flawed analysis in Michigan

2021See MCL 462.26(8); In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich at 427 .

2021See MCL 462.26(8); In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich at 427 .

2017“Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32 ; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), so while the error with respect to § 19b(3)(i) does not undermine the court’s ultimate decision, this Court finds it important to articulate the flawed analysis with respect to this factor.

2017“Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights,” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32 ; 817 NW2d 111 (2011), so while the error with respect to § 19b(3)(i) does not undermine the court’s ultimate decision, this Court finds it important to articulate the flawed analysis with respect to this factor.

2016I write separately this one time to briefly express my belief that contrary to the flawed analysis contained throughout Hyatt and for the reasons set forth in People v Skinner, 312 Mich App 15, 20 ; 877 NW2d 482 (2015), defendant possesses a Sixth Amendment right to choose whether he will be sentenced by a judge or a jury.

2016I write separately this one time to briefly express my belief that contrary to the flawed analysis contained throughout Hyatt and for the reasons set forth in People v Skinner, 312 Mich App 15, 20 ; 877 NW2d 482 (2015), defendant possesses a Sixth Amendment right to choose whether he will be sentenced by a judge or a jury.

2015The prosecution also argues that, unlike in Cunningham, 549 US 270 , in which findings of certain aggravating factors required the sentencing court to impose an increased sentence, in this case the sentencing court has discretion under MCL 769.25 to impose the harsher sentence.

2015Specifically, the dissent contends that our opinion states that “Apprendi and its progeny requires that all facts relating to a sentence must be found by a jury.” Id.

2015In short, the dissent’s contention that consideration of factors is distinct from making findings about those factors is a difference without any real meaning, illustrates the tenuous nature of the dissent’s flawed analysis, and “ignore [s] reality and the actual text of the statute.” Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397, 438 ; 774 NW2d 1 (2009) (YOUNG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2015In short, the dissent’s contention that consideration of factors is distinct from making findings about those factors is a difference without any real meaning, illustrates the tenuous nature of the dissent’s flawed analysis, and “ignore [s] reality and the actual text of the statute.” Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397, 438 ; 774 NW2d 1 (2009) (YOUNG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2009See Golden Valley Co v Greengard’s Estate, 69 ND 171 , 190; 284 NW 423 (1938); Gas Products Co v Rankin, 63 Mont 372 ; 207 P 993 (1922); Wolbol v Steinhoff, 25 Wyo 227, 258; 170 P 381 (1918); Woodbury v Dorman, 15 Minn 341 (1870); Stearns v Hemmens, 3 NYS 16 (NY Comm Pl, 1888). 4 any change in an assigned judge now justify the reopening of a predecessor’s ruling?

2009See Golden Valley Co v Greengard’s Estate, 69 ND 171 , 190; 284 NW 423 (1938); Gas Products Co v Rankin, 63 Mont 372 ; 207 P 993 (1922); Wolbol v Steinhoff, 25 Wyo 227, 258; 170 P 381 (1918); Woodbury v Dorman, 15 Minn 341 (1870); Stearns v Hemmens, 3 NYS 16 (NY Comm Pl, 1888). 4 any change in an assigned judge now justify the reopening of a predecessor’s ruling?

2009See Golden Valley Co v Greengard’s Estate, 69 ND 171 , 190; 284 NW 423 (1938); Gas Products Co v Rankin, 63 Mont 372 ; 207 P 993 (1922); Wolbol v Steinhoff, 25 Wyo 227, 258; 170 P 381 (1918); Woodbury v Dorman, 15 Minn 341 (1870); Stearns v Hemmens, 3 NYS 16 (NY Comm Pl, 1888). 4 any change in an assigned judge now justify the reopening of a predecessor’s ruling?

2009Plaintiffs and the new majority simply disagree with this Court’s prior opinion for the reasons previously stated in the flawed analysis of Justice Weaver’s dissent. 51 Mich 11 ; 16 NW 185 (1883).

2009Plaintiffs and the new majority simply disagree with this Court’s prior opinion for the reasons previously stated in the flawed analysis of Justice Weaver’s dissent. 51 Mich 11 ; 16 NW 185 (1883).

2009See Golden Valley Co v Greengard’s Estate, 69 ND 171 , 190; 284 NW 423 (1938); Gas Products Co v Rankin, 63 Mont 372 ; 207 P 993 (1922); Wolbol v Steinhoff, 25 Wyo 227, 258; 170 P 381 (1918); Woodbury v Dorman, 15 Minn 341 (1870); Stearns v Hemmens, 3 NYS 16 (NY Comm Pl, 1888). 4 any change in an assigned judge now justify the reopening of a predecessor’s ruling?

2008Instead, “due process requires that the notice given be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Vicencio v Jaime Ramirez, MD, PC, 211 Mich App 501, 504 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995).

2008Instead, “due process requires that the notice given be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Vicencio v Jaime Ramirez, MD, PC, 211 Mich App 501, 504 ; 536 NW2d 280 (1995).