Boyle test in Michigan

2022We affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling “that our decision in Smith provides no support for inferring a damage remedy for a violation of the Michigan Constitution in an action against a municipality or an individual government employee” because those plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies under federal law. 10 In Lewis v Michigan, we declined to infer a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of our Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, because that provision expressly states it will be implemented by the Legislature. 11 Finally, in Mays, only a plurality of the Court supporte

2022We affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling “that our decision in Smith provides no support for inferring a damage remedy for a violation of the Michigan Constitution in an action against a municipality or an individual government employee” because those plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies under federal law. 10 In Lewis v Michigan, we declined to infer a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of our Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, because that provision expressly states it will be implemented by the Legislature. 11 Finally, in Mays, only a plurality of the Court supporte

2022Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task—as we do not.”). 5 just this year, “Now long past ‘the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action,’ . . . we have come ‘to appreciate more fully the tension between’ judicially created causes of action and ‘the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power . . . .’ ” 17 “At bottom,” the Court continued, “creating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor.” 18 The Court appears to have limited Bivens and the two other cases allowing damages

2022Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and competence for that task—as we do not.”). 5 just this year, “Now long past ‘the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action,’ . . . we have come ‘to appreciate more fully the tension between’ judicially created causes of action and ‘the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power . . . .’ ” 17 “At bottom,” the Court continued, “creating a cause of action is a legislative endeavor.” 18 The Court appears to have limited Bivens and the two other cases allowing damages

2022We affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling “that our decision in Smith provides no support for inferring a damage remedy for a violation of the Michigan Constitution in an action against a municipality or an individual government employee” because those plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies under federal law. 10 In Lewis v Michigan, we declined to infer a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of our Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, because that provision expressly states it will be implemented by the Legislature. 11 Finally, in Mays, only a plurality of the Court supporte

2022We affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling “that our decision in Smith provides no support for inferring a damage remedy for a violation of the Michigan Constitution in an action against a municipality or an individual government employee” because those plaintiffs had adequate alternative remedies under federal law. 10 In Lewis v Michigan, we declined to infer a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of our Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, because that provision expressly states it will be implemented by the Legislature. 11 Finally, in Mays, only a plurality of the Court supporte

2022Just two terms ago, three 119 Edwards v Vannoy, 593 US ___ , ___; 141 S Ct 1547 , 1560; 209 L Ed 2d 651 (2021). 120 Egbert, 596 US at ___ (opinion of the Court); slip op at 7 (emphasis added). 121 Id. at ___ (Gorsuch, J., concurring); slip op at 2 (“When might a court ever be ‘better equipped’ than the people’s elected representatives to weigh the ‘costs and benefits’ of creating a cause of action?

2022Just two terms ago, three 119 Edwards v Vannoy, 593 US ___ , ___; 141 S Ct 1547 , 1560; 209 L Ed 2d 651 (2021). 120 Egbert, 596 US at ___ (opinion of the Court); slip op at 7 (emphasis added). 121 Id. at ___ (Gorsuch, J., concurring); slip op at 2 (“When might a court ever be ‘better equipped’ than the people’s elected representatives to weigh the ‘costs and benefits’ of creating a cause of action?

1998Even if Justice Boyle’s brief concurring opinion is not read to adopt the lead opinion’s reasoning on this issue, we note that Justice Boyle expressly rejected the "reasonable time limitation” doctrine in her separate opinion in Nederhood v Cadillac Malleable Iron Co, 445 Mich 234, 259-267 ; 518 NW2d 390 (1994).

1998Even if Justice Boyle’s brief concurring opinion is not read to adopt the lead opinion’s reasoning on this issue, we note that Justice Boyle expressly rejected the "reasonable time limitation” doctrine in her separate opinion in Nederhood v Cadillac Malleable Iron Co, 445 Mich 234, 259-267 ; 518 NW2d 390 (1994).

1995This is a misstatement; Chief Justice Brickley expressly joined in Justice Boyle’s analysis "regarding admissibility of defendant’s responses and further questioning resulting therefrom.” People v Sutton (After Remand), 436 Mich 575, 600 ; 464 NW2d 276 (1990).

1995This is a misstatement; Chief Justice Brickley expressly joined in Justice Boyle’s analysis "regarding admissibility of defendant’s responses and further questioning resulting therefrom.” People v Sutton (After Remand), 436 Mich 575, 600 ; 464 NW2d 276 (1990).

1991Id. at 689 .

1991Indeed, as Justice Boyle stated in Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 712 ; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), when the policy is found to be clear and unambiguous "there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning of the exclusion. [See 2 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 15:57, pp 298-302.] (Since all prior negotiations are assumed to be merged in the written contract, the policy itself constitutes the contract between the parties, and, if the meaning is clear, it alone must be looked to in construction.)” The majority is in accord with Justice Boyle’s analysis and thus we do

1991Indeed, as Justice Boyle stated in Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656, 712 ; 443 NW2d 734 (1989), when the policy is found to be clear and unambiguous "there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning of the exclusion. [See 2 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 15:57, pp 298-302.] (Since all prior negotiations are assumed to be merged in the written contract, the policy itself constitutes the contract between the parties, and, if the meaning is clear, it alone must be looked to in construction.)” The majority is in accord with Justice Boyle’s analysis and thus we do

1986The "belief/action and direct/indirect” dichotomies, discussed but not relied upon in Justice Boyle’s opinion, have long been abandoned in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, inasmuch as either would be applicable in the present case. 74 The argument that the Free Exercise Clause protects only religious "belief’ and, therefore, that religiously grounded "actions” are outside the protections of the First Amendment, accepted in Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 ; 25 L Ed 244 (1878), was expressly rejected in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 ; 60 S Ct 900 ; 84 L Ed 1

1986The "belief/action and direct/indirect” dichotomies, discussed but not relied upon in Justice Boyle’s opinion, have long been abandoned in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, inasmuch as either would be applicable in the present case. 74 The argument that the Free Exercise Clause protects only religious "belief’ and, therefore, that religiously grounded "actions” are outside the protections of the First Amendment, accepted in Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 ; 25 L Ed 244 (1878), was expressly rejected in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 ; 60 S Ct 900 ; 84 L Ed 1

1986The "belief/action and direct/indirect” dichotomies, discussed but not relied upon in Justice Boyle’s opinion, have long been abandoned in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, inasmuch as either would be applicable in the present case. 74 The argument that the Free Exercise Clause protects only religious "belief’ and, therefore, that religiously grounded "actions” are outside the protections of the First Amendment, accepted in Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 ; 25 L Ed 244 (1878), was expressly rejected in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 ; 60 S Ct 900 ; 84 L Ed 1

1986The "belief/action and direct/indirect” dichotomies, discussed but not relied upon in Justice Boyle’s opinion, have long been abandoned in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, inasmuch as either would be applicable in the present case. 74 The argument that the Free Exercise Clause protects only religious "belief’ and, therefore, that religiously grounded "actions” are outside the protections of the First Amendment, accepted in Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 ; 25 L Ed 244 (1878), was expressly rejected in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 ; 60 S Ct 900 ; 84 L Ed 1

1986The "belief/action and direct/indirect” dichotomies, discussed but not relied upon in Justice Boyle’s opinion, have long been abandoned in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court, inasmuch as either would be applicable in the present case. 74 The argument that the Free Exercise Clause protects only religious "belief’ and, therefore, that religiously grounded "actions” are outside the protections of the First Amendment, accepted in Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 ; 25 L Ed 244 (1878), was expressly rejected in Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 ; 60 S Ct 900 ; 84 L Ed 1