Vanderlinde standard in Maryland

2022See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 647 (2002) (explaining that “[w]e did 45 not apply Vanderlinde as a bright-line rule,” and explaining our holding in that case as “‘ordinarily’ disbarment will be the appropriate sanction when dishonesty is involved, however, we must still examine the facts, circumstances and mitigation in each case[]”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 211 (2010) (explaining that the Vanderlinde principle, “as clarified in Lane,” is “consistent with the long-chanted mantra that the appropriate sanction in an attorney-discipline matter ‘depen

2011We took pains to make clear that the Vanderlinde standard of mitigation (i.e., that “when faced with proffers of mitigation involving mental disability, such proffers must pass the ‘root cause’ analysis” to be compelling, see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 209 , 9 A.3d 37, 51-52 (2010) (emphasis omitted)) is “a separate standard and is not a factor in deciding whether a case qualifies for disposition under Rule 16-736.” Cappell, 389 Md. at 422 , 886 A.2d at 124 .

2026Supreme Court reaffirmed holding in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 530, 533-34 , 270 A.3d 917, 946, 948 (2022), that standard established in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001), requires attorney to demonstrate compelling extenuating circumstances to warrant imposition of sanction less than disbarment for misconduct involving intentional dishonesty, and that Court may invoke Vanderlinde standard based on nature, circumstances, and consequences of intentionally dishonest conduct.

2026Supreme Court reaffirmed holding in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 530, 533-34 , 270 A.3d 917, 946, 948 (2022), that standard established in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001), requires attorney to demonstrate compelling extenuating circumstances to warrant imposition of sanction less than disbarment for misconduct involving intentional dishonesty, and that Court may invoke Vanderlinde standard based on nature, circumstances, and consequences of intentionally dishonest conduct.

2026In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14 , 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001), this Court held that, absent “compelling extenuating circumstances,” disbarment is the appropriate sanction for “cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like[,]” and established what has been referred to as the “Vanderlinde standard.” See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Malone, 482 Md. 82, 131 , 285 A.3d 546, 575 (2022); Miller, 467 Md. at 232 n.19, 223 A.3d at 1009 .

2026In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14 , 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001), this Court held that, absent “compelling extenuating circumstances,” disbarment is the appropriate sanction for “cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like[,]” and established what has been referred to as the “Vanderlinde standard.” See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Malone, 482 Md. 82, 131 , 285 A.3d 546, 575 (2022); Miller, 467 Md. at 232 n.19, 223 A.3d at 1009 .

2026In Vanderlinde, id. at 413-14 , 773 A.2d at 485 , we determined that generally where attorney misconduct involving intentional dishonesty is concerned, a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed only upon a showing by the attorney of compelling extenuating circumstances that are the “root cause” of the misconduct and that result in the “attorney’s utter inability to confirm [the attorney’s] conduct in accordance with the law and with the M[A]RPC.” - 58 - More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 529-30 , 270 A.3d 917, 945 (2022)—a case involving a violation of MA

2026Supreme Court reaffirmed holding in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 530, 533-34 , 270 A.3d 917, 946, 948 (2022), that standard established in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001), requires attorney to demonstrate compelling extenuating circumstances to warrant imposition of sanction less than disbarment for misconduct involving intentional dishonesty, and that Court may invoke Vanderlinde standard based on nature, circumstances, and consequences of intentionally dishonest conduct.

2026In Vanderlinde, id. at 413-14 , 773 A.2d at 485 , we determined that generally where attorney misconduct involving intentional dishonesty is concerned, a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed only upon a showing by the attorney of compelling extenuating circumstances that are the “root cause” of the misconduct and that result in the “attorney’s utter inability to confirm [the attorney’s] conduct in accordance with the law and with the M[A]RPC.” - 58 - More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 529-30 , 270 A.3d 917, 945 (2022)—a case involving a violation of MA

2026Supreme Court reaffirmed holding in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 530, 533-34 , 270 A.3d 917, 946, 948 (2022), that standard established in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (2001), requires attorney to demonstrate compelling extenuating circumstances to warrant imposition of sanction less than disbarment for misconduct involving intentional dishonesty, and that Court may invoke Vanderlinde standard based on nature, circumstances, and consequences of intentionally dishonest conduct.

