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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2019–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Virginia v. Blackgreen2 sentences2021Accordingly, we conclude that the true threat exception under the first amendment does not mandate that the accused specifically intend to threaten the victim and a statutory ban on threats that requires knowing conduct is not unconstitutionally overbroad. ¶ 58 Arguing for a contrary result, defendant places significant reliance on the statement in Black that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” See 2020Accordingly, we conclude that the true threat exception under the first amendment does not mandate that the accused specifically intend to threaten the victim and a statutory ban on threats that requires knowing conduct is not unconstitutionally overbroad. ¶ 58 Arguing for a contrary result, defendant places significant reliance on the statement in Black that “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” See | 3 | 8 |
O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Societygreen2 sentences2020See O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (“the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels”). ¶ 66 Further, defendant claims that, in Relerford, the supreme court “was able to sidestep the question of what kind of mental state the First Amendment requires of a statute that prohibits threats,” the “true threat exception requires a mental state of intentionality, or at least knowledge, that the recipient will understand the communication as a threat,” and the “true threat” 2019See O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 421, 440 (2008) (“the opinion of one district, division, or panel of the appellate court is not binding on other districts, divisions, or panels”). ¶ 66 Further, defendant claims that, in Relerford, the supreme court “was able to sidestep the question of what kind of mental state the First Amendment requires of a statute that prohibits threats,” the “true threat exception requires a mental state of intentionality, or at least knowledge, that the recipient will understand the communication as a threat,” and the “true threat” | 2 | 2 |
People v. Morochogreen2 sentences2020See Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶¶ 65-66, 69 . ¶ 63 Defendant asserts that subsection (a) is unconstitutional because it lacks any elements of a true threat, including that it does not require that “predicate communications express any intent to act in the future.” However, as previously discussed, under the true threat exception, the “speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 . ¶ 64 Defendant also asserts that subsection (a) is unconstitutional because it does not even refer to an “ ‘unlawful act of violence.’ ” We note that, following oral argument, 2019See Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶¶ 65-66, 69 . ¶ 63 Defendant asserts that subsection (a) is unconstitutional because it lacks any elements of a true threat, including that it does not require that “predicate communications express any intent to act in the future.” However, as previously discussed, under the true threat exception, the “speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60 . ¶ 64 Defendant also asserts that subsection (a) is unconstitutional because it does not even refer to an “ ‘unlawful act of violence.’ ” We note that, following oral argument, | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. SUCIC
green
2 sentences2020“In - 11 - addressing a facial overbreadth challenge, the first task is to determine whether the statute reaches constitutionally protected speech ***.” Id. ¶ 59 Although the supreme court in Relerford found that the “communicates to or about” phrase in subsection (a) did not fall within the true threat exception and concluded that it was overbroad in violation of the first amendment, it nevertheless determined that the “threats” provision was separate from the “communicates to or about” provision and implied that it could form the requisite course of conduct prohibited by subsection (a). 2019“In addressing a facial overbreadth challenge, the first task is to determine whether the statute reaches constitutionally protected speech ***.” Id. ¶ 59 Although the supreme court in Relerford found that the “communicates to or about” phrase in subsection (a) did not fall within the true threat exception and concluded that it was overbroad in violation of the first amendment, it nevertheless determined that the “threats” provision was separate from the “communicates to or about” provision and implied that it could form the requisite course of conduct prohibited by subsection (a). | 2 | 2019–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.