firearm violation in Pennsylvania

2026On March 14, 2024, Cintron filed a pro se “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence Merger Issue.” Treating this filing as Cintron’s first PCRA petition, the PCRA court appointed counsel.3 On October 28, 2024, PCRA counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Turner/ Finley, supra, in which counsel opined that Cintron’s PCRA petition was untimely and Cintron did not plead and prove a time-bar exception.

2024As previously noted, Appellant assails the element of possession, which “can be found by proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.” Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730 , 741 -3- J-S43001-24 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa.Super. 2018)).

2017See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”); Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d 1267 , 1270 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2008) (finding waiver where appellant failed to support issue with argument or citation to authority) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)). 11 The Commonwealth also argues that the trial court erred in finding that Officer Davis lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Adams based on a firearm violation.

2015We note that Lynch has been overruled on other grounds, as stated in Commonwealth v. Foglia, supra, 979 A.2d at 361 n.2. - 13 - J-S26008-15 Here, during the chase, D.X.P., a juvenile, brandished a firearm in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1 (“Possession of firearm by minor”).6 Because police observed him committing this offense, the officers had probable cause to arrest D.X.P. and seize the firearm.7 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the firearm.8 Dispositional order affirmed.

2015Hill 1, 66 A.3d at 363 . ____________________________________________ 1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). -2- J-S23023-15 In a separate but related appeal, Appellant challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence with respect to the aggregated thirty- five-to-seventy-year sentence imposed for his convictions of aggravated assault and the firearm violation.

2015Hill 1, 66 A.3d at 363 . ____________________________________________ 1 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). -2- J-S23023-15 In a separate but related appeal, Appellant challenged the discretionary aspects of his sentence with respect to the aggregated thirty- five-to-seventy-year sentence imposed for his convictions of aggravated assault and the firearm violation.

2015Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“Hill 2”).

2014J-S79008-14 the sentence was affirmed. [Commonwealth v. Alexander, 928 A.2d 1117 (Pa. Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum).

1983Curry v. Myers, supra , to hold that § 6103 "merely defines that a firearm violation will not merge with a crime of violence," and "was not intended to create a separately punishable crime." Accordingly, because appellant's two-and-one-half-to-five year sentence for crimes committed with a firearm cannot stand, we must remand to the lower court for resentencing.

1983Curry v. Myers, supra, to hold that § 6103 “merely defines that a firearm violation will not merge with a crime of violence,” and “was not intended to create a separately punishable crime.” Accordingly, because appellant’s two-and-one-half-to-five year sentence for crimes committed with a firearm cannot stand, we must remand to the lower court for resentencing.

1980Relying upon its decision in Mitchell v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 243 , 375 A.2d 902 (1977), the Commonwealth Court held that “credit for confinement under a detainer lodged against a parolee must be applied to the original sentence.” Gaito v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 199, 204 , 392 A.2d 343, 345 (1978).

1980Relying upon its decision in Mitchell v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 243 , 375 A.2d 902 (1977), the Commonwealth Court held that “credit for confinement under a detainer lodged against a parolee must be applied to the original sentence.” Gaito v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 199, 204 , 392 A.2d 343, 345 (1978).

1975A similar result was reached by the New York courts in the case of People v. DeWitt, 285 App. Div. 1157 , 140 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1955), where it was held that although an inoperable pistol was not a firearm under the New York firearm statute, possession of such inoperable pistol could nevertheless be prohibited by a dangerous weapon statute. [4] The section of the Uniform Firearms Act considered in Layton is very limited in scope in that it relates to a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence and "intended to cover only objects which could cause violence by firing a shot." Commonwealth

1975A similar result was reached by the New York courts in the case of People v. DeWitt, 285 App. Div. 1157 , 140 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1955), where it was held that although an inoperable pistol was not a firearm under the New York firearm statute, possession of such inoperable pistol could nevertheless be prohibited by a dangerous weapon statute. 4 The section of the Uniform Firearms Act considered in Layton is very limited in scope in that it relates to a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence and “intended to cover only objects which could cause violence by firing a shot.” Commonwealth v

1975A similar result was reached by the New York courts in the case of People v. DeWitt, 285 App. Div. 1157 , 140 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1955), where it was held that although an inoperable pistol was not a firearm under the New York firearm statute, possession of such inoperable pistol could nevertheless be prohibited by a dangerous weapon statute. [4] The section of the Uniform Firearms Act considered in Layton is very limited in scope in that it relates to a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence and "intended to cover only objects which could cause violence by firing a shot." Commonwealth

1975A similar result was reached by the New York courts in the case of People v. DeWitt, 285 App. Div. 1157 , 140 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1955), where it was held that although an inoperable pistol was not a firearm under the New York firearm statute, possession of such inoperable pistol could nevertheless be prohibited by a dangerous weapon statute. [4] The section of the Uniform Firearms Act considered in Layton is very limited in scope in that it relates to a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence and "intended to cover only objects which could cause violence by firing a shot." Commonwealth

1974Commonwealth v. Lockhart, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 60 , 296 A. 2d 883 (1972).

1974Commonwealth v. Lockhart, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 60 , 296 A. 2d 883 (1972).