six-month notice requirement in Illinois

1994In Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 506 , 368 N.E.2d 105 , for example, the plaintiff challenged the six-month notice requirement and the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 41 of the Transit Act.

1994In Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 506 , 368 N.E.2d 105 , for example, the plaintiff challenged the six-month notice requirement and the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 41 of the Transit Act.

2006Consequently, the Transit Act remained unchanged, explicitly providing that a cause of action must be dismissed for failure to comply with section 41 requirements. [Citation.] Moreover, the more stringent requirements of the Transit Act have withstood constitutional equal protection challenges as a result of the magnitude of the CTA’s operations. [Citations.]” Curtis, 341 Ill.

1977(Repaskey v. Chicago Transit Authority (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 185 .) Plaintiffs respond that a pre-1973 injury was there involved and the differing periods were not applicable, a conclusion which may be incorrect.

1972In King we acknowledged that the legislature is primarily responsible for determining classifications, and that we will not interfere with the legislative judgment unless it is without rational basis. ( 47 Ill.2d at 250 .) The rationale of King is equally applicable to section 8 — 101, barring a suit if not commenced within one year.

1972As to the plaintiff’s first contention, we recently held in King v. Johnson (1970), 47 Ill.2d 247 , that the six-month notice requirement of the statute was constitutional in that it did not constitute a special privilege, nor an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.

1971App.2d 439 , 442 where the statutory requirement of notice is described as "a condition precedent to the cause of action." The court in Hoffman agreed specifically with the reasoning and result of Schear and held, "that the language of Section 9-103 has no application to the six-month notice requirement." 129 Ill.

1970In McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52 , this court held that statutes, general in their terms (as is the guest statute), are frequently construed to contain exceptions when considered in connection with well known rules of law. ( 285 Ill. at 54 .) There the court was concerned with whether the six-month notice requirement of the Injuries Act of 1905 (Hurd’s Stat. 1917 p. 1663) applied to minor children seven years of age or under.

1970In McDonald v. City of Spring Valley, 285 Ill. 52 , this court held that statutes, general in their terms (as is the guest statute), are frequently construed to contain exceptions when considered in connection with well known rules of law. ( 285 Ill. at 54 .) There the court was concerned with whether the six-month notice requirement of the Injuries Act of 1905 (Hurd’s Stat. 1917 p. 1663) applied to minor children seven years of age or under.

1960As observed in People v. Chicago Transit Authority, 392 Ill. 77 , ‘That there is a substantial difference between the situation of passengers in the area here involved and those in the balance of the State, is readily seen.’ The quoted observation is singularly appropriate here.” It has been suggested that the six-month notice requirement is technical and should be liberally construed.