61 California opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Serrano v. Priestgreen2 sentences2009“Under Serrano III, a court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 48 .) We expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar, noting that anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method ‘ “is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the ba 1998Moreover, its adoption of the lodestar method of calculating reasonable fees was based on the premise that anchoring the analysis to the lodestar figure “ ‘is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 48, fn. 23 , quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470 .) Thus its pronouncements cannot be read as necessarily limited only to fees awarded under section 1021.5. | 4 | 6 |
Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 | 2 | 4 |
Roe v. Halbiggreen1 sentence2026Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity . . . .’”” (Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 286, 311 (Roe).) Thus, “[i]n setting attorney’s fees ‘[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.’” (Ibid.) Although a trial court is not required to issue a statement of decision regarding a fee award or to identify each charge it finds unreasonable, it must articulate—at least in general terms—its reasons for si | 1 | 1 |
Warren v. Kia Motors Am., Inc.green1 sentence2026(Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908 , 921.) That is, a court presented with a voluminous fee request may “‘“make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure,”’” but it “must clearly explain its reasons for choosing the particular [reduction] that it chose; otherwise, the reviewing court is unable to determine that the court had valid, specific reasons for its across-the-board percentage reduction.” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41 (Warren).) Where no statement of decision is r | 1 | 1 |
People v. Holfordgreen1 sentence2016(See People v. Holford (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 155, 174 [“nature of discretion requires that the court’s decision be an informed one”].) But it is a problem defense counsel could have remedied. | 1 | 1 |
Chavez v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2016In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Id. at p. 1132.) “[Anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method ‘ “is the only way of *272 approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees ... , the ultimate goal 2016In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Id. at p. 1132.) “[Anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method ‘ “is the only way of *272 approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees ... , the ultimate goal | 1 | 1 |
Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Districtgreen1 sentence2015(Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 20 Cal.3d [25], 49 [(Serrano III)].)” (Ketchum, at p. 1134.) The court reaffirmed this approach yet again in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 [“ ‘anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method “ ‘is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”) Use of the lodestar does not, however, mean a party seeking attorneys’ fees is “necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services ac | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.green1 sentence2015(Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 20 Cal.3d [25], 49 [(Serrano III)].)” (Ketchum, at p. 1134.) The court reaffirmed this approach yet again in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 [“ ‘anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method “ ‘is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”) Use of the lodestar does not, however, mean a party seeking attorneys’ fees is “necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services ac | 1 | 1 |
Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenecheagreen2 sentences2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend 2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend | 1 | 1 |
Christian Research Institute v. Alnorgreen2 sentences2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend 2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Wells Fargo Bank, NAgreen2 sentences2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend 2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend | 1 | 1 |
Nazemi v. Tsenggreen2 sentences2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend 2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend | 1 | 1 |
Bankes v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend 2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend | 1 | 1 |
| Margolin v. Regional Planning Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carma Developers (California), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| International Insurance v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adolph Ramish, Inc. v. Woodruffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kern v. Henrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Flannery v. California Highway Patrolgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Serrano v. Unruhgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cedar Shake and Shingle Bureau Chemco, Inc. Wesco, Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Social Services v. Ronald P.red | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lo Cignogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allen v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thorntongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Couch v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Noblesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fisher v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. American Marine Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Craig v. Borengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mandel v. Lacknergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lamb v. Schmittgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chimel v. Californiared | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Swanngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation, Manhattan-Ward, Incorporated v. Grinnell Corporation, 1225 Vine Street Building, Inc. v. Grinnell Corporation
green
2 sentences2016Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.‘ (City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470 ; see also Lindy Bros. 2016Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ (City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470 ; see also Lindy Bros. | 9 | 1977–2016 |
Ketchum v. Moses
green
2 sentences2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 | 3 | 2015–2018 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2021In support of his proposed instruction, defendant quotes Watson, as follows: “A finding of gross negligence is made by applying an objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved, then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. [Citation.] However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard. [Citation.]” ( Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 296- 297.) The problem with the instruction, however, was precisely that it did not explain 2021In support of his proposed instruction, defendant quotes Watson, as follows: “A finding of gross negligence is made by applying an objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have been aware of the risk involved, then defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. [Citation.] However, a finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard. [Citation.]” ( Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 296- 297.) The problem with the instruction, however, was precisely that it did not explain | 2 | 2021–2021 |
People v. DALERIO
green
2 sentences2021At the outset, Dalerio acknowledged the “[d]efendant … deceived a nine-year-old child into voluntarily accompanying him and then physically escorted the child a substantial distance before attempting to kill her.” (Dalerio, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 777 , emphasis added.) The defendant confessed “he took her ‘up into the woods ... and then slamm[ed] her down ….’ ” (Id. at p. 779.) The victim, however, never testified the defendant used any force. 2021At the outset, Dalerio acknowledged the “[d]efendant … deceived a nine-year-old child into voluntarily accompanying him and then physically escorted the child a substantial distance before attempting to kill her.” (Dalerio, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 777 , emphasis added.) The defendant confessed “he took her ‘up into the woods ... and then slamm[ed] her down ….’ ” (Id. at p. 779.) The victim, however, never testified the defendant used any force. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University
green
2 sentences2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Carnley v. Cochran
green
2 sentences2013In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 , we dealt with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. 2013In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 , we dealt with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.
