reasonably thorough inquiry in New York

2026After a reasonably thorough inquiry, the court had sufficient information upon which to determine that the absence of the juror would delay the trial by far more that the statutory two-hour period ( see CPL 270.35[2][a]; People v Jeanty , 94 NY2d 507, 515-517 [2000]; People v Bailey , 194 AD3d 496, 497 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1095 [2021]).

2023So, we are going to replace juror number one." Although replacement of a juror is generally left to the court's discretion, "[w]ithout a reasonably thorough inquiry, . . . the exercise of the court's discretion on the ultimate issue of whether or not to replace the juror [was] uninformed" ( People [*5]v Jeanty , 94 NY2d 507, 516 [2000]).

2019The defendant's claim regarding the constitutionality of the discharge of the juror is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Angelo , 88 NY2d 217, 222 ; People v Ballard , 51 AD3d 1034 1035-1036 ) and, in any event, without merit ( see People v Jeanty , 94 NY2d at 517 ; People v Ballard , 51 AD3d at 1036 ).

2019The defendant's claim regarding the constitutionality of the discharge of the juror is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Angelo , 88 NY2d 217, 222 ; People v Ballard , 51 AD3d 1034 1035-1036 ) and, in any event, without merit ( see People v Jeanty , 94 NY2d at 517 ; People v Ballard , 51 AD3d at 1036 ).

2019The defendant's claim regarding the constitutionality of the discharge of the juror is unpreserved for appellate review ( see People v Angelo , 88 NY2d 217, 222 ; People v Ballard , 51 AD3d 1034 1035-1036 ) and, in any event, without merit ( see People v Jeanty , 94 NY2d at 517 ; People v Ballard , 51 AD3d at 1036 ).

2017The defendant’s claim regarding the constitutionality of the discharge of the juror is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217, 222 [1996]; People v Ballard, 51 AD3d 1034, 1035-1036 [2008]) and, in any event, without merit (see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d at 517 ; People v Ballard, 51 AD3d at 1036 ).

2025The defendant's general objection failed to preserve for appellate review his specific contention that the Supreme Court failed to conduct a reasonably thorough inquiry before discharging juror No. 12 on the ground of illness and replacing her with an alternate juror ( see People v Gueye , 122 AD3d 768, 768 ).

2017The defendant’s claim regarding the constitutionality of the discharge of the juror is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217, 222 [1996]; People v Gueye, 122 AD3d 768, 768 [2014]; People v Ballard, 51 AD3d 1034, 1035-1036 [2008]) and, in any event, without merit (see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d at 517 ; People v Ballard, 51 AD3d at 1036 ).

2014Defendant contends that the court impermissibly delegated its duty pursuant to CPL 270.35 (2) (a) “to make a reasonably thorough inquiry” with respect to whether a juror was unable to continue serving by reason of illness (see People v Smith, 304 AD2d 364, 365 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 566 [2003]).

2014Defendant contends that the court impermissibly delegated its duty pursuant to CPL 270.35 (2) (a) “to make a reasonably thorough inquiry” with respect to whether a juror was unable to continue serving by reason of illness (see People v Smith, 304 AD2d 364, 365 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 566 [2003]).

2010The defendant’s contention that the County Court failed to make a reasonably thorough inquiry of a juror, as required by CPL 270.35 (2) (a), before discharging her prior to opening statements is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Settles, 28 AD3d 591 [2006]; People v Riccardi, 199 AD2d 432, 432 [1993]).

2008Under these circumstances, the court properly exercised its discretion in discharging the juror because he was “unavailable for continued service” within the meaning of the statute (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Riccardi, 199 AD2d 432 [1993]; People v Hill, 182 AD2d 640 [1992]).

2002Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court conducted “a reasonably thorough inquiry and recit[ed] on the record * * * the facts and reasons” for discharging the juror (People v Page, 72 NY2d 69, 73 ; see, People v O’Connor, 222 AD2d 705 ).

2000Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the court conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry and recited on the record the facts and reasons for the dismissal of that juror, as required (see, CPL 270.35; People v Page, 72 NY2d 69, 73 ; People v O’Connor, 222 AD2d 705 ).

1993We find that the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in discharging the sworn juror without first conducting a reasonably thorough inquiry to determine whether the juror was unavailable for continued service (see, People v Page, 72 NY2d 69 ; People v Washington, 75 NY2d 740 ; People v Davis, 178 AD2d 424 ; People v Guine, 173 AD2d 849 ).

1993We agree with the defendant’s contention that the trial court improvidently discharged a sworn juror without first conducting "a reasonably thorough inquiry and recitation on the record of the facts and reasons for invoking the statutory authorization of discharging and replacing [the] juror based on continued unavailability” (People v Page, 72 NY2d 69, 73 ; see, CPL 270.35; see, People v Davis, 178 AD2d 424, 425 ).

