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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohrgreen2 sentences2008(See id. at pp. 498-500, 116 S.Ct. 2240 .) [8] Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of FDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) ["State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act" are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ["[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties 2008(See id. at pp. 498-500.) Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of PDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) (2007) [“State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act” are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 [“[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel fed | 1 | 3 |
Steele v. Collagen Corp.green2 sentences2008(See id. at pp. 498-500, 116 S.Ct. 2240 .) [8] Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of FDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) ["State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act" are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ["[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties 2008(See id. at pp. 498-500.) Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of PDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) (2007) [“State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act” are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 [“[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel fed | 1 | 2 |
Daryl A. Miller v. At & T Network Systems, an at & T Technologies, Inc. Group, Defendantsgreen2 sentences2004(Miller v. AT&T Network Systems (9th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 543, 548, fn. 2 .) The definition in the CBA, article 14, of a grievance that may be submitted to arbitration includes “any difference of opinion or dispute between the Employer and [an employee] regarding the interpretation of this Agreement.” Specifically, to be supportable under the CBA, a termination for “just cause” must be made after a “fair and complete investigation.” The arbitrator in the termination proceedings decided that the investigation was inadequate. 1989(Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988) 486 U.S. 399, 405-406 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 410, 418 , 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1880 ]; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962) 369 U.S. 95, 103 [ 7 L.Ed.2d 593, 599 , 82 S.Ct. 571, 577 ]; Miller v. AT & T Network Systems (9th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 543, 545 .) Even those suits based upon tort rather than contract causes of action are governed by federal law if resolution of the tort claims is “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.” (Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985) 471 U.S. 202, 213 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 206, 216 , 105 S.Ct. | 1 | 2 |
Bonney v. Stephens Memorial Hospitalgreen1 sentence2022(Me. 2011) 17 A.3d 123, 128 [stating, in dicta, HIPAA standards “may be admissible to establish the standard of care associated with a state tort claim” (italics added)]; Acosta v. Byrum (N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Acosta v. Byrumgreen1 sentence2022Ct. App. 2006) 180 N.C.App. 562, 571-572 (Acosta) [trial court erred in purporting to dismiss HIPAA cause of action, where complaint included no such cause of action, and plaintiff merely cited HIPAA as “evidence of the appropriate standard of care”]; Ilene N. Moore et al., Confidentiality and Privacy in Health Care from the Patient's Perspective: Does HIPAA Help? (2007) 17 Health Matrix 215 , 230-231 [citing Acosta for proposition that HIPAA regulations have been used as “evidence of standards in state tort actions”].) 35 misrepresentation is a tort “‘separate and distinct’” from negligence. | 1 | 1 |
Kenneth M. Zeran v. America Online, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence2018There, the victim of defamatory posts on an America Online (AOL) message board filed claims against AOL, an interactive service provider. ( Zeran , at pp. 329, 332 .) The plaintiff did not bring a cause of action against the poster of the offensive messages, but instead sought to hold AOL liable for the third party's defamatory speech. ( Id . at pp. 329-330.) Addressing whether AOL could assert section 230 as an affirmative defense to the claims against it, the court reasoned that "[ section] 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for inf | 1 | 1 |
New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehnergreen2 sentences2010Rather, the issue is “predominantly one of fact” and “does not require ‘resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers.’ ” 6 ( 538 F.3d at p. 339 ; see also Minton v. Gunn (Tex.App. 2009) 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 [patent issue is not substantial where it “is predominantly one of fact, with little or no precedential value”].) In New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner (2005) 270 Neb. 264 [ 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 ], the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected an argument that the malpractice action was subject to federal jurisdiction, finding that “[pjatent law is implic 2010Rather, the issue is “predominantly one of fact” and “does not require ‘resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers.’ ” 6 ( 538 F.3d at p. 339 ; see also Minton v. Gunn (Tex.App. 2009) 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 [patent issue is not substantial where it “is predominantly one of fact, with little or no precedential value”].) In New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner (2005) 270 Neb. 264 [ 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 ], the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected an argument that the malpractice action was subject to federal jurisdiction, finding that “[pjatent law is implic | 1 | 1 |
Minton v. Gunngreen1 sentence2010Rather, the issue is “predominantly one of fact” and “does not require ‘resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers.’ ” 6 ( 538 F.3d at p. 339 ; see also Minton v. Gunn (Tex.App. 2009) 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 [patent issue is not substantial where it “is predominantly one of fact, with little or no precedential value”].) In New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner (2005) 270 Neb. 264 [ 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 ], the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected an argument that the malpractice action was subject to federal jurisdiction, finding that “[pjatent law is implic | 1 | 1 |
Nuno v. County of San Bernardinogreen2 sentences2008(Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 58 F.Supp.2d at p. 1130, fn. 3 .) But we cannot think of a reason to distinguish between section 1983 and a state tort claim arising from the same alleged misconduct and, as stated above, the parties offer none. 2008Heck , of course, is a rule of federal law that applies only to federal causes of action that challenge the validity of a state conviction. ( Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 58 F.Supp.2d at p. 1130, fn. 3 .) But we cannot think of a reason to distinguish between section 1983 and a state tort claim arising from the same alleged misconduct and, as stated above, the parties offer none. | 1 | 1 |
