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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2010–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Herrera v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 226 (2) ( 675 SE2d 11 ) (2009); Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 435 (3) ( 702 SE2d 731 ) (2010). 2014See Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 226 (2) ( 675 SE2d 11 ) (2009); Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 435 (3) ( 702 SE2d 731 ) (2010). | 3 | 3 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 226 (2) ( 675 SE2d 11 ) (2009); Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 435 (3) ( 702 SE2d 731 ) (2010). 2014See Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 226 (2) ( 675 SE2d 11 ) (2009); Herrera v. State, 306 Ga. App. 432, 435 (3) ( 702 SE2d 731 ) (2010). | 3 | 3 |
Scott v. Stategreen2 sentences2021As the Supreme Court explained in Scott, “the ‘facts’ of crimes to which the Drinkard test refers are the elements of the two crimes at issue, not the particular facts describing how those crimes were committed.” 306 Ga. 507, 509 (3) n.3. 2021As the Supreme Court explained in Scott, “the ‘facts’ of crimes to which the Drinkard test refers are the elements of the two crimes at issue, not the particular facts describing how those crimes were committed.” 306 Ga. 507, 509 (3) n.3. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Ray Metcalf v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Metcalf, 349 Ga. App. at 414-424 (2) (e), (f), (g). 13 State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 35 (3) (a) ( 796 SE2d 1 ) (2016) (“[a]ggravated battery and armed robbery do not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibit entirely different categories of injury — depriving a victim of a member of his body versus depriving a victim of property”) (emphasis omitted); Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 422 (4) ( 474 SE2d 243 ) (1996) (under pre-Drinkard analysis, two counts of aggravated assault of a peace officer and two counts of interference with government p | 1 | 1 |
Epperson v. the Stategreen2 sentences2021See Metcalf, 349 Ga. App. at 414-424 (2) (e), (f), (g). 13 State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 35 (3) (a) ( 796 SE2d 1 ) (2016) (“[a]ggravated battery and armed robbery do not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibit entirely different categories of injury — depriving a victim of a member of his body versus depriving a victim of property”) (emphasis omitted); Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 422 (4) ( 474 SE2d 243 ) (1996) (under pre-Drinkard analysis, two counts of aggravated assault of a peace officer and two counts of interference with government p 2021See Metcalf, 349 Ga. App. at 414-424 (2) (e), (f), (g). 13 State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 35 (3) (a) ( 796 SE2d 1 ) (2016) (“[a]ggravated battery and armed robbery do not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibit entirely different categories of injury — depriving a victim of a member of his body versus depriving a victim of property”) (emphasis omitted); Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 422 (4) ( 474 SE2d 243 ) (1996) (under pre-Drinkard analysis, two counts of aggravated assault of a peace officer and two counts of interference with government p | 1 | 1 |
Hyman v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Metcalf, 349 Ga. App. at 414-424 (2) (e), (f), (g). 13 State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 35 (3) (a) ( 796 SE2d 1 ) (2016) (“[a]ggravated battery and armed robbery do not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibit entirely different categories of injury — depriving a victim of a member of his body versus depriving a victim of property”) (emphasis omitted); Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 422 (4) ( 474 SE2d 243 ) (1996) (under pre-Drinkard analysis, two counts of aggravated assault of a peace officer and two counts of interference with government p 2021See Metcalf, 349 Ga. App. at 414-424 (2) (e), (f), (g). 13 State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 35 (3) (a) ( 796 SE2d 1 ) (2016) (“[a]ggravated battery and armed robbery do not simply prohibit different degrees of injury or risk of injury; rather, the two crimes prohibit entirely different categories of injury — depriving a victim of a member of his body versus depriving a victim of property”) (emphasis omitted); Hyman v. State, 222 Ga. App. 419, 422 (4) ( 474 SE2d 243 ) (1996) (under pre-Drinkard analysis, two counts of aggravated assault of a peace officer and two counts of interference with government p | 1 | 1 |
Daniel v. Stategreen2 sentences2019See Daniel, 292 Ga. App. at 565-566 . 2019See Daniel, 292 Ga. App. at 565-566 . | 1 | 1 |
Drinkard v. Walkergreen2 sentences2019See Drinkard, 281 Ga. at 216-217 . 2019See Drinkard, 281 Ga. at 216-217 . | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Smith, 290 Ga. at 773 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. at 383, 384 ( 589 SE2d 69 ) (2003)). 2019Smith, 290 Ga. at 773 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. at 383, 384 ( 589 SE2d 69 ) (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marlowegreen2 sentences2019Smith, 290 Ga. at 773 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. at 383, 384 ( 589 SE2d 69 ) (2003)). 2019Smith, 290 Ga. at 773 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. at 383, 384 ( 589 SE2d 69 ) (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Stuart v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Jernigan v. State, 333 Ga. App. 339, 343 (3) ( 775 SE2d 791 ) (2015) (under the Drinkard test, court examines “whether each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied); Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-43 ( 734 SE2d 814 ) (2012) (Drinkard test applies to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another). 2015See Jernigan v. State, 333 Ga. App. 339, 343 (3) ( 775 SE2d 791 ) (2015) (under the Drinkard test, court examines “whether each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied); Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-43 ( 734 SE2d 814 ) (2012) (Drinkard test applies to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another). | 1 | 1 |
Jernigan v. the Stategreen2 sentences2015See Jernigan v. State, 333 Ga. App. 339, 343 (3) ( 775 SE2d 791 ) (2015) (under the Drinkard test, court examines “whether each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied); Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-43 ( 734 SE2d 814 ) (2012) (Drinkard test applies to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another). 2015See Jernigan v. State, 333 Ga. App. 339, 343 (3) ( 775 SE2d 791 ) (2015) (under the Drinkard test, court examines “whether each offense requires proof of a fact which the other does not”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied); Stuart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 839, 842-43 ( 734 SE2d 814 ) (2012) (Drinkard test applies to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another). | 1 | 1 |
Franks v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“In applying the Drinkard test, we consider the crimes as indicted and not every possible manner of committing a particular crime.” Franks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 495 (3), n. 8 ( 758 SE2d 604 ) (2013). 2014“In applying the Drinkard test, we consider the crimes as indicted and not every possible manner of committing a particular crime.” Franks v. State, 325 Ga. App. 488, 495 (3), n. 8 ( 758 SE2d 604 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elamin v. State
green
2 sentences2010In Elamin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 591 (1) ( 667 SE2d 439 ) (2008), the Court of Appeals purported to apply the Drinkard test but did not complete the Drinkard analysis, finding only that aggravated assault with intent to rob required proof of at least one additional fact which robbery by intimidation did not require. 2010In Elamin v. State, 293 Ga. App. 591 (1) ( 667 SE2d 439 ) (2008), the Court of Appeals purported to apply the Drinkard test but did not complete the Drinkard analysis, finding only that aggravated assault with intent to rob required proof of at least one additional fact which robbery by intimidation did not require. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.