Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
17 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1939–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Haley v. Stategreen1 sentence2018To preserve error for appellate review, Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure “requires that the record demonstrate (1) the complaining party made a timely and specific request, objection, or motion; and (2) the trial judge either ruled on the request, objection, or motion, or he refused to rule and the complaining party objected to that refusal.” Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 516 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Stoddard v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“While the nature and 50 normal use of an automobile will often be the key factor in providing the ‘exigent circumstances’ in situations where otherwise they would not exist, nevertheless the fact that the place to be searched is a car is but one factor, an important one, in making the determination as to the existence of the ‘exigent circumstances.’ It is not the only factor to be considered.” Stoddard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 744, 752 (Tex. Crim. 2015“While the nature and 50 normal use of an automobile will often be the key factor in providing the ‘exigent circumstances’ in situations where otherwise they would not exist, nevertheless the fact that the place to be searched is a car is but one factor, an important one, in making the determination as to the existence of the ‘exigent circumstances.’ It is not the only factor to be considered.” Stoddard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 744, 752 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Cardwell v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2015Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 598 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.) (“Where there is no reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved, the Carroll doctrine is simply inapplicable.”). 2015Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 598 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.) (“Where there is no reasonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be moved, the Carroll doctrine is simply inapplicable.”). | 1 | 1 |
Pena v. Stategreen1 sentence2008In Pena v. State, this Court held that, “under the Due Course of Law provision of article I, section 19 [of the Texas Constitution], the State has a duty to preserve material evidence which has apparent exculpatory value, encompassing both exculpatory evidence and evidence that is potentially useful to the defense.” 226 S.W.3d 634, 651 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, pet. granted). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Workers' Compensation Commission v. Garciagreen1 sentence2007See Texas Workers’ Compensation Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504 , 517 n.15 (Tex. 1995). 3 In its summary-judgment motion, the Estate asserts that Carroll has “no evidence to establish any element of any of her claims.” It enumerates the claims and elements it is challenging, including Carroll’s claim to “a share of [Hempel’s] estate if: (x) the Court admits to probate the 1960 and 1969 joint and mutual will and codicil; and (y) the Court determines that a gift therein has lapsed and such gift would pass by intestacy.” 13 CONCLUSION We affirm the judgment of the district court. _______________ | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guzmangreen2 sentences2000See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). 2000See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. Changreen1 sentence1995Morrison v. Chan , 699 S.W.2d 205, 206-07 (Tex. 1985); Voskamp v. Arnoldy , 749 S.W.2d 113, 127 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
Voskamp v. Arnoldygreen1 sentence1995Morrison v. Chan , 699 S.W.2d 205, 206-07 (Tex. 1985); Voskamp v. Arnoldy , 749 S.W.2d 113, 127 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied). | 1 | 1 |
Kiser v. Lemco Industries, Inc.green1 sentence1980See Kiser v. Lemco Industries, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1975, no writ); Houston Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Semands, 318 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1958, writ dism’d); Coffield v. Richter, 229 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1950, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Carroll
green
2 sentences2011Hayes, 314 S.W.3d at 502 ; accord Davis v. Baker, No. 03-10-00324-CV, 2010 WL 5463864 , at *4, 2010 Tex.App. 2011Hayes, 314 S.W.3d at 502 ; accord Davis v. Baker, No. 03- 10-00324-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10317 , at *12 (Tex. App.—Austin, Dec. 22, 2010, no pet. h.); Daybreak Cmnty. | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Carroll v. State
green
2 sentences2008In Carroll v. State, 266 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, no pet. h.), Carroll challenged the trial court’s refusal to submit a spoliation instruction to the jury “concerning the State’s failure to preserve video *634 tapes of Carroll’s stop and arrest.” Carroll, 266 S.W.3d at 3 . 2008In Carroll v. State, 266 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, no pet. h.), Carroll challenged the trial court’s refusal to submit a spoliation instruction to the jury “concerning the State’s failure to preserve video *634 tapes of Carroll’s stop and arrest.” Carroll, 266 S.W.3d at 3 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
green
2 sentences1982“Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 , 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). 1982“Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 , 93 S.Ct. 2535 , 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). | 2 | 1981–1982 |
Northwest Independent School District v. Carroll Independent School District
green
1 sentence2021Before Carroll filed its sixth amended petition adding the ultra vires claim, we had already concluded in Carro// IT that “the [DJA] applies when, as here, a school district seeks to resolve a controversy regarding a judgment or order issued by a commissioners court even though the words Judgment’ and ‘order’ are not contained within the specific enumerations listed in the Act.” 441 S.W.3d at 691 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re KAF
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923 (2005) 74 USLW 3132 , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 565 IV [6] Finally, Carroll raises two constitutional issues should we hold, as we have, that her appeal was untimely. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In the Interest of K.A.F.
neutral
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923 (2005) 74 USLW 3132 , 48 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 565 IV [6] Finally, Carroll raises two constitutional issues should we hold, as we have, that her appeal was untimely. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Gill v. State
green
2 sentences1982Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). 1982Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1981Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). " Carroll has been followed in a line of subsequent cases, but the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. 1981Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). " Carroll has been followed in a line of subsequent cases, but the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Coffield v. Richter
neutral
1 sentence1980See Kiser v. Lemco Industries, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1975, no writ); Houston Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Semands, 318 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1958, writ dism’d); Coffield v. Richter, 229 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1950, no writ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Houston Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Semands
neutral
1 sentence1980See Kiser v. Lemco Industries, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1975, no writ); Houston Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Semands, 318 S.W.2d 777 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1958, writ dism’d); Coffield v. Richter, 229 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1950, no writ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Edmondson v. Carroll
green
1 sentence1939Edmondson again appealed to this court, and by an opinion reported in Edmondson v. Carroll, 65 S.W.2d 1107, 1110 , writ dismissed, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, in this language: “The cause is remanded to the trial court for a trial of the cross-action of appellant [Edmondson]. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.