res judicata is inapplicable doctrine in Illinois

2018Alternatively, the City argues that, on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable.1 ¶ 15 We first note that, on administrative review, this court “reviews the administrative agency’s final decision, not the circuit court’s decision. [Citations.]” Sloper v. City of Chicago, Department of Administrative Hearings, 2014 IL App (1st) 140712, ¶ 15 .

2018Alternatively, the City argues that, on the merits, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. 1 *371 ¶ 15 We first note that, on administrative review, this court "reviews the administrative agency's final decision, not the circuit court's decision. [Citations.]" Sloper v. City of Chicago, Department of Administrative Hearings , 2014 IL App (1st) 140712 , ¶ 15, 388 Ill.Dec. 10 , 23 N.E.3d 1208 .

1986The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” (People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 408 .) When res judicata is established “ ‘as a bar against the prosecution of a second action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand *** it is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or dem

1986The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” (People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 408 .) When res judicata is established “ ‘as a bar against the prosecution of a second action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand *** it is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or dem

1986The doctrine of res judicata provides that “a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” (People v. Kidd (1947), 398 Ill. 405, 408 .) When res judicata is established “ ‘as a bar against the prosecution of a second action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand *** it is conclusive not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or dem

1981There has been no final judgment or decree upon the merits on the State charge of driving under the influence which is necessary to invoke the doctrine of res judicata (Russell v. Klein (1977), 46 Ill.

1980The cases cited by Jackson in support of his position, Marx v. Marco (1947), 331 Ill.

1975In his opinion, Justice Burke stated: “The outcome of the prior criminal proceedings would in any event be immaterial in the subsequent proceedings instituted by the Mayor to revoke plaintiff’s food purveyor license. [Citations.] The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this case for the principal reason that the burden of proof in the criminal proceeding is different from the burden of proof in the license revocation proceeding.” 12 Ill.App.3d 368, 371 .

1973(See Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill.App.2d 326 , 188 N.E.2d 243 ; Taylor v. Civil Service Com., 33 Ill.App.2d 48 , 178 N.E.2d 200 .) The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this case for the principal reason that the burden of proof in the criminal proceeding is different from the burden of proof in the license revocation proceeding.

1973(See Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill.App.2d 326 , 188 N.E.2d 243 ; Taylor v. Civil Service Com., 33 Ill.App.2d 48 , 178 N.E.2d 200 .) The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this case for the principal reason that the burden of proof in the criminal proceeding is different from the burden of proof in the license revocation proceeding.

1973(See Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill.App.2d 326 , 188 N.E.2d 243 ; Taylor v. Civil Service Com., 33 Ill.App.2d 48 , 178 N.E.2d 200 .) The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this case for the principal reason that the burden of proof in the criminal proceeding is different from the burden of proof in the license revocation proceeding.

1973(See Nechi v. Daley, 40 Ill.App.2d 326 , 188 N.E.2d 243 ; Taylor v. Civil Service Com., 33 Ill.App.2d 48 , 178 N.E.2d 200 .) The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this case for the principal reason that the burden of proof in the criminal proceeding is different from the burden of proof in the license revocation proceeding.

1973We believe the following pronouncement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 400 , 186 A.65, 70, is appropriate: “It has been the established rule that a criminal prosecution does not bar a subsequent civil or administrative proceeding based upon the same set of facts, nor does a judgment rendered therein have any probative value in subsequent proceedings beyond the mere fact of its rendition: Wilson v. Wilson, 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 451 .

1973We believe the following pronouncement by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 400 , 186 A.65, 70, is appropriate: “It has been the established rule that a criminal prosecution does not bar a subsequent civil or administrative proceeding based upon the same set of facts, nor does a judgment rendered therein have any probative value in subsequent proceedings beyond the mere fact of its rendition: Wilson v. Wilson, 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 451 .