spouse doctrine in California

2017Because of the pendency of Juan's motion to quash, the family court denied Florencia's initial request without prejudice. " 'Where a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent party may be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine.' " ( Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154 , 1172, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 , italics omitted.) The doctrine is codified in Family Code section 2251 (further undesignated statutory references are to this code), which provides in part: "If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or

2017Because of the pendency of Juan's motion to quash, the family court denied Florencia's initial request without prejudice. " 'Where a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent party may be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine.' " ( Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1154 , 1172, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 642 , italics omitted.) The doctrine is codified in Family Code section 2251 (further undesignated statutory references are to this code), which provides in part: "If a determination is made that a marriage is void or voidable and the court finds that either party or

2014When a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, "an innocent party nevertheless may be entitled to relief under the long recognized protections of the putative marriage doctrine." (In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 717 , 11 overruled on other grounds Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126 .) "Relief under the putative spouse doctrine is not precluded even if the circumstances do not establish either a void or voidable marriage." (In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005 , overruled on other grounds Ceja, at p. 1126.) Family Code sec

2013Code, former § 4452, added by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3314, 3322.) Because codification of the putative spouse doctrine was not meant to restrict the doctrine’s application (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 719; In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ]), precodification case law provides the key to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent.

2014When a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, "an innocent party nevertheless may be entitled to relief under the long recognized protections of the putative marriage doctrine." (In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 717 , 11 overruled on other grounds Ceja, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1126 .) "Relief under the putative spouse doctrine is not precluded even if the circumstances do not establish either a void or voidable marriage." (In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005 , overruled on other grounds Ceja, at p. 1126.) Family Code sec

2014Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Courts apply the putative spouse doctrine in a variety of actions and proceedings including dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973 , 978- 979, 985 ["the mandate of [Family Code] section 2251 must be applied, without regard to guilt or innocence, when the court makes the predicate findings that (1) the marriage is void or voidable, and (2) at least one party to the union maintained a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage"]; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003,

2009Legal Principles A. Putative Marriages “Where a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent party may be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine.” (Estate of DePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 92, 107 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 ]; accord, In re Marriage of Ramirez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 751, 756 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 ].) 1.

2009Legal Principles A. Putative Marriages “Where a marriage is invalid due to some legal infirmity, an innocent party may be entitled to relief under the putative spouse doctrine.” (Estate of DePasse (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 92, 107 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 143 ]; accord, In re Marriage of Ramirez (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 751, 756 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 ].) 1.

2022It is well-settled that “an unsuccessful personal injury suit by the physically injured spouse acts as an estoppel that bars the spouse who would claim damages for loss of consortium.” (Meighan v. Shore (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025 , 1034–1035; see also Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283 , 1315– 1316; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury, ¶ 3:2413.) Because we conclude plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action fails, we must also conclude the cause of action for loss of consortium fails. 15 4.

2022It is well-settled that “an unsuccessful personal injury suit by the physically injured spouse acts as an estoppel that bars the spouse who would claim damages for loss of consortium.” (Meighan v. Shore (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025 , 1034–1035; see also Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283 , 1315– 1316; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury, ¶ 3:2413.) Because we conclude plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action fails, we must also conclude the cause of action for loss of consortium fails. 32 5.

2010The Putative Spouse Doctrine The putative spouse doctrine is “an equitable doctrine first recognized by the judiciary, and later codified by the Legislature.” (In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ] (Ellis & Arriaga).) In 1943, our Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is well settled that a woman who lives with a man as his wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists, is entitled upon termination of their relationship to share in the property acquired by them during its existence.” (Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, 683 [ 13

2010The Putative Spouse Doctrine The putative spouse doctrine is “an equitable doctrine first recognized by the judiciary, and later codified by the Legislature.” (In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1005 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 401 ] (Ellis & Arriaga).) In 1943, our Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is well settled that a woman who lives with a man as his wife in the belief that a valid marriage exists, is entitled upon termination of their relationship to share in the property acquired by them during its existence.” (Vallera v. Vallera (1943) 21 Cal.2d 681, 683 [ 13

2025(Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113 , 1120-1121 & 1121, fn. 5 (Ceja); Estate of Leslie (1984) 37 Cal.3d 186, 199-200 [a surviving putative spouse is entitled to the status of surviving spouse in intestate succession and is entitled to succeed to a share of the decedent spouse’s separate property]; Estate of Sax (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1304 .) 12 A putative spouse is statutorily defined as a spouse of a void or voidable marriage in which “either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.” (Fam.

2014Code, § 2251, subd. (a)(1), italics added.) Courts apply the putative spouse doctrine in a variety of actions and proceedings including dissolution actions (In re Marriage of Tejeda (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 973 , 978- 979, 985 ["the mandate of [Family Code] section 2251 must be applied, without regard to guilt or innocence, when the court makes the predicate findings that (1) the marriage is void or voidable, and (2) at least one party to the union maintained a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage"]; In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003,

2020Section 2100, subdivision (c), which precedes section 2107, provides that “a full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, regardless of the characterization as community or separate, together with a disclosure of all income and 15 Section 1101, subdivision (a) states in full: “A spouse has a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse’s pr

2013Nor did Husband present any evidence demonstrating that Wife obtained any personal benefit from the loan of $45,000 that would give rise to an obligation to reimburse the community those funds (cf. In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1486 [a spouse may claim that post- separation the other spouse used community assets for personal benefit under circumstances that would give rise to an obligation to reimburse the community]), or award him damages in a sum equivalent to “the equity and profit from . . . the sale of [the] Kona” property as if the community had acquired an owner

2010The courts accordingly fashioned a variety of remedies by judicial decision.” (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 677 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 557 P.2d 106 ], fn. omitted.) Some decisions, as we explained in our discussion ante, “affirmed the power of a court to employ equitable principles to achieve a fair division of property acquired during putative marriage.” (Id. at p. 678.) The codification of the putative spouse doctrine was not intended to make substantive changes to the case law before the enactment of the Family Law Act in 1969.

