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8 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Coopergreen2 sentences2021Butler v. S&S P’ship, 435 Md. 635 (2013); Admiral Mortgage v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 545 (2000)(“[T]he appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court.”); Livingstone v. Greater Washington Anesthesiology & Pain Consultants, P.C., 187 Md. 2020See Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533 (2000) (“[T]he appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court.”); cf. Eagle–Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 26 (1990) (explaining that the rule allowing trial court to modify a pretrial order “to prevent manifest injustice,” then Md. Rule 2-504(c) but now under Md. Rule 2-504.2(c), “reposes in the trial judge a great deal of discretion”). | 4 | 6 |
Maddox v. Stonegreen2 sentences2013In Maddox v. Stone, 174 Md.App. 489, 497, 508-09 , 921 A.2d 912 (2007), this Court reversed the circuit court’s exclusion of an expert witness as a sanction for violation of a scheduling order. 10 We held: [Although] the governing principle [in imposing sanctions] is that the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary[,] ... the more draconian sanctions, of dismissing a claim or precluding the evidence necessary to support a claim, are normally reserved for persistent and deliberate violations that actually cause some prejudice, either to a part 2013In Maddox v. Stone, 174 Md.App. 489, 497, 508-09 , 921 A.2d 912 (2007), this Court reversed the circuit court’s exclusion of an expert witness as a sanction for violation of a scheduling order. 10 We held: [Although] the governing principle [in imposing sanctions] is that the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary[,] ... the more draconian sanctions, of dismissing a claim or precluding the evidence necessary to support a claim, are normally reserved for persistent and deliberate violations that actually cause some prejudice, either to a part | 1 | 2 |
Livingstone v. Greater Washington Anesthesiology & Pain Consultants, P.C.green1 sentence2021Butler v. S&S P’ship, 435 Md. 635 (2013); Admiral Mortgage v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 545 (2000)(“[T]he appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court.”); Livingstone v. Greater Washington Anesthesiology & Pain Consultants, P.C., 187 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbosgreen1 sentence2020See Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533 (2000) (“[T]he appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court.”); cf. Eagle–Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 26 (1990) (explaining that the rule allowing trial court to modify a pretrial order “to prevent manifest injustice,” then Md. Rule 2-504(c) but now under Md. Rule 2-504.2(c), “reposes in the trial judge a great deal of discretion”). | 1 | 1 |
Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Service Corp.green2 sentences2000See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 295 Md. 693 , 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329 , 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155 , 259 A.2d 528 (1969). 2000See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 295 Md. 693 , 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329 , 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155 , 259 A.2d 528 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Butler v. S & S Partnership
green
1 sentence2021Butler v. S&S P’ship, 435 Md. 635 (2013); Admiral Mortgage v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 545 (2000)(“[T]he appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court.”); Livingstone v. Greater Washington Anesthesiology & Pain Consultants, P.C., 187 Md. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Naughton v. Bankier
green
1 sentence2009Ultimately, however, “ ‘the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary with the trial court.’ ” Id. (quoting Admiral Mortgage, Inc. v. Cooper, 357 Md. 533, 545 , 745 A.2d 1026 (2000)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Broadwater v. Arch
green
2 sentences2000See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 295 Md. 693 , 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329 , 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155 , 259 A.2d 528 (1969). 2000See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 295 Md. 693 , 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329 , 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155 , 259 A.2d 528 (1969). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Evans v. Howard
green
2 sentences2000See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 295 Md. 693 , 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329 , 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155 , 259 A.2d 528 (1969). 2000See Starfish Condo. v. Yorkridge Serv., 295 Md. 693 , 458 A.2d 805 (1983); Broadwater v. Arch, 267 Md. 329 , 297 A.2d 671 (1972); Evans v. Howard, 256 Md. 155 , 259 A.2d 528 (1969). | 1 | 2000–2000 |