problem claim in Pennsylvania

2021This situation leads to duplication of effort by the courts and the parties and may result in inconsistent rulings and orders.” Id.

2016In that case, the Supreme Court "granted review limited to [an] issue ... [relating to] subrogation credit arising from the negotiated settlement between claimant and his medical services provider." Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1203 .

2016In that case, the Supreme Court “granted review limited to [an] issue ... [relating to] subrogation credit arising from the negotiated settlement between claimant and his medical services provider.” Lucey, 732 A.2d at 1203 .

2011The trial court also noted that she had written a complaint on her questionnaire about "wasting people's money with all trials.” Id. at 112— 13. (4) E.J. was objected to by Appellant's trial counsel, in counsel’s words, because “she knows about the case or has read or heard about the case, he killed three people, and furthermore she knows prosecution witnesses-” Id. at 102-3. (5) M.A. gave on his questionnaire two conflicting opinions regarding his feeling about the death penalty, and further indicated that he has hearing problems and was to be admitted into the hospital during the anticipated

2007Our review of the record amply supports the trial court’s statement that Deputy Sheriff Macejka “entered a problem bar in a high-crime area, observed [Appellant] making furtive movements with his hand to his left pocket, at a time when another law enforcement person yelled, ‘Gun, gun.’ This constituted a reasonable basis to pat down [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/06, at 3. ¶ 10 The circumstances of this case are readily distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Wood, 833 A.2d 740 (Pa.Super.2003) (en banc), affd, 580 Pa. 561 , 862 A.2d 589 (2004).

2007Our review of the record amply supports the trial court’s statement that Deputy Sheriff Macejka “entered a problem bar in a high-crime area, observed [Appellant] making furtive movements with his hand to his left pocket, at a time when another law enforcement person yelled, ‘Gun, gun.’ This constituted a reasonable basis to pat down [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/06, at 3. ¶ 10 The circumstances of this case are readily distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Wood, 833 A.2d 740 (Pa.Super.2003) (en banc), affd, 580 Pa. 561 , 862 A.2d 589 (2004).

2007The additional defendant cites to the following rule set forth by the Hileman court: “It is well established that where an original defendant wishes to join an additional defendant who is not already a defendant in the action on the ground that the additional defendant is solely liable on the plaintiff’s cause of action, the original defendant must act within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. at 326 , 605 A.2d at 382 . (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) The problem with applying this rule in the instant case is that the plaintiffs, by their

2007The additional defendant cites to the following rule set forth by the Hileman court: “It is well established that where an original defendant wishes to join an additional defendant who is not already a defendant in the action on the ground that the additional defendant is solely liable on the plaintiff’s cause of action, the original defendant must act within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. at 326 , 605 A.2d at 382 . (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) The problem with applying this rule in the instant case is that the plaintiffs, by their

2007Our review of the record amply supports the trial court’s statement that Deputy Sheriff Macejka “entered a problem bar in a high-crime area, observed [Appellant] making furtive movements with his hand to his left pocket, at a time when another law enforcement person yelled, ‘Gun, gun.’ This constituted a reasonable basis to pat down [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/06, at 3. ¶ 10 The circumstances of this case are readily distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Wood, 833 A.2d 740 (Pa.Super.2003) (en banc), affd, 580 Pa. 561 , 862 A.2d 589 (2004).

1985Seneca, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 470 , 16 A.2d 754 (1940); Upper Montgomery Joint Authority v. Yerk, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 269 , 274 A.2d 212 (1971).

1985Seneca, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 470 , 16 A.2d 754 (1940); Upper Montgomery Joint Authority v. Yerk, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 269 , 274 A.2d 212 (1971).

1985Seneca, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 470 , 16 A.2d 754 (1940); Upper Montgomery Joint Authority v. Yerk, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 269 , 274 A.2d 212 (1971).

1985Seneca, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 470 , 16 A.2d 754 (1940); Upper Montgomery Joint Authority v. Yerk, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 269 , 274 A.2d 212 (1971).

1976Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Superior Ct. 155, 162, n.4 , 339 A.2d 764 , 767-768 n.4 (1975) (although appellant was no longer confined to a state hospital, the controversy was a continuing one and affected large numbers of people).

1976See, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 333 n.2 (although the named appellee met the challenged three month voting requirement, the problem the requirement posed to other Tennessee voters would recur); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (the burden placed on nomination of candidates for state office would control future elections, although the election in question had been held); Werner v. King, 310 Pa. 120 , 164 A. 418 (1933) (issue concerned the annual duty of a public official); Commonwealth ex rel.

1976See, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 333 n.2 (although the named appellee met the challenged three month voting requirement, the problem the requirement posed to other Tennessee voters would recur); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (the burden placed on nomination of candidates for state office would control future elections, although the election in question had been held); Werner v. King, 310 Pa. 120 , 164 A. 418 (1933) (issue concerned the annual duty of a public official); Commonwealth ex rel.

1973Burton, supra, and Yealy, supra, were apparently the last cases in which our Supreme Court dealt with this problem of immunity except in the context of “high public officials.” There have been some other opinions, however, holding that public officials were immune from liability for ordinary acts of negligence unless they intentionally acted maliciously or wantonly.

1973Burton, supra, and Yealy, supra, were apparently the last cases in which our Supreme Court dealt with this problem of immunity except in the context of “high public officials.” There have been some other opinions, however, holding that public officials were immune from liability for ordinary acts of negligence unless they intentionally acted maliciously or wantonly.

1968Appellant himself, however, has also filed a brief preserving the coerced confession and ineffective counsel issues. 3 In Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A. 2d 172 (1968), where appellant’s testimony that he entered the plea solely because of the confession was actually corroborated by trial counsel, an additional problem of waiver tinder §4 of the Post Conviction Hearing Act was presented; We point out, however, that the §4 waiver issue need never be faced when, as here, appellant cannot even meet the Garrett test of “primary motivation.” 4 But for the factual allegation concerning t

1968Appellant himself, however, has also filed a brief preserving the coerced confession and ineffective counsel issues. 3 In Commonwealth v. Baity, 428 Pa. 306 , 237 A. 2d 172 (1968), where appellant’s testimony that he entered the plea solely because of the confession was actually corroborated by trial counsel, an additional problem of waiver tinder §4 of the Post Conviction Hearing Act was presented; We point out, however, that the §4 waiver issue need never be faced when, as here, appellant cannot even meet the Garrett test of “primary motivation.” 4 But for the factual allegation concerning t