Carroll doctrine (Georgia) · Go Syfert
← Georgia issues

Carroll doctrine in Georgia

8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Chambers v. Maroneygreen
scotus · 1970 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1976–1978
2 sentences

1978The majority hold that probable cause and exigent circumstances have not been shown by the state so as to bring the search of the automobile within the Carroll doctrine or "automobile exception.” See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543), and also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419).

1978The majority hold that probable cause and exigent circumstances have not been shown by the state so as to bring the search of the automobile within the Carroll doctrine or "automobile exception." See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543), and also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419).

13
State v. Johnsongreen
gactapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Areasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify an investigative detention is shown by “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention, and the officer must have some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was neither arbitrary nor harassing.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 282 Ga. App. 102, 105 ( 637 SE2d 825 ) (2006).

2007Areasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify an investigative detention is shown by “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the detention, and the officer must have some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was neither arbitrary nor harassing.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Johnson, 282 Ga. App. 102, 105 ( 637 SE2d 825 ) (2006).

11
Paul v. Stategreen
ga · 2000 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
2 sentences

2002Abernathy v. State, 252 Ga. App. 635 -636 (1) ( 556 SE2d 859 ) (2001); see Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 848-849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58 ) (2000).

2002Abernathy v. State, 252 Ga. App. 635 -636 (1) ( 556 SE2d 859 ) (2001); see Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 848-849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58 ) (2000).

11
Department of Transportation v. Browngreen
gactapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995). 4.

1996See Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 179 (1) ( 460 SE2d 812 ) (1995). 4.

11
Mock v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
2 sentences

1996Mock v. State, 218 Ga. App. 514, 517 (3) ( 462 SE2d 429 ) (1995).

1996Mock v. State, 218 Ga. App. 514, 517 (3) ( 462 SE2d 429 ) (1995).

11
Chambers v. Walkergreen
gactapp · 1974 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158 , supra; Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 308 ( 211 SE2d 150 ) (1974); Peters v. State, 148 Ga. App. 850, 851 ( 253 SE2d 214 ) (1979).

1980They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158 , supra; Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 308 ( 211 SE2d 150 ) (1974); Peters v. State, 148 Ga. App. 850, 851 ( 253 SE2d 214 ) (1979).

11
Peters v. Stategreen
gactapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158 , supra; Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 308 ( 211 SE2d 150 ) (1974); Peters v. State, 148 Ga. App. 850, 851 ( 253 SE2d 214 ) (1979).

1980They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158 , supra; Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 308 ( 211 SE2d 150 ) (1974); Peters v. State, 148 Ga. App. 850, 851 ( 253 SE2d 214 ) (1979).

11
United States v. Watsongreen
scotus · 1975 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1977–1977
1 sentence

1977Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (83 SC 1623, 10 LE2d 726) (1963); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (96 SC 820, 46 LE2d 598) (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975). *340 At the outset we must decide whether the warrantless seizure of the van fits an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, be it a search incident to lawful arrest, the plain view doctrine, or the automobile or Carroll doctrine.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
Carroll v. United States green
scotus · 1925
2 sentences

1978The primary thrust of the state's argument is an attempt to fit the facts here within the Carroll doctrine, or so-called "automobile exception," named for Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543) (1925).

1978The primary thrust of the state's argument is an attempt to fit the facts here within the Carroll doctrine, or so-called "automobile exception," named for Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (45 SC 280, 69 LE 543) (1925).

41976–1980
Abernathy v. State green
gactapp · 2001
2 sentences

2002Abernathy v. State, 252 Ga. App. 635 -636 (1) ( 556 SE2d 859 ) (2001); see Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 848-849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58 ) (2000).

2002Abernathy v. State, 252 Ga. App. 635 -636 (1) ( 556 SE2d 859 ) (2001); see Paul v. State, 272 Ga. 845, 848-849 (3) ( 537 SE2d 58 ) (2000).

12002–2002
Cunningham v. State green
gactapp · 1974
2 sentences

1980They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158 , supra; Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 308 ( 211 SE2d 150 ) (1974); Peters v. State, 148 Ga. App. 850, 851 ( 253 SE2d 214 ) (1979).

1980They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158 , supra; Cunningham v. State, 133 Ga. App. 305, 308 ( 211 SE2d 150 ) (1974); Peters v. State, 148 Ga. App. 850, 851 ( 253 SE2d 214 ) (1979).

11980–1980
Ker v. California green
scotus · 1963
1 sentence

1977Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (83 SC 1623, 10 LE2d 726) (1963); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (96 SC 820, 46 LE2d 598) (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975). *340 At the outset we must decide whether the warrantless seizure of the van fits an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, be it a search incident to lawful arrest, the plain view doctrine, or the automobile or Carroll doctrine.

11977–1977
Texas v. White green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

1977Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67 (96 SC 304, 46 LE2d 209) (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 52 .

1977Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67 (96 SC 304, 46 LE2d 209) (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 52 .

11977–1977
Gerstein v. Pugh green
scotus · 1975
1 sentence

1977Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (83 SC 1623, 10 LE2d 726) (1963); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (96 SC 820, 46 LE2d 598) (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975). *340 At the outset we must decide whether the warrantless seizure of the van fits an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, be it a search incident to lawful arrest, the plain view doctrine, or the automobile or Carroll doctrine.

11977–1977
Coolidge v. New Hampshire green
scotus · 1971
1 sentence

1977Coolidge, supra, at 458-464 .

11977–1977

Where else courts name it

MD 49 (1967–2026) FL 17 (1969–2022) TX 17 (1939–2021) AL 16 (1972–2018) CA 12 (1973–2013) GA 8 (1976–2007) IA 7 (1971–2015) LA 7 (1962–1987) VA 7 (1997–2026) WV 5 (1980–1982) MA 4 (1975–2001) MI 4 (1974–2022) IL 4 (1981–2022) MT 4 (1992–2025) OH 4 (2004–2024) MS 4 (1972–2025) PA 4 (2004–2024) NJ 4 (1979–1989) MN 3 (1974–2014) WI 3 (2001–2023) HI 3 (1970–2020) IN 3 (1995–2004) MO 3 (1991–2000) KY 2 (1971–2001) SC 2 (2004–2007) NE 2 (1991–2014) AZ 2 (1977–1984) NY 2 (1979–2024) KS 2 (2018–2020) DC 2 (1974–1992) ID 2 (1991–2001) NC 2 (2021–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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