Edson v. City of Anaheimgreen1 sentence2008Section 1983 "`creates a species of tort liability'" ( Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483 ) and has been described as "`the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.'" ( Susag v. City of Lake Forest, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 .) Indeed, Yount's common law battery cause of action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable force. ( Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273-1274 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ].) Moreover, this court has recently reiterated its concern about the use of civil suits to collaterally attack crimin | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc.green2 sentences2004(Id. at p. 624.) These show “the facts which the plaintiff believes support the finding of the tort and the facts which the defendant may assert in defense. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] .) “ ‘[The] line between a tort actionable in court and an employment dispute actionable only in a grievance arbitration proceeding is . . . not sharp, except in extreme cases.’ [Citation.]” (DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 517, 526 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 733 P.2d 614 ] (DeTomaso).) “D 2004(Id. at p. 624.) These show “the facts which the plaintiff believes support the finding of the tort and the facts which the defendant may assert in defense. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] .) “ ‘[The] line between a tort actionable in court and an employment dispute actionable only in a grievance arbitration proceeding is . . . not sharp, except in extreme cases.’ [Citation.]” (DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 517, 526 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 733 P.2d 614 ] (DeTomaso).) “D | 1 | 1 |
DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.green2 sentences2004(Id. at p. 624.) These show “the facts which the plaintiff believes support the finding of the tort and the facts which the defendant may assert in defense. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] .) “ ‘[The] line between a tort actionable in court and an employment dispute actionable only in a grievance arbitration proceeding is . . . not sharp, except in extreme cases.’ [Citation.]” (DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 517, 526 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 733 P.2d 614 ] (DeTomaso).) “D 2004(Id. at p. 624.) These show “the facts which the plaintiff believes support the finding of the tort and the facts which the defendant may assert in defense. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] .) “ ‘[The] line between a tort actionable in court and an employment dispute actionable only in a grievance arbitration proceeding is . . . not sharp, except in extreme cases.’ [Citation.]” (DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 517, 526 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 733 P.2d 614 ] (DeTomaso).) “D | 1 | 1 |
Moreau v. San Diego Transit Corp.green1 sentence2004(Id. at p. 624.) These show “the facts which the plaintiff believes support the finding of the tort and the facts which the defendant may assert in defense. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1027 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 895 ] .) “ ‘[The] line between a tort actionable in court and an employment dispute actionable only in a grievance arbitration proceeding is . . . not sharp, except in extreme cases.’ [Citation.]” (DeTomaso v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 517, 526 [ 235 Cal.Rptr. 292 , 733 P.2d 614 ] (DeTomaso).) “D | 1 | 1 |
Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Districtgreen2 sentences2002Because the appellant elected to pursue only one remedy as to one distinct wrong[, filing suit against a state governmental agency under state law], the [federal] district court did not err in holding that the statute of limitations relevant to the appellant’s federal civil rights action had not been equitably tolled by her previous filing of the state tort claim action.” (Ervin v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-1020 ; see also Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1086 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 576 ] [pursuit of civil rights action in federa 2002Because the appellant elected to pursue only one remedy as to one distinct wrong[, filing suit against a state governmental agency under state law], the [federal] district court did not err in holding that the statute of limitations relevant to the appellant’s federal civil rights action had not been equitably tolled by her previous filing of the state tort claim action.” (Ervin v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-1020 ; see also Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1086 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 576 ] [pursuit of civil rights action in federa | 1 | 1 |
| Stone v. City and County of San Franciscogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Susan Carol Hanks v. General Motors Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Hydraulic Research & Manufacturing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sarro v. Retail Store Employees Uniongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008(See id. at pp. 498-500, 116 S.Ct. 2240 .) [8] Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of FDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) ["State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act" are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ["[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties 2008(See id. at pp. 498-500.) Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of PDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) (2007) [“State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act” are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 [“[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel fed | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Kandis L. Papike v. Tambrands Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Barbara MITCHELL and Gregory Mitchell, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLLAGEN CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Elizabeth and Clifford Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Brooks v. Howmedica
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Barbara E. Horn, of the Estate of Daniel Ray Horn, Deceased v. Thoratec Corporation
green