2010The courts accordingly fashioned a variety of remedies by judicial decision.” (Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 677 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 557 P.2d 106 ], fn. omitted.) Some decisions, as we explained in our discussion ante, “affirmed the power of a court to employ equitable principles to achieve a fair division of property acquired during putative marriage.” (Id. at p. 678.) The codification of the putative spouse doctrine was not intended to make substantive changes to the case law before the enactment of the Family Law Act in 1969.

2013Code, former § 4452, added by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3314, 3322.) Because codification of the putative spouse doctrine was not meant to restrict the doctrine’s application (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 719; In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ]), precodification case law provides the key to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent.

2013Code, former § 4452, added by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, pp. 3314, 3322.) Because codification of the putative spouse doctrine was not meant to restrict the doctrine’s application (Vryonis, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 719; In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ]), precodification case law provides the key to ascertaining the Legislature’s intent.

2022It is well-settled that “an unsuccessful personal injury suit by the physically injured spouse acts as an estoppel that bars the spouse who would claim damages for loss of consortium.” (Meighan v. Shore (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025 , 1034–1035; see also Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283 , 1315– 1316; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury, ¶ 3:2413.) Because we conclude plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action fails, we must also conclude the cause of action for loss of consortium fails. 15 4.

2022It is well-settled that “an unsuccessful personal injury suit by the physically injured spouse acts as an estoppel that bars the spouse who would claim damages for loss of consortium.” (Meighan v. Shore (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1025 , 1034–1035; see also Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283 , 1315– 1316; Haning et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury, ¶ 3:2413.) Because we conclude plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action fails, we must also conclude the cause of action for loss of consortium fails. 32 5.

1989Our Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 80 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 413 , 592 P.2d 1165 ], held that a spouse may claim reimbursement for amounts paid after separation on preexisting community debts.

1989Our Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 80 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 413 , 592 P.2d 1165 ], held that a spouse may claim reimbursement for amounts paid after separation on preexisting community debts.

2017Hollenhorst, Acting P. J., and Slough, J., concurred. 1 All further statutory citations refer to the Penal Code, unless another code is specified. 2 The penalty for torture is “imprisonment in the state prison for a term of life.” (§ 206.1.) 3 On August 21, 2013, the victim weighed 82 pounds. * See footnote, ante, page 1036. 11 In People v. Martinez (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1035 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 508 ], the court held that the individual offenses committed during a course of conduct torture, including infliction of corporal injury on a spouse in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), were n

2017Hollenhorst, Acting P. J., and Slough, J., concurred. 1 All further statutory citations refer to the Penal Code, unless another code is specified. 2 The penalty for torture is “imprisonment in the state prison for a term of life.” (§ 206.1.) 3 On August 21, 2013, the victim weighed 82 pounds. * See footnote, ante, page 1036. 11 In People v. Martinez (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1035 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 508 ], the court held that the individual offenses committed during a course of conduct torture, including infliction of corporal injury on a spouse in violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), were n

2025(Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1113 , 1120-1121 & 1121, fn. 5 (Ceja); Estate of Leslie (1984) 37 Cal.3d 186, 199-200 [a surviving putative spouse is entitled to the status of surviving spouse in intestate succession and is entitled to succeed to a share of the decedent spouse’s separate property]; Estate of Sax (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1304 .) 12 A putative spouse is statutorily defined as a spouse of a void or voidable marriage in which “either party or both parties believed in good faith that the marriage was valid.” (Fam.

2013(See generally Estate of Sax (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1300, 1305 [ 263 Cal.Rptr. 190 ] [describing applicability of putative spouse doctrine in additional statutory contexts].) 6 When addressing the state of the mind of a “party,” we refer to the alleged putative spouse, who may be someone other than the party litigant. 7 (E.g., Feig v. Bank of America etc. Assn. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 266, 269-270 [ 54 P.2d 3 ] (Feig); Brown v. Brown, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at pp. 186-187; Goldberg, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d at p. 412 ; Estate of Foy, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d at p. 331 ; Turknette v. Turknette, supra, 100 Cal.

2026(Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 .) In any event, she identifies no authority to support the conclusion that the Legislature has extended the putative spouse doctrine to domestic partners.

2026(Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.) In any event, she identifies no authority to support the conclusion that the Legislature has extended the putative spouse doctrine to domestic partners.

2026(See People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1457 [spousal battery in violation of section 243, subdivision (e)(1), is a lesser included offense of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse in violation of section 273.5].) The trial court’s duty to instruct on general principles of law raised by the evidence includes “ ‘ “ ‘giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.

2026(See People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1457 [spousal battery in violation of section 243, subdivision (e)(1), is a lesser included offense of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse in violation of section 273.5].) The trial court’s duty to instruct on general principles of law raised by the evidence includes “ ‘ “ ‘giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.

2022We lack jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ remaining arguments. “ ‘Our jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from.’ ” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170 .) “If an order is appealable, an aggrieved party must file a timely notice of appeal from the order to obtain appellate review. [Citation.] A notice of appeal from a judgment alone does not encompass other judgments and separately appealable orders … .” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239 [concluding that notice of appeal mention

2020(In re Marriage of Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997, 1019-1020 [involving allegations that husband used community assets to improve his separate business].) We 11 Dinesh testified that he purchased furniture for his New York apartment for $25,000 in 2010 and the items depreciated in value during the four years they were used. 21 review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence.