firearm violation (Massachusetts) · Go Syfert
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firearm violation in Massachusetts

10 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 2003–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

CaseFollowedCited
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen
mass · 1977 · cited in 3 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2005–2012
2 sentences

2012In the future, where a defendant charged with the unlawful carrying of a firearm in violation of § 10 (a) possesses evidence that the firearm was manufactured before 1900, the defendant shall provide the Commonwealth with pretrial notice of the affirmative defense of exemption as required by rule 14 (b) (3). 10 See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 214 (2005) (statutory exemption “is an affirmative defense”); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 407 (1977) (treating firearm licensing exclusion as affirmative defense).

2012In Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 406 (1977) (Jones), we concluded that the absence of a license was not an element of the crime under § 10 (a), but that the “holding of a valid license brings the defendant within an exception to the general prohibition against carrying a firearm, and is an affirmative defense.” Id.

33
Ruggiero v. Police Commissioner of Bostongreen
massappct · 1984 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2003–2007
2 sentences

2007See Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 423 (1995) (revocation of a driver’s license has “long affected public safety concerns”); Dupont, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 694 , quoting Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 258 (1984) (“A license to carry a firearm is a privilege voluntarily granted and revocable pursuant to a statute that aims ‘to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons’ ").

2003A license to carry a firearm is a privilege voluntarily granted and revocable pursuant to a statute that aims “to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons.” Ruggiero v. Police Commr. of Boston, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 258 (1984).

22
District of Columbia v. Hellergreen
scotus · 2008 · cited in 2 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2009–2011
2 sentences

2011Heller, supra at 629-630 . (i) Unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of G.

2009The defendant is charged with four counts of improper storage of a firearm in violation of G.L.c. 140, §131L. 1 The case is now before the Court on the defendant’s motion to dismiss those charges on the grounds that the statute unconstitutionally infringes on his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as construed by the United States Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008) (“Hellef’).

12
Commonwealth v. Andersongreen
mass · 2005 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012In the future, where a defendant charged with the unlawful carrying of a firearm in violation of § 10 (a) possesses evidence that the firearm was manufactured before 1900, the defendant shall provide the Commonwealth with pretrial notice of the affirmative defense of exemption as required by rule 14 (b) (3). 10 See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 195, 214 (2005) (statutory exemption “is an affirmative defense”); Commonwealth v. Jones, 372 Mass. 403, 407 (1977) (treating firearm licensing exclusion as affirmative defense).

11
Commonwealth v. Cabralgreen
mass · 2005 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See also Commonwealth v. Cabral, 443 Mass. 171, 178-179 (2005), quoting Model Penal Code § 1.12(3)(c) (1985) (“affirmative defense [is] one that ‘involves a matter of . . . justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant on which he can fairly be required to adduce supporting evidence’ ”).

11
Williams v. Stategreen
md · 2011 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479 , 488 n.7 (2011) (defendant could not challenge handgun statute where he had not obtained, or even applied for, handgun permit). (ii) Unlawful carrying of a firearm in violation of G.

11
Luk v. Commonwealthgreen
mass · 1995 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007See Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 423 (1995) (revocation of a driver’s license has “long affected public safety concerns”); Dupont, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 694 , quoting Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 258 (1984) (“A license to carry a firearm is a privilege voluntarily granted and revocable pursuant to a statute that aims ‘to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons’ ").

11
Commonwealth v. DeJesusgreen
massappct · 1998 · cited in 1 Massachusetts opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 351-352 (1998). b.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (6)

CaseCitedYears
Commonwealth v. Anderson green
mass · 2012
2 sentences

2018And that is for good reason, because many, perhaps most, defendants given enhanced sentences under the provisions of § 10G cannot reasonably be characterized as armed career criminals. **333 "The term, 'armed career criminal,' derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2006), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for those convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (2006) who have three prior convictions of a 'violent felony' or a 'serious drug offense.' " Commonwealth v. Anderson , 461 Mass. 616

2018And that is for good reason, because many, perhaps most, defendants given enhanced sentences under the provisions of § 10G cannot reasonably be characterized as armed career criminals. **333 "The term, 'armed career criminal,' derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2006), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for those convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (2006) who have three prior convictions of a 'violent felony' or a 'serious drug offense.' " Commonwealth v. Anderson , 461 Mass. 616

12018–2018
Anderson v. Massachusetts green
scotus · 2012
1 sentence

2018And that is for good reason, because many, perhaps most, defendants given enhanced sentences under the provisions of § 10G cannot reasonably be characterized as armed career criminals. **333 "The term, 'armed career criminal,' derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2006), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for those convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (2006) who have three prior convictions of a 'violent felony' or a 'serious drug offense.' " Commonwealth v. Anderson , 461 Mass. 616

12018–2018
Francois v. New York green
scotus · 2012
1 sentence

2018And that is for good reason, because many, perhaps most, defendants given enhanced sentences under the provisions of § 10G cannot reasonably be characterized as armed career criminals. **333 "The term, 'armed career criminal,' derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2006), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for those convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (2006) who have three prior convictions of a 'violent felony' or a 'serious drug offense.' " Commonwealth v. Anderson , 461 Mass. 616

12018–2018
Powell v. Thaler green
scotus · 2012
1 sentence

2018And that is for good reason, because many, perhaps most, defendants given enhanced sentences under the provisions of § 10G cannot reasonably be characterized as armed career criminals. **333 "The term, 'armed career criminal,' derives from the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2006), which imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years for those convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (2006) who have three prior convictions of a 'violent felony' or a 'serious drug offense.' " Commonwealth v. Anderson , 461 Mass. 616

12018–2018
Commonwealth v. Depina green
mass · 2010
1 sentence

2012The Commonwealth asserts that pursuant to Commonwealth v. Depina, supra, any error was harmless.

12012–2012
Dupont v. Chief of Police of Pepperell green
massappct · 2003
1 sentence

2007See Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 423 (1995) (revocation of a driver’s license has “long affected public safety concerns”); Dupont, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 694 , quoting Ruggiero v. Police Comm’r of Boston, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 258 (1984) (“A license to carry a firearm is a privilege voluntarily granted and revocable pursuant to a statute that aims ‘to limit access to deadly weapons by irresponsible persons’ ").

12007–2007

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10 (7) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 121 (5) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131 (5) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 7 (5) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 24 (4) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129C (3) MA § Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10G (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CT 90 (1977–2026) CA 61 (1967–2026) VA 50 (1994–2026) IL 22 (2005–2025) PA 21 (1974–2026) OH 21 (1993–2025) FL 19 (1982–2025) WA 17 (1983–2026) NY 11 (1987–2025) TX 10 (1976–2021) MA 10 (2003–2018) GA 8 (1977–2021) LA 8 (1979–2024) IA 7 (2016–2024) NM 5 (1981–2018) KS 4 (1977–2004) VI 4 (2011–2016) WI 4 (1992–2023) IN 4 (2002–2015) NJ 3 (1976–2017) NC 3 (1974–2025) MO 3 (2012–2021) MI 3 (2012–2016) MS 3 (2016–2021) AK 2 (1987–2024) HI 2 (1999–2025) UT 2 (1991–2019) TN 2 (1992–2015) AZ 2 (2000–2014) VT 2 (1993–2018) AL 2 (2015–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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