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8 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Warmackgreen2 sentences2021People v. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d 112, 124 (1980). ¶ 79 In conducting the requisite balancing test, the trial court should consider such factors as the nature of the previous conviction, how much time has elapsed since that conviction, the life the defendant has lived since the conviction, the defendant’s criminal record, and the similarity between the prior conviction and the charged offense. 2020People v. Warmack, 83 Ill. 2d 112, 124 (1980). ¶ 79 In conducting the requisite balancing test, the trial court should consider such factors as the nature of the previous conviction, how much time has elapsed since that conviction, the life the defendant has lived since the conviction, the defendant’s criminal record, and the similarity between the prior conviction and the charged offense. | 2 | 2 |
The People v. Montgomeryyellow2 sentences2003Young also argues that his counsel was ineffective for disclosing the “mere fact” of the prior convictions on direct examination, without requiring the court to engage in the requisite balancing test set forth in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516 , 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1971). 2003Young also argues that his counsel was ineffective for disclosing the “mere fact” of the prior convictions on direct examination, without requiring the court to engage in the requisite balancing test set forth in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516 , 268 N.E.2d 695, 698 (1971). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rebergreen1 sentence2022“Furthermore, a trial judge is presumed to know that law, and on review, the appellate court presumes that the trial judge followed applicable law unless the record indicates otherwise.” Reber, 2019 IL App (5th) 150439, ¶ 85 (citing People v. Groel, 2012 IL App (3d) 090595, ¶ 43 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mullins
green
2 sentences2020This last factor requires a trial judge to conduct a balancing test, weighing the prior conviction’s probative value against its potential prejudice.” Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 14 . ¶ 32 In performing the requisite balancing test, “the trial court should consider, inter alia, the nature of the prior conviction, the nearness or remoteness of that crime to the present charge, the subsequent career of the person, the length of the witness’ criminal record, and whether the crime was similar to the one charged. [Citation.]” Id. 2020This last factor requires a trial judge to conduct a balancing test, weighing the prior conviction’s probative value against its potential prejudice.” Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 14 . ¶ 32 In performing the requisite balancing test, “the trial court should consider, inter alia, the nature of the prior conviction, the nearness or remoteness of that crime to the present charge, the subsequent career of the person, the length of the witness’ criminal record, and whether the crime was similar to the one charged. [Citation.]” Id. | 3 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Groel
green
1 sentence2022“Furthermore, a trial judge is presumed to know that law, and on review, the appellate court presumes that the trial judge followed applicable law unless the record indicates otherwise.” Reber, 2019 IL App (5th) 150439, ¶ 85 (citing People v. Groel, 2012 IL App (3d) 090595, ¶ 43 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Ahlers
green
2 sentences2020Though the the trial court did not explicitly mention the balancing test prior to admitting evidence, this court found that the trial court implicitly engaged in the balancing analysis where “the court noted that it was going to require the State to present the specific - 18 - evidence that it intended to introduce at trial in order for the court to ‘weigh that against what prejudicial effect it might have upon the defendant.’ ” Id. at 750 . ¶ 58 Similarly, the defendant in People v. Boyd, 366 Ill App. 3d 84, 90 (2006), argued on appeal that the trial court failed to conduct the balancing test 2020The court ultimately allowed the State to introduce “this evidence” in their case-in-chief because it occurred only a year prior and showed context. ¶ 57 In People v. Abernathy, 402 Ill. App. 3d 726 (2010), the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court failed to conduct the requisite balancing test before admitting evidence under section 115-7.4. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Neely
green
1 sentence2020That is, defendant’s claim of error comes down to whether the trial court adequately conducted the requisite balancing test when it determined that it would admit only one of Grant’s prior drug convictions. - 12 - ¶ 36 In this court, defendant does not suggest that the trial court was unaware of the governing standard but criticizes the court for “only cursorily discussing the Montgomery balancing test.” Although a trial court need not explicitly state on the record that it is conducting the balancing test (see Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d at 16 ), the record shows that the court was cognizant of Mont | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. McKibbins
green
2 sentences1995People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 188 , 449 N.E.2d 821, 826 . 1995People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 176, 188 , 449 N.E.2d 821, 826 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.