2 sentences2008(See id. at pp. 498-500, 116 S.Ct. 2240 .) [8] Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of FDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) ["State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act" are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 , 116 S.Ct. 2240 ["[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties 2008(See id. at pp. 498-500.) Preemption does not apply to a state tort claim based on a violation of PDA requirements because the state claim would not be seeking to impose a device-specific requirement not already imposed by the FDA. ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(2) (2007) [“State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act” are not preempted]; Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 495 [“[n]othing in § 360k denies [a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel fed | 2 | 2008–2008 |
cluster 24463
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Gomez v. St. Jude Medical Daig Division Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Ethel Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Jack McMullen and Barbara McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir. 1997) 107 F.3d 737 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Yount v. City of Sacramento
green
1 sentence2011Section 1983 ‘ “creates a species of tort liability” ’ [citation] and has been described as ‘ “the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.” ’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] [][]... [f] In light of the fact that Heck and California law express similar concerns about judicial economy and the avoidance of conflicting resolutions, we conclude that the [Heck] analysis in the preceding sections applies equally to Yount’s common law claim for battery.” (Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 902 .) 2. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Singh v. Duane Morris LLP
green
1 sentence2010Rather, the issue is “predominantly one of fact” and “does not require ‘resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers.’ ” 6 ( 538 F.3d at p. 339 ; see also Minton v. Gunn (Tex.App. 2009) 301 S.W.3d 702, 709 [patent issue is not substantial where it “is predominantly one of fact, with little or no precedential value”].) In New Tek Manufacturing, Inc. v. Beehner (2005) 270 Neb. 264 [ 702 N.W.2d 336, 346 ], the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected an argument that the malpractice action was subject to federal jurisdiction, finding that “[pjatent law is implic | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Edson v. City of Anaheim
green
1 sentence2008Section 1983 "`creates a species of tort liability'" ( Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483 ) and has been described as "`the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.'" ( Susag v. City of Lake Forest, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 .) Indeed, Yount's common law battery cause of action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable force. ( Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273-1274 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ].) Moreover, this court has recently reiterated its concern about the use of civil suits to collaterally attack crimin | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Heck v. Humphrey
green
2 sentences2008Section 1983 “ ‘creates a species of tort liability’ ” (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483 ) and has been described as “ ‘the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.’ ” (Susag v. City of Lake Forest, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 .) Indeed, Yount’s common law battery cause of action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable force. 2008Section 1983 "`creates a species of tort liability'" ( Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483 ) and has been described as "`the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.'" ( Susag v. City of Lake Forest, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 .) Indeed, Yount's common law battery cause of action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable force. ( Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273-1274 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ].) Moreover, this court has recently reiterated its concern about the use of civil suits to collaterally attack crimin | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Susag v. City of Lake Forest
green
2 sentences2008Section 1983 “ ‘creates a species of tort liability’ ” (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483 ) and has been described as “ ‘the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.’ ” (Susag v. City of Lake Forest, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 .) Indeed, Yount’s common law battery cause of action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable force. 2008Section 1983 "`creates a species of tort liability'" ( Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 483 ) and has been described as "`the federal counterpart of state battery or wrongful death actions.'" ( Susag v. City of Lake Forest, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 .) Indeed, Yount's common law battery cause of action, like his section 1983 claim, requires proof that Officer Shrum used unreasonable force. ( Edson v. City of Anaheim (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1273-1274 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ].) Moreover, this court has recently reiterated its concern about the use of civil suits to collaterally attack crimin | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Armstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp.
green
2 sentences2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 2008Jude Medical Daig Div. Inc. (5th Cir.2006) 442 F.3d 919 ; Martin v. Medtronic, Inc. (5th Cir.2001) 254 F.3d 573 ; Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 216 ; Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc. (6th Cir.2005) 405 F.3d 421 ; McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc. (7th Cir.2005) 421 F.3d 482 ; Mitchell v. Collagen Corp. (7th Cir.1997) 126 F.3d 902 ; Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc. (8th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 785 ; and Papike v. Tambrands Inc. (9th Cir.1997) 107 F.3d 737 . [10] Contrary to Jessen's contention, we are not bound by the contrary decision by Division One of this court in Armstrong, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th 5 | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Aline Ervin v. County of Los Angeles, a Chartered Governmental Entity green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Hyles v. Mensing green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Louise Newberry v. Pacific Racing Association and Tanforan Racing Association Peter W. Tunney, Individually and as Vice President and General Manager green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Patricia M. Wood v. General Motors Corporation green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Ben Carter v. Sheet Metal Workers' International Association and Local 85 Sheet Metal Workers' International Association green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| cluster 297148 green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Elkins v. Derby green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Addison v. State of California green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.