Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Nunngreen2 sentences2000Citing People v. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 248 (1979), the defendant argues that the fact of the amendment creates a presumption that the legislature intended to change the law as it previously existed and, therefore, that the prior version of the solicitation statute is not violated if the accused solicits via computer. 2000Citing People v. Nunn , 77 Ill. 2d 243, 248 (1979), the defendant argues that the fact of the amendment creates a presumption that the legislature intended to change the law as it previously existed and, therefore, that the prior version of the solicitation statute is not violated if the accused solicits via computer. | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scribner v. Sachs
green
2 sentences1976While not necessarily controlling, “an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed.” (Scribner v. Sachs (1960), 18 Ill.2d 400, 411 .) “The function of this court is to construe the statute in accordance with the normal import of the words used, whatever its opinion may be regarding the desirability of results produced by the operation of the statute.” (People ex rel. 1974As stated in Scribner: “It is true that an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed, [citations] but this presumption is not necessarily controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations.” 18 Ill.2d at 411 . | 3 | 1974–1978 |
Bruni v. Department of Registration & Education
green
2 sentences1979Bruni v. Department of Registration and Education (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 6, 12 , 319 N.E.2d 37, 40 . 1979Bruni v. Department of Registration and Education (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 6, 12 , 319 N.E.2d 37, 40 . | 2 | 1978–1979 |
People Ex Rel. Carruthers v. Cooper
neutral
1 sentence1976Carruthers v. Cooper (1949), 404 Ill. 395, 400 .) It seems clear, if the amendatory language is accepted at face value, that it was intended to eliminate existing authority of the circuit court, where no final administrative decision had occurred, to hear the merits of those cases in which a taxpayer had the statutory right to file a claim for credit with the department, officer or agency to whom the payment was originally made and the disposition of that claim for credit was judicially reviewable under the Administrative Review Act. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
McLaughlin v. the People
green
2 sentences1960It is true that an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed, ( McLaughlin v. People, 403 Ill. 493 ; Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill.2d 112 ,) but this presumption is not necessarily controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations. (50 Am. 1960It is true that an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed, (McLaughlin v. People, 403 Ill. 493 ; Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill. 2d 112 ,) but this presumption is "not necessarily controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations. (50 Am. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb
green
2 sentences1960It is true that an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed, ( McLaughlin v. People, 403 Ill. 493 ; Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill.2d 112 ,) but this presumption is not necessarily controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations. (50 Am. 1960It is true that an amendment creates a presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed, (McLaughlin v. People, 403 Ill. 493 ; Acme Fireworks Corp. v. Bibb, 6 Ill. 2d 112 ,) but this presumption is "not necessarily controlling and may be overcome by more persuasive considerations. (50 Am. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States
green
1 sentence1938Anno., 2d ed., p. 63; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457 -463; and point out that the very fact that a change was made in the phraseology of the law by an amendment creates the presumption that it was intended to change the law as it formerly existed. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
United States v. Bashaw
green
1 sentence1938United States v. Bashaw, 50 Fed. 749 ( 8 C. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.