2026In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14 , 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001), this Court held that, absent “compelling extenuating circumstances,” disbarment is the appropriate sanction for “cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like[,]” and established what has been referred to as the “Vanderlinde standard.” See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Malone, 482 Md. 82, 131 , 285 A.3d 546, 575 (2022); Miller, 467 Md. at 232 n.19, 223 A.3d at 1009 .

2026In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14 , 773 A.2d 463, 485 (2001), this Court held that, absent “compelling extenuating circumstances,” disbarment is the appropriate sanction for “cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like[,]” and established what has been referred to as the “Vanderlinde standard.” See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Malone, 482 Md. 82, 131 , 285 A.3d 546, 575 (2022); Miller, 467 Md. at 232 n.19, 223 A.3d at 1009 .

2026Invoking the Vanderlinde standard, we concluded that the attorney “failed to demonstrate any compelling extenuating circumstances to justify a sanction less than disbarment.” Id. at 696, 279 A.3d at 904 (citation modified).

2026Invoking the Vanderlinde standard, we concluded that the attorney “failed to demonstrate any compelling extenuating circumstances to justify a sanction less than disbarment.” Id. at 696, 279 A.3d at 904 (citation modified).

2026In seeking a sanction of less than disbarment, Mr. Hecht draws our attention to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Koven, 361 Md. 337, 338, 343 , 761 A.2d 881, 881, 884 (2000), a case in which we indefinitely suspended, with the right to apply for reinstatement after two years, an attorney who violated MARPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(b), (c), and (d).

2026In seeking a sanction of less than disbarment, Mr. Hecht draws our attention to Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Koven, 361 Md. 337, 338, 343 , 761 A.2d 881, 881, 884 (2000), a case in which we indefinitely suspended, with the right to apply for reinstatement after two years, an attorney who violated MARPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(b), (c), and (d).

2026In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 625 , 271 A.3d 249, 279 (2022), where an attorney’s misconduct involved misappropriation of funds, after “deploy[ing]” the Vanderlinde standard, we concluded that the attorney’s “emotional problems” did not rise to the level of a compelling extenuating circumstance sufficient to preclude disbarment. - 61 - In this case, after careful consideration of the nature, circumstances, and consequences of Mr. Hecht’s intentional dishonest conduct, we conclude that the Vanderlinde standard applies.

2026In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 625 , 271 A.3d 249, 279 (2022), where an attorney’s misconduct involved misappropriation of funds, after “deploy[ing]” the Vanderlinde standard, we concluded that the attorney’s “emotional problems” did not rise to the level of a compelling extenuating circumstance sufficient to preclude disbarment. - 61 - In this case, after careful consideration of the nature, circumstances, and consequences of Mr. Hecht’s intentional dishonest conduct, we conclude that the Vanderlinde standard applies.

2022See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 647 (2002) (explaining that “[w]e did 45 not apply Vanderlinde as a bright-line rule,” and explaining our holding in that case as “‘ordinarily’ disbarment will be the appropriate sanction when dishonesty is involved, however, we must still examine the facts, circumstances and mitigation in each case[]”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Palmer, 417 Md. 185, 211 (2010) (explaining that the Vanderlinde principle, “as clarified in Lane,” is “consistent with the long-chanted mantra that the appropriate sanction in an attorney-discipline matter ‘depen

2022See Garcia, 410 Md. at 522 , 979 A.2d at 155 .

2022See Garcia, 410 Md. at 522 , 979 A.2d at 155 .

2020See Christopher, 383 Md. at 641-42, 861 A.2d at 701-03; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zakroff, 387 Md. 603 , 645-46, 876 A.2d 664 , 689-90 (2005); Guida, 391 Md. at 56-57, 891 A.2d at 1098-99; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359 , 382-84, 69 A.3d 11 , 24-25 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 444 Md. 227, 262 , 118 A.3d 995 , 1014-15 (2015).19 There are further practical difficulties with the facts of Ms. Miller’s case and their interaction with the Vanderlinde standard, even if we endorsed her expansive view of the standard.

