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8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Housing Authority v. Southern Railway Co.green2 sentences1981Co., 245 Ga. 229, 230 ( 264 SE2d 174 ) (1980), our Supreme Court ruled that “unique property is simply property which must be valued by something other than the fair market value standard,” such as, for example, the cost-less-depreciation or the income methods. 1981Co., 245 Ga. 229, 230 ( 264 SE2d 174 ) (1980), our Supreme Court ruled that “unique property is simply property which must be valued by something other than the fair market value standard,” such as, for example, the cost-less-depreciation or the income methods. | 1 | 3 |
Atlanta & West Point Railroad v. Hudsongreen1 sentence2016Moreover, BHV and Furman claim that Georgia case law specifically limits the recovery of animal treatment expenses to an animal’s pre-injury fair market value, citing Atlanta *147 & West Point R. v. Hudson, 62 Ga. 679, 683 (2) (1879) and Southern R. | 1 | 1 |
MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. CMES, Inc.green2 sentences2016Generally, in a suit to recover damages to personal property it is a well-established principle that “a plaintiff cannot recover an amount of damages against a tortfeasor greater than the fair market value of the property prior to impairment.” See MCI Communications Svcs. v. CMES, Inc., 291 Ga. 461, 463-464 ( 728 SE2d 649 ) (2012). 2016Generally, in a suit to recover damages to personal property it is a well-established principle that “a plaintiff cannot recover an amount of damages against a tortfeasor greater than the fair market value of the property prior to impairment.” See MCI Communications Svcs. v. CMES, Inc., 291 Ga. 461, 463-464 ( 728 SE2d 649 ) (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Conner v. Hartgreen2 sentences2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet 2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet | 1 | 1 |
Parris v. Atlanta, Knoxville & Northern Railway Co.green1 sentence2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet | 1 | 1 |
Downside Risk, Inc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1984Downside Risk v. MARTA, 168 Ga. App. 202, 204 ( 308 SE2d 547 ) (1983). “[U]ñique property is simply property which must be valued by something other than the fair market value standard.” Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Sou. 1984Downside Risk v. MARTA, 168 Ga. App. 202, 204 ( 308 SE2d 547 ) (1983). “[U]ñique property is simply property which must be valued by something other than the fair market value standard.” Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Sou. | 1 | 1 |
City of Atlanta v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1981Co., supra. "As there was no evidence that fair market value would not give just and adequate compensation to the individual condemnee, the court erred in giving the jury instructions authorizing them to award damages based on the peculiar value of the land to condemnee alone, as distinguished from its market value." City of Atlanta v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 330, 331 ( 167 SE2d 216 ). 1981Co., supra. "As there was no evidence that fair market value would not give just and adequate compensation to the individual condemnee, the court erred in giving the jury instructions authorizing them to award damages based on the peculiar value of the land to condemnee alone, as distinguished from its market value." City of Atlanta v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 330, 331 ( 167 SE2d 216 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hortman v. Cantrell
green
2 sentences2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet 2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Rogers v. McClure
green
1 sentence2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Pinholster v. McGinnis
neutral
2 sentences2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet 2012Co., 128 Ga. 434, 437-438 (1) ( 57 SE 692 ) (1907); Conner v. Hart, 252 Ga. App. 92, 94 (1) (a) ( 555 SE2d 783 ) (2001); Pinholster v. McGinnis, 155 Ga. App. 589 (1) ( 271 SE2d 722 ) (1980). “[S]ome injury [or damage] — even if small or nominal — is necessary. [Cit.]” Conner v. Hart, supra. For example, in Hortman v. Cantrell, 173 Ga. App. 429 ( 326 SE2d 779 ) (1985), the Court of Appeals, applying the fair market value rule of computing damages, held that plaintiffs could not recover damages against a contractor who built their house contrary to their specifications because the actual complet | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Department of Transportation v. Vest
green
2 sentences1982Dept. of Transp. v. Vest, 160 Ga. App. 368 ( 287 SE2d 85 ) (1981); Housing Auth. &c. of Atlanta v. Sou. 1982Dept. of Transp. v. Vest, 160 Ga. App. 368 ( 287 SE2d 85 ) (1981); Housing Auth. &c. of Atlanta v. Sou. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
HOUSING &C. CITY OF ATLANTA v. Troncalli
green
2 sentences1980"Strictly speaking, there are three recognized techniques for determining market value: replacement cost new less depreciation, income, and comparable sales.” Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta v. Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. 515 ( 142 SE2d 93 ) (1965). 1980"Strictly speaking, there are three recognized techniques for determining market value: replacement cost new less depreciation, income, and comparable sales.” Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta v. Troncalli, 111 Ga. App. 515 ( 142 SE2d 93 ) (1965). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.