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8 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1995–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arwood v. Tzengreen2 sentences1998See Arwood v. Tzen, 224 Ga. App. 722, 723 (2) ( 481 SE2d 874 ) (1997). 1998See Arwood v. Tzen, 224 Ga. App. 722, 723 (2) ( 481 SE2d 874 ) (1997). | 1 | 1 |
Sharfuddin v. Drug Emporium, Inc.green2 sentences1998Sharfuddin v. Drug Emporium, 230 Ga. App. 679, 680-681 ( 498 SE2d 748 ) (1998). 1998Sharfuddin v. Drug Emporium, 230 Ga. App. 679, 680-681 ( 498 SE2d 748 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Solon Automated Services, Inc. v. Corporation of Mercer Universitygreen2 sentences1997Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 ( 458 SE2d 876 ) (1995); compare Solon Automated Svcs. v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 221 Ga. App. 856, 859 ( 473 SE2d 544 ) (1996). 1997Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 ( 458 SE2d 876 ) (1995); compare Solon Automated Svcs. v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 221 Ga. App. 856, 859 ( 473 SE2d 544 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences1997Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 ( 458 SE2d 876 ) (1995); compare Solon Automated Svcs. v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 221 Ga. App. 856, 859 ( 473 SE2d 544 ) (1996). 1997Hodge v. SADA Enterprises, 217 Ga. App. 688, 690 ( 458 SE2d 876 ) (1995); compare Solon Automated Svcs. v. Corp. of Mercer Univ., 221 Ga. App. 856, 859 ( 473 SE2d 544 ) (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Andersongreen2 sentences1997Such standard of ordinary care recognizes that the owner/occupier has a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for invitees, “including] a duty to anticipate the negligence of others which is usual or likely to happen,” and that the invitee, who “ ‘may rely upon the discharge of this duty[,] ... is not necessarily, and as a matter of law, guilty of negligence in failing to discover the existence of a patent defect in the premises which renders it unsafe for persons coming upon the premises.’ Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 810 ( 101 SE2d 770 ) [(1957)].” Winn-Dixie St 1997Such standard of ordinary care recognizes that the owner/occupier has a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for invitees, “including] a duty to anticipate the negligence of others which is usual or likely to happen,” and that the invitee, who “ ‘may rely upon the discharge of this duty[,] ... is not necessarily, and as a matter of law, guilty of negligence in failing to discover the existence of a patent defect in the premises which renders it unsafe for persons coming upon the premises.’ Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga. App. 800, 810 ( 101 SE2d 770 ) [(1957)].” Winn-Dixie St | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences1995Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga.App. 808, 810 , 406 S.E.2d 234 (1991). 1995Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga.App. 808, 810 , 406 S.E.2d 234 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Kroger Companygreen2 sentences1995Even if we construe the employee’s statement to Johnson as probative evidence that Dill’s had actual knowledge of the puddle under an exception to the hearsay rule (compare Brooks v. Kroger Co., 194 Ga. App. 215, 216 ( 390 SE2d 280 ) (1990)), the second part of the Alterman Foods test requires Johnson to show that, despite exercising ordinary care for her own safety, she was without knowledge of the puddle’s presence. 1995Even if we construe the employee’s statement to Johnson as probative evidence that Dill’s had actual knowledge of the puddle under an exception to the hearsay rule (compare Brooks v. Kroger Co., 194 Ga. App. 215, 216 ( 390 SE2d 280 ) (1990)), the second part of the Alterman Foods test requires Johnson to show that, despite exercising ordinary care for her own safety, she was without knowledge of the puddle’s presence. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alterman Foods, Inc. v. Ligon
green
2 sentences1998Robinson, supra. Robinson reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods , a plaintiff invitee must prove that the invitee "`was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.' Id. at 623 , 272 S.E.2d 327 ." Robinson, supra at 736, 748-749 , 493 S.E.2d 403 . 1998Robinson, supra. Robinson reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods , a plaintiff invitee must prove that the invitee "`was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.' Id. at 623 , 272 S.E.2d 327 ." Robinson, supra at 736, 748-749 , 493 S.E.2d 403 . | 2 | 1995–1998 |
Robinson v. Kroger Co.
green
2 sentences1998Robinson, supra. Robinson reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods , a plaintiff invitee must prove that the invitee "`was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.' Id. at 623 , 272 S.E.2d 327 ." Robinson, supra at 736, 748-749 , 493 S.E.2d 403 . 1998Robinson, supra. Robinson reaffirmed that under the second prong of Alterman Foods , a plaintiff invitee must prove that the invitee "`was without knowledge of the substance or for some reason attributable to the defendant was prevented from discovering the foreign substance.' Id. at 623 , 272 S.E.2d 327 ." Robinson, supra at 736, 748-749 , 493 S.E.2d 403 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Hardy
green
1 sentence1997Such standard of ordinary care recognizes that the owner/occupier has a duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for invitees, "includ[ing] a duty to anticipate the negligence of others which is usual or likely to happen," and that the invitee, who "`may rely upon the discharge of this duty[,] ... is not necessarily, and as a matter of law, guilty of negligence in failing to discover the existence of a patent defect in the premises which renders it unsafe for persons coming upon the premises.' Cooper v. Anderson, 96 Ga.App. 800, 810 , 101 S.E.2d 770 [(1957) ]." Winn-Dixie St | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.