sequestration rule in Georgia

2022Lead trial counsel testified that if he had known Min-Hyuk was present at Oh’s deposition, he would have “tried to get the [trial court] to restrict [Min-Hyuk’s] testimony based on a violation of the [order], or at least . . . make it known to the jury that there was something improper in his testimony.” 19 Second-chair counsel testified that if Min-Hyuk was present, he would have used Min-Hyuk’s alleged violation of the court order to impeach him during trial. “[T]he purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discou

2022Lead trial counsel testified that if he had known Min-Hyuk was present at Oh’s deposition, he would have “tried to get the [trial court] to restrict [Min-Hyuk’s] testimony based on a violation of the [order], or at least . . . make it known to the jury that there was something improper in his testimony.” 19 Second-chair counsel testified that if Min-Hyuk was present, he would have used Min-Hyuk’s alleged violation of the court order to impeach him during trial. “[T]he purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discou

1996Although no "proper foundation for an exception to the sequestration rule" was expressly laid by the State, see Davis, supra at 904 , 252 S.E.2d 443 , and Norman, supra at 316 , 338 S.E.2d 249 , Chastain did not require it.

1996Although no “proper foundation for an exception to the sequestration rule” was expressly laid by the State, see Davis, supra at 904 , and Norman, supra at 316 , Chastain did not require it.

1983See Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347, 348 ( 276 SE2d 224 ); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 357 (28) ( 260 SE2d 60 ); Watts v. State, 239 Ga. 725, 729-731 ( 238 SE2d 894 ).

1983See Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328, 347, 348 ( 276 SE2d 224 ); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 357 (28) ( 260 SE2d 60 ); Watts v. State, 239 Ga. 725, 729-731 ( 238 SE2d 894 ).

2013And “[t]he trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in enforcement of the sequestration rule, which will not be controlled absent abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted.) Lassiter v. State, 175 Ga. App. 338, 340 (5) ( 333 SE2d 412 ) (1985).

2013And “[t]he trial court is vested with broad discretionary powers in enforcement of the sequestration rule, which will not be controlled absent abuse of discretion.” (Citation omitted.) Lassiter v. State, 175 Ga. App. 338, 340 (5) ( 333 SE2d 412 ) (1985).

1988The trial court gave curative instructions in accord with Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328 (10) ( 276 SE2d 224 ) (1981).

1988The trial court gave curative instructions in accord with Jordan v. State, 247 Ga. 328 (10) ( 276 SE2d 224 ) (1981).

1985Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 357 ( 260 SE2d 60 ).

1985Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 357 ( 260 SE2d 60 ).

1984Pearley v. State, 235 Ga. 276, 277 ( 219 SE2d 404 ). 5.

1984Pearley v. State, 235 Ga. 276, 277 ( 219 SE2d 404 ). 5.

2014Sirmans v. State, 301 Ga. App. 756, 759 (4) ( 688 SE2d 669 ) (2009) (citations omitted).

2014Sirmans v. State, 301 Ga. App. 756, 759 (4) ( 688 SE2d 669 ) (2009) (citations omitted).

2000Staley v. State, 224 Ga. App. 806, 809 (3) ( 482 SE2d 459 ) (1997).

2000Staley v. State, 224 Ga. App. 806, 809 (3) ( 482 SE2d 459 ) (1997).

1965The court held, citing Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549, 562 ( 37 SE2d 785 ), that the Code confers upon the party making the sequestration request an absolute right to have all the opposition’s witnesses excluded, “subject only to the sound discretion of the trial judge in permitting one or more witnesses to remain in the courtroom to advise the opposite party in the presentation of his case. . .” It was held that since the solicitor had made no contention that he needed the agent’s assistance in the conduct of the case the State could not rely on this exception to the sequestration

1965The court held, citing Poultryland, Inc. v. Anderson, 200 Ga. 549, 562 ( 37 SE2d 785 ), that the Code confers upon the party making the sequestration request an absolute right to have all the opposition’s witnesses excluded, “subject only to the sound discretion of the trial judge in permitting one or more witnesses to remain in the courtroom to advise the opposite party in the presentation of his case. . .” It was held that since the solicitor had made no contention that he needed the agent’s assistance in the conduct of the case the State could not rely on this exception to the sequestration

1983“It has been held in numerous decisions that it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow the prosecuting witness to remain in the courtroom, as an exception to the sequestration rule. [Cits.] It has also been held that, based upon a showing by the state of some need not to call the unsequestered witness first, the trial court is authorized, in its discretion, to allow the unsequestered witness to be called to the stand after other witnesses have testified.” Hall v. State, 243 Ga. 207, 210 ( 253 SE2d 160 ) (1979).

