7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kisamore v. Stategreen2 sentences1985In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 235 , 462 A.2d 58, 62 (1983), we repeated what had been said in State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693 , 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976), namely, that “ 'plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.’ ” And see Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656 , 409 A.2d 719, 720 (1980). 1985In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 235 , 462 A.2d 58, 62 (1983), we repeated what had been said in State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693 , 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976), namely, that “ 'plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.’ ” And see Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656 , 409 A.2d 719, 720 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Loveday v. Stategreen2 sentences1985In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 235 , 462 A.2d 58, 62 (1983), we repeated what had been said in State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693 , 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976), namely, that “ 'plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.’ ” And see Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656 , 409 A.2d 719, 720 (1980). 1985In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 235 , 462 A.2d 58, 62 (1983), we repeated what had been said in State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693 , 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976), namely, that “ 'plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.’ ” And see Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656 , 409 A.2d 719, 720 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brockmangreen2 sentences1985In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 235 , 462 A.2d 58, 62 (1983), we repeated what had been said in State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693 , 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976), namely, that “ 'plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.’ ” And see Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656 , 409 A.2d 719, 720 (1980). 1985In Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 235 , 462 A.2d 58, 62 (1983), we repeated what had been said in State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693 , 357 A.2d 376, 381 (1976), namely, that “ 'plea bargains, when properly utilized, aid the administration of justice and, within reason, should be encouraged.’ ” And see Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656 , 409 A.2d 719, 720 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Haynesgreen1 sentence1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen2 sentences1985See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). *247 Cubbage additionally suggests that the “coercive circumstances [of impending sentencing] seem to severely limit the possibility that the criminal defendant has given a voluntary and knowing waiver.” The argument invites us to rule that sentencing considerations in a plea bargain are per se coercive, a ruling which would destroy the plea bargaining process. 1985See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). *247 Cubbage additionally suggests that the “coercive circumstances [of impending sentencing] seem to severely limit the possibility that the criminal defendant has given a voluntary and knowing waiver.” The argument invites us to rule that sentencing considerations in a plea bargain are per se coercive, a ruling which would destroy the plea bargaining process. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. Shatzer
green
1 sentence2010The Court noted, 559 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 1223 , that, after the expiration of fourteen days, the State would still bear the burden of demonstrating that there was a valid waiver of the defendant’s Miranda rights under the voluntary and knowing standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2010The Court noted, 559 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 1223 , that, after the expiration of fourteen days, the State would still bear the burden of demonstrating that there was a valid waiver of the defendant’s Miranda rights under the voluntary and knowing standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 2010The Court noted, 559 U.S. at-, 130 S.Ct. at 1223 , that, after the expiration of fourteen days, the State would still bear the burden of demonstrating that there was a valid waiver of the defendant’s Miranda rights under the voluntary and knowing standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2008The seminal issue in this case involves the application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07 , in which the Supreme Court held that prior to custodial interrogation, an individual must be advised that he “has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” The individual may make a voluntary and knowing waiver of his right to counsel, in which event the police are free to question him. 2008The seminal issue in this case involves the application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. at 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07 , in which the Supreme Court held that prior to custodial interrogation, an individual must be advised that he “has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” The individual may make a voluntary and knowing waiver of his right to counsel, in which event the police are free to question him. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Pasley
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Uzzle v. State
green
2 sentences2005Without such testimony, there is usually no direct evidence of involuntariness.” ’ ” (Quoting Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 571-72 , 832 A.2d 869 , cert. denied, 378 Md. 619 , 837 A.2d 929 (2003) (quoting Ashford v. State, 147 Md.App. 1, 56 , 807 A.2d 732 (2002))). 2005Without such testimony, there is usually no direct evidence of involuntariness.” ’ ” (Quoting Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 571-72 , 832 A.2d 869 , cert. denied, 378 Md. 619 , 837 A.2d 929 (2003) (quoting Ashford v. State, 147 Md.App. 1, 56 , 807 A.2d 732 (2002))). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ashford v. State
green
2 sentences2005Without such testimony, there is usually no direct evidence of involuntariness.” ’ ” (Quoting Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 571-72 , 832 A.2d 869 , cert. denied, 378 Md. 619 , 837 A.2d 929 (2003) (quoting Ashford v. State, 147 Md.App. 1, 56 , 807 A.2d 732 (2002))). 2005Without such testimony, there is usually no direct evidence of involuntariness.” ’ ” (Quoting Uzzle v. State, 152 Md.App. 548, 571-72 , 832 A.2d 869 , cert. denied, 378 Md. 619 , 837 A.2d 929 (2003) (quoting Ashford v. State, 147 Md.App. 1, 56 , 807 A.2d 732 (2002))). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Staton v. Warden
green
2 sentences1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). 1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Blackburn v. State
green
1 sentence1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Gibson
green
2 sentences1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). 1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Gwin v. State
green
1 sentence1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Fearing
green
2 sentences1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). 1985See Brown v. Haynes, 385 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Mo.1974); Gwin v. State, 456 So.2d 845 (Ala.Crim.App.1984); Staton v. Warden, 175 Conn. 328 , 398 A.2d 1176 (1978) (rejecting per se invalidity but holding that the record failed to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver); People v. Fearing, 110 Ill.App.3d 643 , 66 Ill.Dec. 378 , 442 N.E.2d 939 (1982); State v. Gibson, 68 N.J. 499 , 348 A.2d 769 (1975); Blackburn v. State, 290 S.E.2d 22 (W.Va. 1982). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Northwest'n Nat. Ins. Co. v. Rosoff
green
2 sentences1978Co. v. Rosoff, 195 Md. 421, 436 , 73 A. 2d 461 (1950), Chief Judge Marbury observed for our predecessors that discretionary rulings “should only be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.” In Jones Chief Judge Murphy referred to the American Bar Association’s “Standards Relating to Trial by Jury,” Approved Draft (1968), § 1.2 (c) of which provides, “A defendant may not withdraw a voluntary and knowing waiver [of trial by jury] as a matter of right, but the court, in its discretion, may permit withdrawal prior to the comme 1978Co. v. Rosoff, 195 Md. 421, 436 , 73 A. 2d 461 (1950), Chief Judge Marbury observed for our predecessors that discretionary rulings “should only be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.” In Jones Chief Judge Murphy referred to the American Bar Association’s “Standards Relating to Trial by Jury,” Approved Draft (1968), § 1.2 (c) of which provides, “A defendant may not withdraw a voluntary and knowing waiver [of trial by jury] as a matter of right, but the court, in its discretion, may permit withdrawal prior to the comme | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Rankin
green
1 sentence1973In State v. Rankin, supra, the Connecticut court stated that the discretion exercised by the trial judge in considering a request to withdraw a jury trial waiver must be reasonable in light of the circumstances, and “[i]f the application for such withdrawal be made seasonably; that is, so that the withdrawal will not unreasonably delay the cause, or impede justice, or otherwise prejudice the state — the court should permit it.” 127 A. 916, at 917 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.