affirmed by this court, is one which for a “reason other than the pendency of an appeal pursuant to subd 1961Its objective is not the correction of error, the enforcement of legal right, or the reversal of the trial court; it seeks only groundless delay, and to that extent defeat of justice, in the execution of a valid final judgment.” (People v. Shorts (1948), 32 Cal.2d 502, 517 [ 197 P.2d 330 ]; Williams v. Duffy (1948), 32 Cal.2d 578, 583 [ 197 P.2d 341 ].) Inasmuch as no appeal pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 1239 of the Penal Code is pending, the final judgment of death, which has been affirmed by this court, is one which for a “reason other than the pendency of an appeal pursuant to subd | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smithgreen1 sentence1948Code, § 1248; People v. Smith (1933), supra, 218 Cal. 484, 487, 489 ; People v. Shorts (1948), supra, ante, pp. 502, 517.) As in the Shorts case (ante, p. 517), “Its objective is not the correction of error, the enforcement of legal right, or the reversal of the trial court; it seeks only groundless delay, and to that extent defeat of justice, in the execution of a valid final judgment. ’ ’ For the reasons above stated petitioner’s motion for stay of execution is denied; respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal is granted; the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Flores
green
2 sentences2015II DISCUSSION Penal Code section 987.8, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part: “In any case in which a defendant is provided legal assistance, either through the public defender or private counsel appointed by the court, upon conclusion of the criminal proceedings in the trial court, . . . the court may, after notice and a hearing, make a determination of the present ability of the defendant to pay all or a portion of the cost thereof. . . .” (Italics added.) If the court orders the payment of attorney fees without affording the defendant a hearing on his or her ability to pay, the appel 2013The time limit “was not intended to limit the authority of an appellate court to remand a case to the trial court for the correction of its error in failing to give a defendant the notice and hearing required by the statute.” (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1068 .) We see no basis to relieve defendant of his forfeiture and remand the case for an assessment of defendant’s ability to pay. | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Chouteau v. Gibson
neutral
2 sentences1936“The judgment is none the less a bar for the reason that it was erroneous. ‘In passing upon the plea of res judicata, the question is not whether a court decided the point involved right or wrong, but the question is, Did the court decide the point and is the decision final. ’ (Chouteau v. Gibson, 76 Mo. 38 .) By failing to appeal and seek a correction of the error through a reversal of the judgment, it is as conclusive upon the plaintiff as if at the trial he had omitted to present sufficient evidence to the court in support of his demand.” There appears to be no doubt that the claim of $9,50 1904“In passing upon the plea of res judicata, the question is not whether a court decided the point involved right or wrong, but the question is, Did the court decide the point and is the decision final?” (Chouteau, v. Gibson, 76 Mo. 38 .) By failing to appeal and seek a correction of the error through a reversal of the judgment, it is as conclusive upon the plaintiff as if at the trial he had omitted to present sufficient evidence to the court in support of his demand. | 2 | 1904–1936 |
People v. Chism
green
1 sentence2020(People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1308 .) Having done neither, defendant has forfeited the claim on appeal. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Prescott
green
1 sentence2015However, as the Attorney General duly notes, the “preferred solution . . . is to remand the case for a new hearing on the matter. [Citations.]” (People v. Prescott (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1476 .) We agree. 3 III DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed as to the $200 attorney fee order and the trial court is directed to hold a noticed hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 987.8, subdivision (b). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Truong v. Nguyen
green
1 sentence2014However, “documents and facts that were not presented to the trial court and which are not part of the record on appeal, cannot be considered on appeal. [Citation.]” (Truong v. Nguyen (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 865, 882 .) Defendant further argues that the judgment should be reversed because Schoop made the correction in violation of requirements contained in the Los Angeles Police Department Manual that corrections be made by drawing a line through the error, accompanied by the initials 5 “VCC” (“Violator‟s copy corrected”), and the initials of the citing officer. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Alameda
green
