flawed analysis in Connecticut

5 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Healthgreen conn · 2008 · cited in 2 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2018 2 sentences 2018See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health , 289 Conn. 135 , 140-41, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ('the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like [certain] federal cases ... employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority')." State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209 , 262, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). 2018See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health , 289 Conn. 135 , 140-41, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ('the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like [certain] federal cases ... employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority')." State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209 , 262, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).	2	2
State v. Jenkinsgreen conn · 2010 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health , 289 Conn. 135 , 140-41, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ('the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like [certain] federal cases ... employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority')." State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209 , 262, 3 A.3d 806 (2010). 2018See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health , 289 Conn. 135 , 140-41, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ('the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like [certain] federal cases ... employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority')." State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209 , 262, 3 A.3d 806 (2010).	1	1
United States v. Dusan Lakichgreen ca7 · 1994 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011In these circumstances, by agreeing that the instruction was satisfactory, [the defendant] waived the right to challenge the instruction on appeal.”); United States v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding waiver when, during colloquy, defense counsel expressly and repeatedly stated that later challenged instruction was acceptable to him); United States v. Perez, supra, 116 F.3d 845 (“[w]aiver occurred . . . because the defendant considered the controlling law, or omitted element, and, in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction”); Uni 2011In these circumstances, by agreeing that the instruction was satisfactory, [the defendant] waived the right to challenge the instruction on appeal."); United States v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding waiver when, during colloquy, defense counsel expressly and repeatedly stated that later challenged instruction was acceptable to him); United States v. Perez, supra, 116 F.3d at 845 ("[w]aiver occurred ... because the defendant considered the controlling law, or omitted element, and, in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction"); Un	1	1
United States v. Sanders, DeAngelogreen ca7 · 2008 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 2 sentences 2011In these circumstances, by agreeing that the instruction was satisfactory, [the defendant] waived the right to challenge the instruction on appeal.”); United States v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding waiver when, during colloquy, defense counsel expressly and repeatedly stated that later challenged instruction was acceptable to him); United States v. Perez, supra, 116 F.3d 845 (“[w]aiver occurred . . . because the defendant considered the controlling law, or omitted element, and, in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction”); Uni 2011In these circumstances, by agreeing that the instruction was satisfactory, [the defendant] waived the right to challenge the instruction on appeal."); United States v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding waiver when, during colloquy, defense counsel expressly and repeatedly stated that later challenged instruction was acceptable to him); United States v. Perez, supra, 116 F.3d at 845 ("[w]aiver occurred ... because the defendant considered the controlling law, or omitted element, and, in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction"); Un	1	1
Mozell v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen conn · 2009 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011See, e.g., Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 291 Conn. at 70, 967 A.2d 41 . [19] Justice Katz declares that our precedent has established that "a defendant will waive Golding review only by affirmatively agreeing to a specific jury instruction discussed on the record"; (emphasis in original); and that the majority, in stating that cases involving waiver fall into three categories, relies on a flawed analysis of this court's case law that "goes well beyond the circumscribed approach to waiver outlined in these cases. . . ." Justice Katz specifically claims that the majority mischarac	1	1
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louise Han PEREZ; Joseph Eclavea Perez; John Velasco Cruz, Defendants-Appellantsgreen ca9 · 1997 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011 1 sentence 2011In these circumstances, by agreeing that the instruction was satisfactory, [the defendant] waived the right to challenge the instruction on appeal."); United States v. Sanders, 520 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding waiver when, during colloquy, defense counsel expressly and repeatedly stated that later challenged instruction was acceptable to him); United States v. Perez, supra, 116 F.3d at 845 ("[w]aiver occurred ... because the defendant considered the controlling law, or omitted element, and, in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction"); Un	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

Case	Cited	Years
Wydrick Phillips v. Jiminez Allen green ca7 · 2012 1 sentence 2018We note that, with the exception of Phillips v. Allen , supra, 668 F.3d at 912 , all of these cases predate this court's decision in Ledbetter .	1	2018–2018
In Re Marriage Cases red cal · 2008 1 sentence 2008Id., at 854-56 , 76 Cal. Rptr.3d 683 , 183 P.3d 384 . [67] We conclude *470 that the state court cases that have determined that gay persons do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, like the federal cases described in this part of the opinion, employed a flawed analysis, and, therefore, they do not constitute persuasive authority.	1	2008–2008
State v. Theriault green connappct · 1995 2 sentences 1996While it is of paramount importance that jury instructions be clear and accurate regarding the essential elements of the crime charged; State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 163 , 397 A.2d 89 (1978); they “ ‘need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate . . . ” State v. Theriault, 38 Conn. App. 815, 819 , 663 A.2d 423 (1995). 1996While it is of paramount importance that jury instructions be clear and accurate regarding the essential elements of the crime charged; State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 163 , 397 A.2d 89 (1978); they “ ‘need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate . . . ” State v. Theriault, 38 Conn. App. 815, 819 , 663 A.2d 423 (1995).	1	1996–1996
State v. Griffin green conn · 1978 2 sentences 1996While it is of paramount importance that jury instructions be clear and accurate regarding the essential elements of the crime charged; State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 163 , 397 A.2d 89 (1978); they “ ‘need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate . . . ” State v. Theriault, 38 Conn. App. 815, 819 , 663 A.2d 423 (1995). 1996While it is of paramount importance that jury instructions be clear and accurate regarding the essential elements of the crime charged; State v. Griffin, 175 Conn. 155, 163 , 397 A.2d 89 (1978); they “ ‘need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate . . . ” State v. Theriault, 38 Conn. App. 815, 819 , 663 A.2d 423 (1995).	1	1996–1996

Where else courts name it

IL 14 (2001–2025) FL 13 (1988–2019) TX 11 (1990–2025) CA 9 (1989–2024) PA 8 (2006–2026) MI 8 (2008–2021) NY 8 (1981–2025) WA 6 (2005–2015) GA 5 (2002–2022) MA 5 (1984–2002) AZ 5 (1990–2022) CT 5 (1996–2018) UT 5 (1991–2024) AR 4 (2000–2025) NJ 4 (1994–2025) NM 4 (2011–2025) MO 4 (2013–2025) VA 4 (2004–2025) IA 4 (2013–2020) KS 3 (2013–2024) SC 2 (2024–2024) WV 2 (1990–2009) OK 2 (2001–2013) MD 2 (2011–2013) AL 2 (2014–2025) MT 2 (2004–2015) CO 2 (2008–2013) OR 2 (1999–2013) GU 2 (2021–2023) IN 2 (2006–2017) NC 2 (2018–2019) HI 2 (2005–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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