8 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences1995Waugh admitted that he did; he said it did not belong to him but conceded that he was “holding it for someone.” We find this evidence sufficient to authorize the jury to find Waugh, a convicted felon, guilty of possessing a firearm under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 1989We find the evidence sufficient to convince any rational trier of fact of the appellant’s guilt of every essential element of the crimes of murder and possession of a firearm under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Remygreen2 sentences2021However, at the time of Pope’s crimes in December 2014, a felon like Pope, who was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131, was “no longer categorically precluded by the final clause of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 from seeking immunity from criminal prosecution under that statute,” Remy, 308 Ga. at 297 , and Pope’s status as a convicted felon would not preclude a finding of immunity as a matter of law. 2021However, at the time of Pope’s crimes in December 2014, a felon like Pope, who was charged with possession of a firearm in violation of OCGA § 16-11-131, was “no longer categorically precluded by the final clause of OCGA § 16-3-24.2 from seeking immunity from criminal prosecution under that statute,” Remy, 308 Ga. at 297, and Pope’s status as a convicted felon would not preclude a finding of immunity as a matter of law. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Consistent with the plain meaning of OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), we held in Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 814 (3) (b) ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015), that the felonious possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 3 or felony first-offender probationer will preclude the felon or probationer from asserting that his use of the firearm in defense of self was justified.4 See also Moore v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 535 (2) (d) ( 832 SE2d 384 ) (2019). 2020Consistent with the plain meaning of OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), we held in Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 814 (3) (b) ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015), that the felonious possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 3 or felony first-offender probationer will preclude the felon or probationer from asserting that his use of the firearm in defense of self was justified.4 See also Moore v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 535 (2) (d) ( 832 SE2d 384 ) (2019). | 1 | 1 |
Woodard v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Consistent with the plain meaning of OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), we held in Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 814 (3) (b) ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015), that the felonious possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 3 or felony first-offender probationer will preclude the felon or probationer from asserting that his use of the firearm in defense of self was justified.4 See also Moore v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 535 (2) (d) ( 832 SE2d 384 ) (2019). 2020Consistent with the plain meaning of OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), we held in Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 814 (3) (b) ( 771 SE2d 362 ) (2015), that the felonious possession of a firearm by a convicted felon 3 or felony first-offender probationer will preclude the felon or probationer from asserting that his use of the firearm in defense of self was justified.4 See also Moore v. State, 306 Ga. 532, 535 (2) (d) ( 832 SE2d 384 ) (2019). | 1 | 1 |
Bogan v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614, 616 (2) ( 340 SE2d 256 ) (1986); Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 374 (2) ( 370 SE2d 348 ) (1988). 2. 1990Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614, 616 (2) ( 340 SE2d 256 ) (1986); Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 374 (2) ( 370 SE2d 348 ) (1988). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences1990Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614, 616 (2) ( 340 SE2d 256 ) (1986); Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 374 (2) ( 370 SE2d 348 ) (1988). 2. 1990Bogan v. State, 177 Ga. App. 614, 616 (2) ( 340 SE2d 256 ) (1986); Green v. State, 187 Ga. App. 373, 374 (2) ( 370 SE2d 348 ) (1988). 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Head v. State
green
2 sentences1995The State cites Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1) ( 316 SE2d 791 ), reversed on other grounds at 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ), in support of this argument, apparently reasoning that specific proof of the type weapon possessed by an accused is unnecessary to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm when a victim testifies that the accused possessed an object which appears to be within the class of weapons prohibited by an unlawful firearms possession statute. 1995The State cites Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1) ( 316 SE2d 791 ), reversed on other grounds at 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ), in support of this argument, apparently reasoning that specific proof of the type weapon possessed by an accused is unnecessary to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm when a victim testifies that the accused possessed an object which appears to be within the class of weapons prohibited by an unlawful firearms possession statute. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Head v. State
green
2 sentences1995The State cites Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1) ( 316 SE2d 791 ), reversed on other grounds at 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ), in support of this argument, apparently reasoning that specific proof of the type weapon possessed by an accused is unnecessary to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm when a victim testifies that the accused possessed an object which appears to be within the class of weapons prohibited by an unlawful firearms possession statute. 1995The State cites Head v. State, 170 Ga. App. 324 (1) ( 316 SE2d 791 ), reversed on other grounds at 253 Ga. 429 ( 322 SE2d 228 ), in support of this argument, apparently reasoning that specific proof of the type weapon possessed by an accused is unnecessary to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm when a victim testifies that the accused possessed an object which appears to be within the class of weapons prohibited by an unlawful firearms possession statute. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Berta v. State
green
2 sentences1977Berta v. State, 223 Ga. 267 ( 154 SE2d 594 ) (1967). 1977Berta v. State, 223 Ga. 267 ( 154 SE2d 594 ) (1967). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.