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8 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2000The supreme court described this standard charge in Thomas v. State, 748 So.2d 970, 977 (Fla. 1999): In order to strike a proper balance on this sensitive issue, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has carefully crafted an instruction that allows a jury to continue deliberations even after it has announced its inability to do so, where there is a reasonable basis to believe a verdict is possible, while cautioning jurors that they should not abandon their views just to get a verdict or to accommodate the majority. 2000The supreme court described this standard charge in Thomas v. State, 748 So.2d 970, 977 (Fla. 1999): In order to strike a proper balance on this sensitive issue, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases has carefully crafted an instruction that allows a jury to continue deliberations even after it has announced its inability to do so, where there is a reasonable basis to believe a verdict is possible, while cautioning jurors that they should not abandon their views just to get a ver-diet or to accommodate the majority. | 2 | 2 |
Fire Ass'n v. Evansville Brewing Ass'ngreen2 sentences1972In Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Evansville Brewing Association, Fla.1917, 73 Fla. 904 , 75 So. 196 , the Supreme Court described a clause similar to Paragraph 2 as a standard or union clause: “The policies contained the following, known as the ‘standard or union mortgage clause’: ‘This insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee * * * only therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property * * * nor by any change in the title or ownership of the property: * * * Provided * * * that the mortgagee * * * shall notify this co 1972In Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Evansville Brewing Association, Fla.1917, 73 Fla. 904 , 75 So. 196 , the Supreme Court described a clause similar to Paragraph 2 as a standard or union clause: “The policies contained the following, known as the ‘standard or union mortgage clause’: ‘This insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee * * * only therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property * * * nor by any change in the title or ownership of the property: * * * Provided * * * that the mortgagee * * * shall notify this co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wilson v. Salamon
green
2 sentences2007Recently, in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006), the supreme court described rule 1.525 as establishing "a bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees." Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla.2005) interpreted rule 1.420(e) by its "plain meaning" to "further the purpose of decreasing litigation over the purpose of the rule and fostering the smooth administration of the trial court's docket." Id. at 158. 2006Recently, in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006), the supreme court described rule 1.525 as establishing "a bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees." Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla.2005) interpreted rule 1.420(e) by its "plain meaning" to "further the purpose of decreasing litigation over the purpose of the rule and fostering the smooth administration of the trial court's docket." The purpose of a rule 1.820(h) motion for trial "is to hasten the litigation along, make the parties evaluate the award, and either accept it or complet | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid
green
2 sentences2007Recently, in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006), the supreme court described rule 1.525 as establishing "a bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees." Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla.2005) interpreted rule 1.420(e) by its "plain meaning" to "further the purpose of decreasing litigation over the purpose of the rule and fostering the smooth administration of the trial court's docket." Id. at 158. 2006Recently, in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 598 (Fla.2006), the supreme court described rule 1.525 as establishing "a bright-line time requirement for motions for costs and attorney fees." Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla.2005) interpreted rule 1.420(e) by its "plain meaning" to "further the purpose of decreasing litigation over the purpose of the rule and fostering the smooth administration of the trial court's docket." The purpose of a rule 1.820(h) motion for trial "is to hasten the litigation along, make the parties evaluate the award, and either accept it or complet | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Ruffin v. State
red
2 sentences1993In Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 , 102 S.Ct. 368 , 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981), the supreme court described the test for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes: In Williams v. State, we announced a broad rule of admissibility based upon relevancy... . [W]e declared that any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into evidence even though it points to a separate crime unless its admissibility is precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. 1993In Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 , 102 S.Ct. 368 , 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981), the supreme court described the test for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes: In Williams v. State, we announced a broad rule of admissibility based upon relevancy.... [W]e declared that any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into evidence even though it points to a separate crime unless its admissibility is precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Johnson v. Florida
green
2 sentences1993In Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 , 102 S.Ct. 368 , 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981), the supreme court described the test for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes: In Williams v. State, we announced a broad rule of admissibility based upon relevancy... . [W]e declared that any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into evidence even though it points to a separate crime unless its admissibility is precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. 1993In Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 , 102 S.Ct. 368 , 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981), the supreme court described the test for admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes: In Williams v. State, we announced a broad rule of admissibility based upon relevancy.... [W]e declared that any fact relevant to prove a fact in issue is admissible into evidence even though it points to a separate crime unless its admissibility is precluded by a specific rule of exclusion. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Lusk v. State
green
2 sentences1999Later, in Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1984), the supreme court described the test for juror competency thusly: "[t]he test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court." Id. at 1041 . 1999Later, in Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1984), the supreme court described the test for juror competency thusly: "[t]he test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court." Id. at 1041 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Glens Falls Insurance v. Porter
green
1 sentence1972In Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Evansville Brewing Association, Fla.1917, 73 Fla. 904 , 75 So. 196 , the Supreme Court described a clause similar to Paragraph 2 as a standard or union clause: “The policies contained the following, known as the ‘standard or union mortgage clause’: ‘This insurance, as to the interest of the mortgagee * * * only therein, shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property * * * nor by any change in the title or ownership of the property: * * * Provided * * * that the mortgagee * * * shall notify this co | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.