2002Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court conducted “a reasonably thorough inquiry and recit[ed] on the record * * * the facts and reasons” for discharging the juror (People v Page, 72 NY2d 69, 73 ; see, People v O’Connor, 222 AD2d 705 ).

2000Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the court conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry and recited on the record the facts and reasons for the dismissal of that juror, as required (see, CPL 270.35; People v Page, 72 NY2d 69, 73 ; People v O’Connor, 222 AD2d 705 ).

2023County Court was certainly not required to wait two hours before substituting juror No. 1, but, on the record before us, it impermissibly presumed that she was "unavailable for continued service without conducting the requisite reasonably thorough inquiry and determining that [the] juror [was] not likely to appear within two hours" ( People v Lang , 35 NY3d 222 , 226 [2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2022The record discloses that, prior to discharging juror No. 1, the court neither heard from nor reached out to her to see if she would not be making it for the trial or if she was en route to the courthouse ( see People v Lang , 35 NY3d at 226; compare People v Robinson , 127 AD3d 588, 588 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1206 [2015]; People v Tyrell , 82 AD3d 1352, 1356 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 810 [2011]).

2017The court conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry into the sworn juror’s unavailability and providently exercised its discretion in replacing the sworn juror with an alternate, after determining that the sworn juror would not appear within the two-hour time period set forth in CPL 270.35 (2) (see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d 507, 517 [2000]; People v Myers, 28 AD3d 373, 373 [2006]; People v Ortiz, 286 AD2d 781, 782 [2001]).

2003Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the court did not improperly delegate its obligation to make “a reasonably thorough inquiry” regarding the juror’s unavailability (CPL 270.35 [2] [a]; see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d 507 [2000]; People v Bruno, 295 AD2d 228 [2002]; People v Ortiz, 286 AD2d 781 [2001]).

2003Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the court did not improperly delegate its obligation to make “a reasonably thorough inquiry” regarding the juror’s unavailability (CPL 270.35 [2] [a]; see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d 507 [2000]; People v Bruno, 295 AD2d 228 [2002]; People v Ortiz, 286 AD2d 781 [2001]).

2003The court did not impermissibly delegate its duty to “make a reasonably thorough inquiry” under CPL 270.35 (2) (a) by relying, without objection, on information relayed by a court officer and a court clerk that the juror was ill with the flu, was going to the doctor, and did not feel well enough to go to court the following day (see People v Harris, 204 AD2d 240 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 826 [1994]; People v Bruno, 295 AD2d 228, 229 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 533 [2002]).

2026After a reasonably thorough inquiry, the court had sufficient information upon which to determine that the absence of the juror would delay the trial by far more that the statutory two-hour period ( see CPL 270.35[2][a]; People v Jeanty , 94 NY2d 507, 515-517 [2000]; People v Bailey , 194 AD3d 496, 497 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 1095 [2021]).

2026Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are beyond our review on direct appeal, as they involve matters not reflected in or fully explained by the record, and therefore should have been raised in a CPL 440.10 motion ( see People v Henderson , 28 NY3d 63, 66 [2016]; People v Rivera , 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]).

2026Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are beyond our review on direct appeal, as they involve matters not reflected in or fully explained by the record, and therefore should have been raised in a CPL 440.10 motion ( see People v Henderson , 28 NY3d 63, 66 [2016]; People v Rivera , 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]).

2022The record discloses that, prior to discharging juror No. 1, the court neither heard from nor reached out to her to see if she would not be making it for the trial or if she was en route to the courthouse ( see People v Lang , 35 NY3d at 226; compare People v Robinson , 127 AD3d 588, 588 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1206 [2015]; People v Tyrell , 82 AD3d 1352, 1356 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 810 [2011]).

2022The record discloses that, prior to discharging juror No. 1, the court neither heard from nor reached out to her to see if she would not be making it for the trial or if she was en route to the courthouse ( see People v Lang , 35 NY3d at 226; compare People v Robinson , 127 AD3d 588, 588 [2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1206 [2015]; People v Tyrell , 82 AD3d 1352, 1356 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 810 [2011]).

2021The prosecutor's summation did not deprive defendant of a fair trial ( see People v D'Alessandro , 184 AD2d 114, 118-119 [1st Dept 1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 884 [1993]).

2017The court conducted a reasonably thorough inquiry into the sworn juror’s unavailability and providently exercised its discretion in replacing the sworn juror with an alternate, after determining that the sworn juror would not appear within the two-hour time period set forth in CPL 270.35 (2) (see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d 507, 517 [2000]; People v Myers, 28 AD3d 373, 373 [2006]; People v Ortiz, 286 AD2d 781, 782 [2001]).

2016Under the circumstances of this case, the testimony offered by the People on rebuttal regarding the defendant’s taking of the victim’s clothing and personal property was properly admitted for the purpose of disproving the defendant’s defense that she was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (see Penal Law § 40.15; People v Santarelli, 49 NY2d 241, 248 [1980]; People v Ploska, 52 AD3d 742, 743 [2008]).