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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Harrisgreen1 sentence1990See also People v. Harris (1990), 196 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daley v. Kilbourn Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Daley v. Kilbourn Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2001Daley v. Kilbourn Club, Inc., 64 Ill. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Kyles
green
1 sentence2025While the appointed counsel in Kyles withdrew the defendant’s - 11 - ineffective assistance claims, choosing instead to challenge only the defendant’s sentence (Kyles, 2020 IL App (2d) 180087, ¶ 17 ), posttrial counsel here adopted defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, included it in his filings and arguments, and provided the requisite representation to ensure the trial court fully considered the issue. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Marseilles v. Radke
green
1 sentence1999The appellate court held that “[a]s subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time in the proceeding, the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on this issue, even in response to Radke’s motion to vacate the consent judgment.” City of Marseilles, 287 Ill. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Swift & Co. v. Dollahan
green
2 sentences1995(Swift & Co. v. Dollahan (1954), 2 Ill. App. 2d 574, 587 , 120 N.E.2d 249 (defendants waived argument by failing to specify it in their motion to dismiss).) The record here shows that defendants clearly raised this issue in their reply memorandum and that plaintiff’s attorney vigorously addressed the issue during the hearing on the motion. 1995(Swift & Co. v. Dollahan (1954), 2 Ill. App. 2d 574, 587 , 120 N.E.2d 249 (defendants waived argument by failing to specify it in their motion to dismiss).) The record here shows that defendants clearly raised this issue in their reply memorandum and that plaintiff’s attorney vigorously addressed the issue during the hearing on the motion. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Shields
green
2 sentences1992(Shields, 143 Ill. 2d at 445-46 , 575 N.E.2d at 543 .) Given the application of section 1 — 6(f) of the Criminal Code and the information stated to the jury by defense counsel in his closing argument, we find the court’s failure to sua sponte instruct on this issue was harmless error. 1992(Shields, 143 Ill. 2d at 445-46 , 575 N.E.2d at 543 .) Given the application of section 1 — 6(f) of the Criminal Code and the information stated to the jury by defense counsel in his closing argument, we find the court’s failure to sua sponte instruct on this issue was harmless error. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Enoch
green
1 sentence1990When combined with the failure to even discuss the issue during the hearing on Ayala’s post-trial motion, we conclude that pursuant to People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 , review of the issue would generally be waived. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hospital
green
2 sentences1978Claimant cites in her brief Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hospital, 55 Ill. 2d 411 , 303 N.E.2d 392 , which stated that “Where a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical profession (1) the conditions under which its drug should be prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to relieve; (3) the precautionary measures which should be observed; and (4) warns of the dangers which are inherent in its use, the doctor’s deviation from such recommendation is prima facie evidence of negligence. 1978Claimant cites in her brief Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hospital, 55 Ill. 2d 411 , 303 N.E.2d 392 , which stated that “Where a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical profession (1) the conditions under which its drug should be prescribed; (2) the disorders it is designed to relieve; (3) the precautionary measures which should be observed; and (4) warns of the dangers which are inherent in its use, the doctor’s deviation from such recommendation is prima facie evidence of negligence. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.