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8 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Krimstock v. Kellyred2 sentences2011Id. at 67. ¶ 78 Persuaded by the approach taken in Krimstock, the circuit court in this case reasoned that the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of Illinois' Criminal Code were facially invalid and unenforceable under the due process clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because they did not provide any mechanism for a prompt, probable cause hearing after a vehicle was seized where claimants could test the State's right to retain their vehicles while they awaited trial on the merits of the forfeiture action and where the *109 2011Id. at 67 . ¶ 78 Persuaded by the approach taken in Krimstock, the circuit court in this case reasoned that the vehicle-forfeiture provisions of Illinois’ Criminal Code were facially invalid and unenforceable under the due process clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because they did not provide any mechanism for a prompt, probable cause hearing after a vehicle was seized where claimants could test the State’s right to retain their vehicles while they awaited trial on the merits of the forfeiture action and where the Sta | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wanda A.
green
2 sentences2015In re Charles A., 367 Ill. 2015In re Charles A., 367 Ill. | 3 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Bernice B.
green
2 sentences2015In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. 2015In re Bernice B., 352 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Moore v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2011In Moore , the California court applied its version of the due process analysis, consisting of the three Mathews factors plus a fourth factor considering "the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official." Moore, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 199 , 237 P.3d at 539 . 2011In Moore, the California court applied its version of the due process analysis, consisting of the three Mathews factors plus a fourth factor considering “the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible government official.” Moore, 237 P.3d at 539 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Mapes v. Hulcher
green
2 sentences1990(Mapes v. Hulcher (1936), 363 Ill. 227, 231 .) Therefore, after considering the three Mathews factors in light of both the purpose behind the general venue rules in Illinois and general principles of statutory interpretation, we determine that the special venue provision of section SO-IS.12 is such an arbitrary and unreasonable statute. 1990But we have stated that a law fixing venue could be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to deprive defendants of due process. ( Mapes v. Hulcher (1936), 363 Ill. 227, 231 , 2 N.E.2d 63 .) Therefore, after considering the three Mathews factors in light of both the purpose behind the general venue rules in Illinois and general principles of statutory interpretation, we determine that the special venue provision of section 30-15.12 is such an arbitrary and unreasonable statute. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.