Harrison defense in Indiana

2010In the present case, the Court of Appeals applied the Harrison analysis as to the State having the burden to rebut the defense, but concluded that "Officer Walker's approximate five-minute observation of Griffin's walk down Campeau Street was sufficient to show that he was not 'briefly' within 1,000 feet of the school," and thus "the State's evidence was sufficient to rebut Griffin's defense." (Griffin, 905 N.E.2d at 525 .

2010In the present case, the Court of Appeals applied the Harrison analysis as to the State having the burden to rebut the defense, but concluded that "Officer Walker's approximate five-minute observation of Griffin's walk down Campeau Street was sufficient to show that he was not 'briefly' within 1,000 feet of the school," and thus "the State's evidence was sufficient to rebut Griffin's defense." (Griffin, 905 N.E.2d at 525 .

1999The postconviction court rejected Harrison’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and found that Harrison’s trial counsel “met the reasonableness standards” of State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996), reh’g granted in part, 681 N.E.2d 181 *778 (Ind.1997), cert, denied — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1060 , 140 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998). 12 A. Guilt Phase Harrison draws our attention to several specific instances of alleged trial counsel ineffectiveness in the guilt phase of his trial: (1) failure to renew a motion for change of venue; (2) failure to file a timely notice of alibi or make an offer t

1998The postconviction court rejected Harrison’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and found that Harrison’s trial counsel “met the reasonableness standards” of State v. Van Cleave , 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996), reh’g granted in part , 681 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1060 , 140 L.

1999The postconviction court rejected Harrison’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and found that Harrison’s trial counsel “met the reasonableness standards” of State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996), reh’g granted in part, 681 N.E.2d 181 *778 (Ind.1997), cert, denied — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1060 , 140 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998). 12 A. Guilt Phase Harrison draws our attention to several specific instances of alleged trial counsel ineffectiveness in the guilt phase of his trial: (1) failure to renew a motion for change of venue; (2) failure to file a timely notice of alibi or make an offer t

1998The postconviction court rejected Harrison’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and found that Harrison’s trial counsel “met the reasonableness standards” of State v. Van Cleave , 674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996), reh’g granted in part , 681 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. 1997), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1060 , 140 L.

1999To support a claim of State misconduct, the withheld evidence must be “material” to Harrison’s defense. “[Ejvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

1999To support a claim of State misconduct, the withheld evidence must be “material” to Harrison’s defense. “[Ejvidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).

2015During the State’s closing argument, the trial court overruled Harrison’s objection to the prosecuting attorney reading a portion of this court’s opinion in Dawson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 742 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), which dealt with the definition of manufacturing methamphetamine.

1999Harrison must show “that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (footnote omitted).

1999Harrison must show “that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (footnote omitted).

1999Harrison’s sole contention in regard to the venue issue is that his trial counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that there were “very serious problems” with venue that “were not eliminated by voir dire.” We reviewed the transcript of voir dire on direct appeal and found no showing “that the jurors were unable to set aside any preconceived notions of guilt and render a verdict based upon the evidence.” Harrison, 644 N.E.2d at 1249 .

1999In In the Matter of J.L.V., Jr., 667 N.E.2d 186 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), this court held that a CHINS determination that follows a fact-finding hearing does not constitute the end of the subject matter of litigation.

1979Shortly after Ringley’s trial, Pointon v. State, (1978) Ind., 372 N.E.2d 1159 , expressly overturned Lockridge and retroactively implemented the former Harrison rule requiring an objection at trial.

1979Shortly after Ringley’s trial, Pointon v. State, (1978) Ind., 372 N.E.2d 1159 , expressly overturned Lockridge and retroactively implemented the former Harrison rule requiring an objection at trial.