5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maddox v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See generally Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 815 (2) ( 746 SE2d 280 ) (2013) (finding, in context of contraband found in automobile where there was evidence that multiple occupants had equal access to contraband, that this could support the theory that all occupants had constructive possession and were guilty as parties to the crime, although the State could elect whether or not to prosecute all occupants, and finding “no basis . . . that the State is required under these circumstances to prove that the prosecuted occupant had sole constructive possession of the contraband”). “[E]qual acce 2022See generally Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 815 (2) ( 746 SE2d 280 ) (2013) (finding, in context of contraband found in automobile where there was evidence that multiple occupants had equal access to contraband, that this could support the theory that all occupants had constructive possession and were guilty as parties to the crime, although the State could elect whether or not to prosecute all occupants, and finding “no basis . . . that the State is required under these circumstances to prove that the prosecuted occupant had sole constructive possession of the contraband”). “[E]qual acce | 1 | 1 |
DELAVEGA v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See generally Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 815 (2) ( 746 SE2d 280 ) (2013) (finding, in context of contraband found in automobile where there was evidence that multiple occupants had equal access to contraband, that this could support the theory that all occupants had constructive possession and were guilty as parties to the crime, although the State could elect whether or not to prosecute all occupants, and finding “no basis . . . that the State is required under these circumstances to prove that the prosecuted occupant had sole constructive possession of the contraband”). “[E]qual acce 2022See generally Maddox v. State, 322 Ga. App. 811, 815 (2) ( 746 SE2d 280 ) (2013) (finding, in context of contraband found in automobile where there was evidence that multiple occupants had equal access to contraband, that this could support the theory that all occupants had constructive possession and were guilty as parties to the crime, although the State could elect whether or not to prosecute all occupants, and finding “no basis . . . that the State is required under these circumstances to prove that the prosecuted occupant had sole constructive possession of the contraband”). “[E]qual acce | 1 | 1 |
cluster 152green1 sentence2015Compare, e.g., United States v. Perez, 116 F3d 840, 844-845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (explaining that, after Olano , an instructional error no longer may he deemed invited merely because the defendant proposed the instruction in question; instead, to establish the waiver of a “known right,” the record must show that “the defendant considered the controlling law . . . and in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction”), with, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F3d 1221, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding, without reference to the Olano standard, that “when | 1 | 1 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louise Han PEREZ; Joseph Eclavea Perez; John Velasco Cruz, Defendants-Appellantsgreen1 sentence2015Compare, e.g., United States v. Perez, 116 F3d 840, 844-845 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (explaining that, after Olano , an instructional error no longer may he deemed invited merely because the defendant proposed the instruction in question; instead, to establish the waiver of a “known right,” the record must show that “the defendant considered the controlling law . . . and in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction”), with, e.g., United States v. Frank, 599 F3d 1221, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding, without reference to the Olano standard, that “when | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ricky Marianogreen1 sentence2015See also United States v. Mariano, 729 F3d 874, 881 (8th Cir. 2013) (suggesting that even “[i]f proposing an instruction is not waiver of the right to challenge it on appeal, then [the Eighth Circuit’s] ‘invited error’ cases also could be understood asa categorical conclusion that a conviction based on a mistaken jury instruction that was specifically requested by the defendant does not result in a miscarriage of justice” and thus fails under the final prong of the plain-error test). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lestergreen2 sentences2008“The fact that the issue is determined pre-trial does not relieve the State of this burden.” State v. Lester, 170 Ga. App. 471, 473 ( 317 SE2d 295 ) (1984) (physical precedent only). 2. 2008“The fact that the issue is determined pre-trial does not relieve the State of this burden.” State v. Lester, 170 Ga. App. 471, 473 ( 317 SE2d 295 ) (1984) (physical precedent only). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Tarver v. Stategreen2 sentences2008The State asserts that the trial court “employed a flawed analysis by incorrectly requiring [it] to prove that a crime occurred within the five-year limitation period.” We disagree that this analysis was flawed because “[t]he burden is on the State to prove that a crime occurred within the applicable statute of limitation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Tarver v. State, 198 Ga. App. 634, 635 ( 402 SE2d 365 ) (1991). 2008The State asserts that the trial court “employed a flawed analysis by incorrectly requiring [it] to prove that a crime occurred within the five-year limitation period.” We disagree that this analysis was flawed because “[t]he burden is on the State to prove that a crime occurred within the applicable statute of limitation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Tarver v. State, 198 Ga. App. 634, 635 ( 402 SE2d 365 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Although the County, citing to Young, supra, 427 U. S. at 58-59 , asserts that the definition of sexually-oriented adult use in its development code is “unquestionably applicable” to appellant “even if there may be some uncertainty about the effect of the [definition] on other litigants,” id., we reject that assertion because it is premised upon the County’s consideration of the overall nature of appellant’s store. 2005Although the County, citing to Young, supra, 427 U. S. at 58-59 , asserts that the definition of sexually-oriented adult use in its development code is “unquestionably applicable” to appellant “even if there may be some uncertainty about the effect of the [definition] on other litigants,” id., we reject that assertion because it is premised upon the County’s consideration of the overall nature of appellant’s store. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Hodo v. State
green
2 sentences2002In the recent case of Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272 , 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000), the defendant claimed that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court did not permit him to question a State's witness, who was a drug dealer, about the potential sentence he could face because of criminal conduct the witness had admitted on the stand. 2002In the recent case of Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272 , 528 S.E.2d 250 (2000), the defendant claimed that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court did not permit him to question a State's witness, who was a drug dealer, about the potential sentence he could face because of criminal conduct the witness had admitted on the stand. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.