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8 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goodman v. Goodmangreen1 sentence2024See Goodman v. Goodman, 797 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (noting the general rule that “a party does not have to invade the principal of non-marital assets in order to support a spouse at a standard of living never achieved during the marriage”). | 1 | 1 |
Casto v. Castogreen1 sentence2021The first ground, which is applicable here, requires the challenging spouse to establish “fraud, duress, coercion, mispresenting or over-reaching.” Casto v. Casto, 508 So. 2d 330, 333 (Fla. 1987) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of Hollettgreen2 sentences2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it 2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it | 1 | 1 |
Kellar v. Estate of Kellargreen2 sentences2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it 2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Bakergreen2 sentences2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it 2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it | 1 | 1 |
Hahn v. Hahngreen1 sentence1995See Hahn v. Hahn, 595 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Wife's claim for battery was viable in a dissolution proceeding); In re Jaquis, 131 B.R. 1004 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1991) (Spouse's claim for infliction of genital herpes allowed in a dissolution proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
Propst v. Neilygreen1 sentence1991According to Propst v. Neily, 467 So.2d 398, 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985): [G]iven the predicate of injury to one spouse, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that the other spouse has a claim for loss of consortium. | 1 | 1 |
Sokol v. Sokolgreen1 sentence1985See Sokol v. Sokol, 441 So.2d 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Albritton v. ST. FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. CO.
green
2 sentences1991In addition to the underlying injury, the spouse claiming loss of consortium "must present competent testimony concerning the impact which the accident had on the marital relationship and, more specifically, evidence concerning [the] loss of consortium." [ Albritton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 382 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980).] I would affirm as to all issues. 1985In addition to the underlying injury, the spouse claiming loss of consortium "must present competent testimony concerning the impact which the accident had on the marital relationship and, more specifically, evidence concerning [the] loss of consortium." Id. | 2 | 1985–1991 |
Flannery's Estate
green
1 sentence2013See In re Estate of Hollett, 150 N.H. 39 , 834 A.2d 348, 353 (2003) (declining to consider “the wife’s delay in challenging the agreement as substantive evidence of the agreement’s voluntariness or ratification”); In re Flannery’s Estate, 315 Pa. 576 , 173 A. 303 , 304 (1934) (holding that laches did not bar a wife from challenging the prenuptial agreement during marriage and noting that in litigation between spouses “presumptions or estoppels by lapse of time, ordinarily, do not affect the rights of the wife”); Baker v. Baker, 24 Tenn.App. 220 , 142 S.W.2d 737, 748 (1940) (explaining that it | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Harris v. Jaquis (In Re Jaquis)
green
1 sentence1995See Hahn v. Hahn, 595 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Wife's claim for battery was viable in a dissolution proceeding); In re Jaquis, 131 B.R. 1004 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1991) (Spouse's claim for infliction of genital herpes allowed in a dissolution proceeding). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Shiver v. Sessions
green
1 sentence1960In Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955), which was a companion case to the Sullivan case, supra, the Supreme Court held that the Wrongful Death Act creates an entirely new cause of action in named beneficiaries and that the rule of marital immunity has no application in such a case because the public policy behind this rule, to-wit, preservation of marital harmony, is no longer present. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.