voluntary and knowing waiver in New York

1995In any event, this contention is without merit since the defendant’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights was established at the Huntley hearing (see, People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 ) by the unrefuted testimony of the Fire Marshal regarding the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession (see, Clewis v Texas, 386 US 707 ; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38 ).

1982In this instance, the people did not meet their burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, a voluntary and knowing waiver (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72, 78 ).

1988The voluntary and knowing standard is the same as that applied to determine whether a defendant has expressly waived the statutory right to appellate review of denial of suppression motions (People v Williams, supra; People v Moore, supra; People v Jandrew, supra).

1978Memorandum: The record does not support a finding that there was a voluntary and knowing waiver by defendant of his right to appeal (cf. People v Williams, 43 AD2d 884 , affd 36 NY2d 829 , cert den 423 US 873 ).

2001Further, with respect to the factual deficiencies that defendant claims exist in his plea, “it is now well settled that where a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser crime than that charged in the indictment, a factual basis for such plea is not necessary” (People v Santmyer, 283 AD2d 718 ; see, People v Evans, 269 AD2d 797, 798 , lv denied 95 NY2d 834 ).

1999While defendant was represented by counsel on the prior aggravated harassment charge, this alone will not bar police from obtaining a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to counsel by the accused in the absence of counsel on the unrelated charges (People v Burdo, 91 NY2d 146 ; People v Cohen, 90 NY2d 632 ; People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331 ).

1999While defendant was represented by counsel on the prior aggravated harassment charge, this alone will not bar police from obtaining a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to counsel by the accused in the absence of counsel on the unrelated charges (People v Burdo, 91 NY2d 146 ; People v Cohen, 90 NY2d 632 ; People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331 ).

1999While defendant was represented by counsel on the prior aggravated harassment charge, this alone will not bar police from obtaining a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to counsel by the accused in the absence of counsel on the unrelated charges (People v Burdo, 91 NY2d 146 ; People v Cohen, 90 NY2d 632 ; People v Bing, 76 NY2d 331 ).

1995In any event, this contention is without merit since the defendant’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights was established at the Huntley hearing (see, People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 ) by the unrefuted testimony of the Fire Marshal regarding the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession (see, Clewis v Texas, 386 US 707 ; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38 ).

1995In any event, this contention is without merit since the defendant’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights was established at the Huntley hearing (see, People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 ) by the unrefuted testimony of the Fire Marshal regarding the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession (see, Clewis v Texas, 386 US 707 ; People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 38 ).

1993The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit (see, People v Stahl, 53 NY2d 1048 ; People v Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245 ).

1993The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit (see, People v Stahl, 53 NY2d 1048 ; People v Udzinski, 146 AD2d 245 ).

1990Although the defendant had sus tained a self-inflicted gunshot wound, the ambulance medical technician’s testimony does not substantiate the defendant’s claim that his medical condition precluded him from making a voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights (see, People v Wilkins, 147 AD2d 729, 731 ).

1988The voluntary and knowing standard is the same as that applied to determine whether a defendant has expressly waived the statutory right to appellate review of denial of suppression motions (People v Williams, supra; People v Moore, supra; People v Jandrew, supra).

1988The voluntary and knowing standard is the same as that applied to determine whether a defendant has expressly waived the statutory right to appellate review of denial of suppression motions (People v Williams, supra; People v Moore, supra; People v Jandrew, supra).

1988More recently, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in dismissing a defendant’s appeal from a sentence as being harsh and excessive, held "that where, as part of a negotiated plea, a defendant clearly waives his right to appeal from the offered sentence, and the sentence is lawful, such waiver will be given effect so long as it is knowing, voluntary and intelligent” (People v Harvey, 124 AD2d 943, 944 , lv denied 69 NY2d 746 ; see also, People v Perdomo, 137 AD2d 769 ; People v Claussell, 137 AD2d 830 ).

1988More recently, the Appellate Division, Third Department, in dismissing a defendant’s appeal from a sentence as being harsh and excessive, held "that where, as part of a negotiated plea, a defendant clearly waives his right to appeal from the offered sentence, and the sentence is lawful, such waiver will be given effect so long as it is knowing, voluntary and intelligent” (People v Harvey, 124 AD2d 943, 944 , lv denied 69 NY2d 746 ; see also, People v Perdomo, 137 AD2d 769 ; People v Claussell, 137 AD2d 830 ).

1987We find nothing in the record which suggests that the court erred in determining that the defendant’s statements were made after a voluntary and knowing waiver of her rights, and that they had not been induced by threats or promises (see, People v Gee, 104 AD2d 561 , lv denied 64 NY2d 759 ).

1982The majority maintains that because of the doctrine of the “law of the case”, we may not consider the question of the admissibility of defendant’s statements, on the ground that we implicitly ruled on that question upon defendant’s appeal from his conviction after the first jury trial (People v Taylor, 68 AD2d 864 ).

1978Memorandum: The record does not support a finding that there was a voluntary and knowing waiver by defendant of his right to appeal (cf. People v Williams, 43 AD2d 884 , affd 36 NY2d 829 , cert den 423 US 873 ).

1978Memorandum: The record does not support a finding that there was a voluntary and knowing waiver by defendant of his right to appeal (cf. People v Williams, 43 AD2d 884 , affd 36 NY2d 829 , cert den 423 US 873 ).