green
2 sentences2002Companies, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 958 , 136 Cal.Rptr. 404 .) The problem with this analysis from Spindle is the same problem identified and criticized in Foley : While the court correctly concluded the insurer's conduct was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Spindle court "did not, however, focus on the fact that traditionally such a finding justified only contract damages." ( Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 689 , 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 , discussing Khanna v. Microdata Corp. (1985) 170 Cal. App.3d 250 , 215 Cal.Rptr. 860 .) The l 2002Companies, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 958 , 136 Cal.Rptr. 404 .) The problem with this analysis from Spindle is the same problem identified and criticized in Foley : While the court correctly concluded the insurer's conduct was a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Spindle court "did not, however, focus on the fact that traditionally such a finding justified only contract damages." ( Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 689 , 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 , 765 P.2d 373 , discussing Khanna v. Microdata Corp. (1985) 170 Cal. App.3d 250 , 215 Cal.Rptr. 860 .) The l | 2 | 1990–2002 |
Laffitte v. Robert Half International Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489 ; Press v. billing or other significant deficiencies, trial courts have more obvious reason to adopt an across-the-board reduction or negative multiplier and appellate courts have less need and less ability to assess the propriety of that reduction. 5 Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 322, fn. 12 )). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood
green
1 sentence2023We disagree. 9 “A material question exists when the judgment, if left unreversed, would preclude a party from litigating its liability on an issue still in controversy.” (Viejo Bancorp, Inc. v. Wood (1989) 217 Cal.App.3d 200, 205 .) Here, plaintiffs’ first argument is a conclusory assertion and a classic example of the problem of an exception that swallows the rule. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Welch
green
1 sentence2021While we traditionally excuse the failure to object where an objection “would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence” (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 ), DeRouen cannot argue his failure to object would have been futile because he had the benefit of the Dueñas opinion when his sentence was imposed. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Perez v. Grajales
green
1 sentence2020As a result of this “blatant lie,” Wilson further argues Cox obstructed justice by failing to “pay[] the required fee for her complaint nor the fee associated with having the Sheriff’s office serve the subpoena upon Appellant.” 27 First Amendment” (same);15 “[D.] The trial court’s order is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment and appellant’s right to a fair trial under defamation” (same);16 and “[E.] Privileged Communications” (same).17 (See Perez, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 591–592.) 15 Wilson argues the court’s Order preventing her from “harassing [Cox] and from taking any action | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Nevarrez v. San Marino Skilled Nursing & Wellness Centre, LLC
green
1 sentence2017On the other hand, cases of repeated or widespread violations would normally qualify for injunctive relief, the classic remedy to prevent future violations, with monetary and coercive sanctions for contempt. [Citations.] Such cases may generate substantial attorney fee awards irrespective of the amount the patient actually recovers since that amount would be only one factor in determining the reasonableness of the attorney fee award.” (Nevarrez, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 135 .) However, the problem with that analysis is that the opportunity to seek an injunction under section 1430, subdivis | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Aguilar
green
1 sentence2016(Id. at p. 1103; Aguilar, supra, at pp. 69-70 .) Defendant attempts to avoid this result by arguing that “there have been no cases that address the problem of when a defense attorney provides affirmative misrepresentations to a non-citizen defendant, who then relies on such mis-advice [sic] to his own detriment.” We reject this contention. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015(Lealao, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 33 .) In common-fund cases in federal court, requests for attorney fees are frequently awarded under a percentage-of-recovery method. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
green
1 sentence2015(Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 20 Cal.3d [25], 49 [(Serrano III)].)” (Ketchum, at p. 1134.) The court reaffirmed this approach yet again in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 [“ ‘anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method “ ‘is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”) Use of the lodestar does not, however, mean a party seeking attorneys’ fees is “necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services ac | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re Jackson
green
2 sentences2013Even if his beliefs "presently can be characterized as mistaken, such an error, in itself, would not necessarily demonstrate that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient." (In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 614 .) In Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 578, 616 , the problem was that defense counsel had failed to investigate the availability of certain mitigating evidence, based on his misunderstanding of still-developing case law. 2013Even if his beliefs "presently can be characterized as mistaken, such an error, in itself, would not necessarily demonstrate that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient." (In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 614 .) In Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 578, 616 , the problem was that defense counsel had failed to investigate the availability of certain mitigating evidence, based on his misunderstanding of still-developing case law. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2013The person must cause the vehicle to move, 22 but the movement may be slight.” The problem with this instruction, according to appellant, is the phrase, “actual physical control.” Under Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753 (Mercer), the jury should have been told that the person driving was the one who intentionally caused the car to move. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| People v. Sigala green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Sturm green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Spindle v. Travelers Insurance Companies green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Khanna v. Microdata Corp. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Goldberger v. Integrated Resources green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Tabachnick v. Ticor Title Insurance green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Griffin green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Prucka v. Papio Natural Resources District green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Manatee County v. Harbor Ventures, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Vella v. Hudgins green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| County of Madera v. Forrester green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Alex Clark, John T. Magee, and Robert Turner v. American Marine Corporation green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| cluster 315529 green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Collie green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| City of Minnetonka v. Carlson green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Beagle green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Betts green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Moultrie green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Anderson v. Chancellor Western Oil Development Corp. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Holman v. State of California green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Rago v. Children's Hospital green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.