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8 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See State v. Nguyen, 281 Kan. 702, 723-24 , 133 P.3d 1259 (2006) (citing Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1031 [Wyo. 1983] [considering totality of circumstances to determine "'whether the prior [Miranda] warnings were effective to sufficiently advise the accused of his constitutional rights so that the prior voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights continued its efficacy'"]). 2006See, e.g., Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Wyo. 1983) (totality of circumstances considered to determine “whether the prior [Miranda] warnings *724 were effective to sufficiently advise the accused of his constitutional rights so that the prior voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights continued its efficacy”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Giang Nguyengreen2 sentences2025See State v. Nguyen, 281 Kan. 702, 723-24 , 133 P.3d 1259 (2006) (citing Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1031 [Wyo. 1983] [considering totality of circumstances to determine "'whether the prior [Miranda] warnings were effective to sufficiently advise the accused of his constitutional rights so that the prior voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights continued its efficacy'"]). 2025See State v. Nguyen, 281 Kan. 702, 723-24 , 133 P.3d 1259 (2006) (citing Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1031 [Wyo. 1983] [considering totality of circumstances to determine "'whether the prior [Miranda] warnings were effective to sufficiently advise the accused of his constitutional rights so that the prior voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights continued its efficacy'"]). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences2020State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71, 78 , 106 P.3d 1 (2005) (finding defendant's mere acquiescence to a preliminary breath test did not establish voluntary consent.); see State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 595-96 , 147 P.3d 115 (2006) (finding defendant's consent was a submission to authority rather than a voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights when he was illegally detained, surrounded by police officers, witnessed the search and arrest of his friend, and was notified about a possible warrant issued under the false identity he gave police). 2020State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71, 78 , 106 P.3d 1 (2005) (finding defendant's mere acquiescence to a preliminary breath test did not establish voluntary consent.); see State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 595-96 , 147 P.3d 115 (2006) (finding defendant's consent was a submission to authority rather than a voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights when he was illegally detained, surrounded by police officers, witnessed the search and arrest of his friend, and was notified about a possible warrant issued under the false identity he gave police). | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2016Finally, construing Thomas to have factually admitted to the existence of a prior burglary adjudication that involved a dwelling (which converted it to a person crime that raised the criminal history score and increased the penalty for the current crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum) without securing a voluntary and knowing waiver of jury trial on the dwelling issue from Thomas effectively deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial in violation of Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ("[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime bey 2016Finally, construing Thomas to have factually admitted to the existence of a prior burglary adjudication that involved a dwelling (which converted it to a person crime that raised the criminal history score and increased the penalty for the current crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum) without securing a voluntary and knowing waiver of jury trial on the dwelling issue from Thomas effectively deprived him of his constitutional' right to a jury trial in violation of Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime be | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barnesgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Barnes, 293 Kan. 240, 260 , 262 P.3d 297 (2011). 2012See State v. Barnes, 293 Kan. 240, 260 , 262 P.3d 297 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2020State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71, 78 , 106 P.3d 1 (2005) (finding defendant's mere acquiescence to a preliminary breath test did not establish voluntary consent.); see State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 595-96 , 147 P.3d 115 (2006) (finding defendant's consent was a submission to authority rather than a voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights when he was illegally detained, surrounded by police officers, witnessed the search and arrest of his friend, and was notified about a possible warrant issued under the false identity he gave police). 2020State v. Jones, 279 Kan. 71, 78 , 106 P.3d 1 (2005) (finding defendant's mere acquiescence to a preliminary breath test did not establish voluntary consent.); see State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584, 595-96 , 147 P.3d 115 (2006) (finding defendant's consent was a submission to authority rather than a voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights when he was illegally detained, surrounded by police officers, witnessed the search and arrest of his friend, and was notified about a possible warrant issued under the false identity he gave police). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Young
green
2 sentences1980State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541 , 552 P.2d 905 (1976); State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412 , 273 Pac. 490 (1929). 1980State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541 , 552 P.2d 905 (1976); State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412 , 273 Pac. 490 (1929). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Oberst
green
2 sentences1980State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541 , 552 P.2d 905 (1976); State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412 , 273 Pac. 490 (1929). 1980State v. Young, 220 Kan. 541 , 552 P.2d 905 (1976); State v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412 , 273 Pac. 490 (1929). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Cashman
green
2 sentences1975(State v. Cashman, 174 Kan. 272 , Syl. ¶ 3, 255 P. 2d 660 ; State v. Hemminger, 210 Kan. 587 , Syl. ¶ 2, 502 P. 2d 791 .) After a criminal prosecution has been commenced a defendant is as much entitled to aid of counsel as at the trial itself, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver. 1975(State v. Cashman, 174 Kan. 272 , Syl. ¶ 3, 255 P. 2d 660 ; State v. Hemminger, 210 Kan. 587 , Syl. ¶ 2, 502 P. 2d 791 .) After a criminal prosecution has been commenced a defendant is as much entitled to aid of counsel as at the trial itself, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Hemminger
green
2 sentences1975(State v. Cashman, 174 Kan. 272 , Syl. ¶ 3, 255 P. 2d 660 ; State v. Hemminger, 210 Kan. 587 , Syl. ¶ 2, 502 P. 2d 791 .) After a criminal prosecution has been commenced a defendant is as much entitled to aid of counsel as at the trial itself, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver. 1975(State v. Cashman, 174 Kan. 272 , Syl. ¶ 3, 255 P. 2d 660 ; State v. Hemminger, 210 Kan. 587 , Syl. ¶ 2, 502 P. 2d 791 .) After a criminal prosecution has been commenced a defendant is as much entitled to aid of counsel as at the trial itself, absent a voluntary and knowing waiver. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.