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8 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Samm v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See Samm, 893 N.E.2d at 766 . | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen2 sentences2010In addition, the detective's persistent resumptions of communications after the defendant's invocation of rights runs afoul of Michigan v. Mosley, which warned, "To permit the continuation of eustodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned." 423 U.S. 96, 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1975). 2010In addition, the detective's persistent resumptions of communications after the defendant's invocation of rights runs afoul of Michigan v. Mosley, which warned, "To permit the continuation of eustodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned." 423 U.S. 96, 102 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 326 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Purkett v. Elemgreen2 sentences2001Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 839 (emphasis in original). 2001Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 839 (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Arave v. Creechgreen2 sentences2000Citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 , 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542 , 123 L.Ed.2d 188, 200 (1993), he argues that this violates a requirement that a capital sentencing statutory scheme must provide a principled basis for differentiating those persons for whom the death penalty is appropriate from those for whom it is not. 2000Citing Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 , 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542 , 123 L.Ed.2d 188, 200 (1993), he argues that this violates a requirement that a capital sentencing statutory scheme must provide a principled basis for differentiating those persons for whom the death penalty is appropriate from those for whom it is not. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Lemondgreen2 sentences1993Cf In re Lemond (1980), 274 Ind. 505, 511 , 413 N.E.2d 228, 2883 (transfer of physical custody from father to mother pursuant to custody order entered in Hawaii was to be achieved through a writ of habeas corpus). 1993Cf In re Lemond (1980), 274 Ind. 505, 511 , 413 N.E.2d 228, 2883 (transfer of physical custody from father to mother pursuant to custody order entered in Hawaii was to be achieved through a writ of habeas corpus). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2005In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court applied the rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 485 (2000), wherein the court stated, "'Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" The Blakely Court, relying upon the Apprendi rule, held that the sentencing scheme at issue violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. 124 S.Ct. at 2543 . 2005In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court applied the rule set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 485 (2000), wherein the court stated, "'Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'" The Blakely Court, relying upon the Apprendi rule, held that the sentencing scheme at issue violated the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. 124 S.Ct. at 2543 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
Maryland v. Shatzer
green
1 sentence2010This violates the principle that a suspect indicates that "he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel," "any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect." Shatzer, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d at 1053 (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 , 108 S.Ct. at 2097-98 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 713 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Arizona v. Roberson
green
2 sentences2010This violates the principle that a suspect indicates that "he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel," "any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect." Shatzer, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d at 1053 (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 , 108 S.Ct. at 2097-98 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 713 ). 2010This violates the principle that a suspect indicates that "he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel," "any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect." Shatzer, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1219, 175 L.Ed.2d at 1053 (quoting Roberson, 486 U.S. at 681 , 108 S.Ct. at 2097-98 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 713 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Yost v. Conroy
green
1 sentence1933Appellant’s contention has support as a general proposition in many decisions of this court; and these decisions assume the rule to be as follows: “It is a general rule that a witness cannot be allowed to express an opinion upon the exact question which the jury are required to decide.” Yost v. Conroy (1884), 92 Ind. 464, 471 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.