2020See Christopher, 383 Md. at 641-42, 861 A.2d at 701-03; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zakroff, 387 Md. 603 , 645-46, 876 A.2d 664 , 689-90 (2005); Guida, 391 Md. at 56-57, 891 A.2d at 1098-99; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359 , 382-84, 69 A.3d 11 , 24-25 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 444 Md. 227, 262 , 118 A.3d 995 , 1014-15 (2015).19 There are further practical difficulties with the facts of Ms. Miller’s case and their interaction with the Vanderlinde standard, even if we endorsed her expansive view of the standard.

2020We have previously remarked that the purpose of sanctions in attorney discipline cases is to “protect the public[,]” “to protect the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698 , 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254 , 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000)).

2020We have previously remarked that the purpose of sanctions in attorney discipline cases is to “protect the public[,]” “to protect the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698 , 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254 , 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000)).

2020See Christopher, 383 Md. at 641-42, 861 A.2d at 701-03; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zakroff, 387 Md. 603 , 645-46, 876 A.2d 664 , 689-90 (2005); Guida, 391 Md. at 56-57, 891 A.2d at 1098-99; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359 , 382-84, 69 A.3d 11 , 24-25 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 444 Md. 227, 262 , 118 A.3d 995 , 1014-15 (2015).19 There are further practical difficulties with the facts of Ms. Miller’s case and their interaction with the Vanderlinde standard, even if we endorsed her expansive view of the standard.

2020See Christopher, 383 Md. at 641-42, 861 A.2d at 701-03; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zakroff, 387 Md. 603 , 645-46, 876 A.2d 664 , 689-90 (2005); Guida, 391 Md. at 56-57, 891 A.2d at 1098-99; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359 , 382-84, 69 A.3d 11 , 24-25 (2013); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 444 Md. 227, 262 , 118 A.3d 995 , 1014-15 (2015).19 There are further practical difficulties with the facts of Ms. Miller’s case and their interaction with the Vanderlinde standard, even if we endorsed her expansive view of the standard.

2020We have previously remarked that the purpose of sanctions in attorney discipline cases is to “protect the public[,]” “to protect the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698 , 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254 , 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000)).

2020We have previously remarked that the purpose of sanctions in attorney discipline cases is to “protect the public[,]” “to protect the integrity of the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cassidy, 362 Md. 689, 698 , 766 A.2d 632, 637 (2001) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 254 , 760 A.2d 1108, 1119 (2000)).

2020Aggravating factors are essentially the antithesis of mitigating factors and “militate in favor of a more severe sanction[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sanderson, 465 Md. 1, 67 , 213 A.3d 122, 161 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 19 This list of cases is not exhaustive.

2020Aggravating factors are essentially the antithesis of mitigating factors and “militate in favor of a more severe sanction[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sanderson, 465 Md. 1, 67 , 213 A.3d 122, 161 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 19 This list of cases is not exhaustive.

2020The Vanderlinde standard has been applied in countless attorney grievance cases since its inception in 2001. - 58 - 325, 337, 68 A.3d 862, 869 (2013)).

2020The Vanderlinde standard has been applied in countless attorney grievance cases since its inception in 2001. - 58 - 325, 337, 68 A.3d 862, 869 (2013)).

2020His diminished concentration, [an 18 As opposed to the instant grievance proceedings, in Bocchino, this Court found that the Vanderlinde standard was not implicated, because “[d]ishonesty [was] not the flagship violation in [Mr. Bocchino]’s case[.]” 435 Md. at 538 , 80 A.3d at 241 .

2020His diminished concentration, [an 18 As opposed to the instant grievance proceedings, in Bocchino, this Court found that the Vanderlinde standard was not implicated, because “[d]ishonesty [was] not the flagship violation in [Mr. Bocchino]’s case[.]” 435 Md. at 538 , 80 A.3d at 241 .

2009Id. at 258, 929 A.2d at 74.

2009Id. at 258, 929 A.2d at 74.