1983“It has been held in numerous decisions that it is within the trial court’s discretion to allow the prosecuting witness to remain in the courtroom, as an exception to the sequestration rule. [Cits.] It has also been held that, based upon a showing by the state of some need not to call the unsequestered witness first, the trial court is authorized, in its discretion, to allow the unsequestered witness to be called to the stand after other witnesses have testified.” Hall v. State, 243 Ga. 207, 210 ( 253 SE2d 160 ) (1979).

2022“A party’s remedy for a violation of the rule is to request the trial court to charge the jury that the violation should be considered in determining the weight and credit to be given the testimony of the witness.” Szorcsik v. State, 303 Ga. 737, 741-742 (3) ( 814 SE2d 708 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022“A party’s remedy for a violation of the rule is to request the trial court to charge the jury that the violation should be considered in determining the weight and credit to be given the testimony of the witness.” Szorcsik v. State, 303 Ga. 737, 741-42 (3) (814 SE2d 708) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2021Hudson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 657, 660 (3) ( 754 SE2d 626 ) (2014) (citation omitted).

2021Hudson v. State, 325 Ga. App. 657, 660 (3) ( 754 SE2d 626 ) (2014) (citation omitted).

2021Known as the rule of sequestration, OCGA § 24-6-615 provides that, at the request of any party to a trial, “the court shall order witnesses excluded so that each witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses[.]” “[T]he purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 185 (2) (a) (2) ( 787 SE2d 221 ) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[I]ts violation generally does not affect the admissibility of the testimony, but may impact the offending w

2021Known as the rule of sequestration, OCGA § 24-6-615 provides that, at the request of any party to a trial, “the court shall order witnesses excluded so that each witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses[.]” “[T]he purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 185 (2) (a) (2) ( 787 SE2d 221 ) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[I]ts violation generally does not affect the admissibility of the testimony, but may impact the offending w

2020To the extent that a provision of the new Evidence Code deviates from the old Evidence Code and borrows its text from a Federal Rule of Evidence, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rule.” Franklin v. State, 306 Ga. 872, 875 (2) n. 9 ( 834 SE2d 830 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 6 299 Ga. 180, 185 (2) (a) ( 787 SE2d 221 ) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020“The purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Jones v. State, 302 Ga. 488, 493 (3) n. 5 ( 807 SE2d 344 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2020“The purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Jones v. State, 302 Ga. 488, 493 (3) n. 5 ( 807 SE2d 344 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016“The district court’s denial of a mistrial for violation of the sequestration rule is ... a matter of discretion and reversible only on a showing of prejudice.” United States v. Diaz, 248 F3d 1065, 1104 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

2016See also Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 5 Eleventh Circuit precedent explains that “[t]he purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. July 23, 1981). 6 See also Fed.

2016See also Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 5 Eleventh Circuit precedent explains that “[t]he purpose of the sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.” Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. July 23, 1981). 6 See also Fed.

2009A trial court, however, “is vested with the discretion to make an exception to the sequestration rule for the chief investigating officer *531 and the discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless abused. [Cits.]” Stafford v. State, 288 Ga. App. 733, 734 (2) ( 655 SE2d 221 ) (2007).

2009A trial court, however, “is vested with the discretion to make an exception to the sequestration rule for the chief investigating officer *531 and the discretion will not be reversed on appeal unless abused. [Cits.]” Stafford v. State, 288 Ga. App. 733, 734 (2) ( 655 SE2d 221 ) (2007).

2002Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425, 432 ( 467 SE2d 865 ) (1996).

2002Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425, 432 ( 467 SE2d 865 ) (1996).

1998“No error is shown to have resulted from [the witness] remaining in the courtroom during the trial in apparent violation of the sequestration rule since no objection was made at trial.” Collins v. State, 144 Ga. App. 102, 105 (6) ( 240 SE2d 597 ) (1977).

1998“No error is shown to have resulted from [the witness] remaining in the courtroom during the trial in apparent violation of the sequestration rule since no objection was made at trial.” Collins v. State, 144 Ga. App. 102, 105 (6) ( 240 SE2d 597 ) (1977).

1997We conclude that “a proper foundation for an exception to the sequestration rule was made, and we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in allowing the investigating officer to remain in the court room and in refusing to direct that he be called as the state’s first witness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 9, 11 (3) ( 258 SE2d 711 ) (1979).

1997We conclude that “a proper foundation for an exception to the sequestration rule was made, and we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in allowing the investigating officer to remain in the court room and in refusing to direct that he be called as the state’s first witness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. State, 151 Ga. App. 9, 11 (3) ( 258 SE2d 711 ) (1979).

1993Fugitt v. State, 254 Ga. 521, 522 (4) ( 330 SE2d 714 ) (1985); Gerald, supra. Appellant argues that since the witness was in custody, disclosure of his identity to enforce the sequestration rule was unnecessary.

1993Fugitt v. State, 254 Ga. 521, 522 (4) ( 330 SE2d 714 ) (1985); Gerald, supra. Appellant argues that since the witness was in custody, disclosure of his identity to enforce the sequestration rule was unnecessary.