2 sentences2006Rev. & Tax.Code (1998 ed.) foll. § 51.5., p. 24, italics added.) Section 51.5 was enacted in response to Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 1174 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 285 ( Dreyer's ). ( Sea World, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1399, fn. 13 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 194 ( Sea World ).) Dreyer's involved "escape assessments" [3] and "whether the four-year statutory bar prescribed for escape assessments begins to run from the time when the base year value of the property was originally determined under Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. 2006Rev. & Tax.Code (1998 ed.) foll. § 51.5., p. 24, italics added.) Section 51.5 was enacted in response to Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Alameda (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 1174 , 224 Cal.Rptr. 285 ( Dreyer's ). ( Sea World, Inc. v. County of San Diego (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1399, fn. 13 , 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 194 ( Sea World ).) Dreyer's involved "escape assessments" [3] and "whether the four-year statutory bar prescribed for escape assessments begins to run from the time when the base year value of the property was originally determined under Proposition 13 (Cal. Const., art. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Van Hoosear v. Railroad Commission
green
2 sentences1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Town of Santa Monica v. Eckert
neutral
2 sentences1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Hayes v. Board of Trustees
neutral
2 sentences1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Hill v. Superior Court
neutral
1 sentence1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Commercial Bank of Spanish America, Ltd. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 1927Assuming that acts alleged to be violative of the injunction were committed by petitioner, whether it acted as the agent or servant of the parties enjoined or in collusion with them or, as claimed, in the exercise of a paramount right to divert and distribute the waters of the stream, are questions which the trial court is empowered to determine. *5 A writ of prohibition does not lie to prevent a subordinate court from deciding erroneously, but the party aggrieved will be left to pursue the ordinary remedies for the correction of error (Van Hoosear v. Railroad Com., 189 Cal. 228 [ 207 Pac. 903 | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Ten'broeck v. . Orchard
green
1 sentence1920(Ten Broeck v. Orchard, 79 N. C. 518 .) , The relief actually awarded plaintiff under the original count is so radically different from that which should have been awarded under the amended complaint that we feel the plaintiff was aggrieved thereby. | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Short v. Frink
green
2 sentences1910He is not an aggrieved party in such sense that he needs or can obtain a correction of the error.” This was said by Judge Temple in an opinion holding that “Unless some very restricted meaning can be given to the amendment to section 475, it is plainly unconstitutional.” There is still a presumption of prejudice *161 arising from error (Short v. Frink, 151 Cal. 83 , [ 90 Pac. 200 ], citing Rulofson v. Billings, 140 Cal. 452 , [ 75 Pac. 35 ], and other cases), but the court has not hesitated to say, since as well as before the amendment to section 475, that the error is without prejudice when i 1910He is not an aggrieved party in such sense that he needs or can obtain a correction of the error.” This was said by Judge Temple in an opinion holding that “Unless some very restricted meaning can be given to the amendment to section 475, it is plainly unconstitutional.” There is still a presumption of prejudice *161 arising from error (Short v. Frink, 151 Cal. 83 , [ 90 Pac. 200 ], citing Rulofson v. Billings, 140 Cal. 452 , [ 75 Pac. 35 ], and other cases), but the court has not hesitated to say, since as well as before the amendment to section 475, that the error is without prejudice when i | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Monier v. Clark
green
1 sentence1910He is not an aggrieved party in such sense that he needs or can obtain a correction of the error.” This was said by Judge Temple in an opinion holding that “Unless some very restricted meaning can be given to the amendment to section 475, it is plainly unconstitutional.” There is still a presumption of prejudice *161 arising from error (Short v. Frink, 151 Cal. 83 , [ 90 Pac. 200 ], citing Rulofson v. Billings, 140 Cal. 452 , [ 75 Pac. 35 ], and other cases), but the court has not hesitated to say, since as well as before the amendment to section 475, that the error is without prejudice when i | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Rulofson v. Billings
green
1 sentence1910He is not an aggrieved party in such sense that he needs or can obtain a correction of the error.” This was said by Judge Temple in an opinion holding that “Unless some very restricted meaning can be given to the amendment to section 475, it is plainly unconstitutional.” There is still a presumption of prejudice *161 arising from error (Short v. Frink, 151 Cal. 83 , [ 90 Pac. 200 ], citing Rulofson v. Billings, 140 Cal. 452 , [ 75 Pac. 35 ], and other cases), but the court has not hesitated to say, since as well as before the amendment to section 475, that the error is without prejudice when i | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Collins v. . Bennett
green
1 sentence1904(Collins v. Bennett, 46 N. Y. 490 ; Davis v. Tallcot, 12 N. Y. 184 ; Caldwells. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Davis v. . Tallcot green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
| Fanning v. Leviston neutral | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| People ex rel. Fries v. Supervisors of Marin Cty. neutral | 1 | 1864–1864 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.