state tort claim in Illinois

1993In its discussion of whether Federal law preempted a State tort claim, the supreme court in Ryherd v. General Cable Co. stated that “where the tort claim rests on breach of a duty which would not exist in the absence of the collective-bargaining agreement [citation], the tort claim is pre-empted.” (Ryherd v. General Cable Co. (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 418, 425-26 , 530 N.E.2d 431 .) According to the court, a State claim is preempted “if the employee could not bring the claim ‘but for’ the collective-bargaining agreement,” and “[conversely, section 301 does not preempt ‘state rules that proscribe con

1993In its discussion of whether Federal law preempted a State tort claim, the supreme court in Ryherd v. General Cable Co. stated that “where the tort claim rests on breach of a duty which would not exist in the absence of the collective-bargaining agreement [citation], the tort claim is pre-empted.” (Ryherd v. General Cable Co. (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 418, 425-26 , 530 N.E.2d 431 .) According to the court, a State claim is preempted “if the employee could not bring the claim ‘but for’ the collective-bargaining agreement,” and “[conversely, section 301 does not preempt ‘state rules that proscribe con

1987The court distinguished both Allis-Chalmers and its prior decision in Bartley on the basis that the claims in both of those cases were a product of the labor contract between the parties, whereas the retaliatory discharge claims were “firmly rooted in the clearly mandated public policy of this State, which, regardless of the existence or absence of a collective-bargaining agreement, confers upon all employees and employers certain nonnegotiable rights and imposes certain nonnegotiable duties and obligations.” (Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 1, 9 .) Further, that “[

1987The court distinguished both Allis-Chalmers and its prior decision in Bartley on the basis that the claims in both of those cases were a product of the labor contract between the parties, whereas the retaliatory discharge claims were “firmly rooted in the clearly mandated public policy of this State, which, regardless of the existence or absence of a collective-bargaining agreement, confers upon all employees and employers certain nonnegotiable rights and imposes certain nonnegotiable duties and obligations.” (Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 1, 9 .) Further, that “[

2026It further noted, “that section 301 preemption cannot be avoided merely by recasting a claim for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement as a State tort claim.” Id. at 425 .

2026It is apparent to me that Lynette’s counsel is doing exactly what was prohibited in Ryherd by “recasting [Lynette’s] claim for breach of a collective- bargaining agreement as a State tort claim.” Ryherd, 124 Ill. 2d at 425 . 53 ¶ 124 I do not find it relevant that the CBA failed to contain the job duties of each position at a company as the job or duties a company wants an employee to perform are not subject to Union approval.

2007Ed. 2d at 273 n.4, 102 S. Ct. at 1154 n.4, the Supreme Court held that in some instances, petitioners may have a “species of ‘property’ ” right in a state law claim, the Leuz court distinguished Logan, finding that the plaintiffs “never had a right to pursue a state tort claim for compensation for *** alleged vaccine-related injuries without first filing a petition for those injuries under the Vaccine Act.” Leuz, 63 Fed.

2007Ed. 2d at 273 n.4, 102 S. Ct. at 1154 n.4, the Supreme Court held that in some instances, petitioners may have a “species of ‘property’ ” right in a state law claim, the Leuz court distinguished Logan, finding that the plaintiffs “never had a right to pursue a state tort claim for compensation for *** alleged vaccine-related injuries without first filing a petition for those injuries under the Vaccine Act.” Leuz, 63 Fed.

2007Ed. 2d at 273 n.4, 102 S. Ct. at 1154 n.4, the Supreme Court held that in some instances, petitioners may have a “species of ‘property’ ” right in a state law claim, the Leuz court distinguished Logan, finding that the plaintiffs “never had a right to pursue a state tort claim for compensation for *** alleged vaccine-related injuries without first filing a petition for those injuries under the Vaccine Act.” Leuz, 63 Fed.

2007Ed. 2d at 273 n.4, 102 S. Ct. at 1154 n.4, the Supreme Court held that in some instances, petitioners may have a “species of ‘property’ ” right in a state law claim, the Leuz court distinguished Logan, finding that the plaintiffs “never had a right to pursue a state tort claim for compensation for *** alleged vaccine-related injuries without first filing a petition for those injuries under the Vaccine Act.” Leuz, 63 Fed.

1987In Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318 , 489 N.E.2d 1367 , the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the test used in Allis-Chalmers that a State tort claim must be “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of *** [the collective-bargaining] agreement.” ( 111 Ill. 2d 318, 328 , 489 N.E.2d 1367, 1373 .) Bartley concerned an employee’s tort action for civil conspiracy.

1987In Bartley v. University Asphalt Co. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 318 , 489 N.E.2d 1367 , the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted the test used in Allis-Chalmers that a State tort claim must be “substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of *** [the collective-bargaining] agreement.” ( 111 Ill. 2d 318, 328 , 489 N.E.2d 1367, 1373 .) Bartley concerned an employee’s tort action for civil conspiracy.