flawed instruction in California

2024(See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 733 [“An abuse of discretion is shown when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard”]; In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litigation, supra, 50 F.4th at p. 783 [“while the district court’s probing analysis suggests that it may have applied heightened scrutiny, its written order relied on a flawed legal standard,” requiring reversal].) Because we find reversal appropriate based on the trial court’s flawed presumption of fairness, we decline to address Colorado Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments concerning the settlemen

2024Because the court appeared to find certification appropriate on the ground that the settlement was fair, we 5 The Ninth Circuit, moreover, has questioned whether a presumption of fairness should ever apply under federal law, particularly given “Congress’ 2018 codification of standards for evaluating whether a proposed class settlement is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’ ” (SFBSC Management, supra, 944 F.3d at p. 1049, fn. 12 [a presumption of unfairness “is very likely inappropriate under the standards now codified”].) 34 conclude that the court’s flawed presumption of fairness undermined bot

2023Prior to deliberations, the jury was instructed with the aiding and abetting instruction (CALCRIM No. 401), which four of our sister courts have found to be a flawed instruction, as applied to implied malice murder, because it permits a jury to convict a defendant of second degree murder without a finding that he or she acted with implied malice.4 Although defendant was not convicted of second degree murder, but rather of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the jury was still required to find she acted with either an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for human life, “i

2023(People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 607 [“[i]f reversal is predicated on instructional error, … double jeopardy principles do not come into play”]; see Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1 , 14‒15 [reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not trigger double jeopardy concerns]; accord, Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31 , 39‒41.) DISPOSITION Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in count 1 is reversed, and the sentence on that count is vacated.

2023(People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 607 [“[i]f reversal is predicated on instructional error, … double jeopardy principles do not come into play”]; see Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1 , 14‒15 [reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not trigger double jeopardy concerns]; accord, Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31 , 39‒41.) DISPOSITION Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in count 1 is reversed, and the sentence on that count is vacated.

2023(People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 607 [“[i]f reversal is predicated on instructional error, … double jeopardy principles do not come into play”]; see Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1 , 14‒15 [reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not trigger double jeopardy concerns]; accord, Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31 , 39‒41.) DISPOSITION Defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter in count 1 is reversed, and the sentence on that count is vacated.

2021Standard of Review “An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses 64 whether the instruction accurately states the law. [Citation.] In reviewing a claim of instructional error, the court must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the Constitution. [Citations.] The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an imper

2021However, “failure to object to instructional error will not result in forfeiture if the substantial rights of the defendant are affected. (§ 1259; [citation].) Here, [defendants] claim[] that the flawed instruction[] deprived [them] of due process, and because this would affect [their] substantial rights if true, [the] claim is not forfeited.” (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579-580 (Mitchell).) 3.

2005(Id. at pp. 552-554.) Without an appropriate instruction, the Moore court reasoned, the jury likely would speculate on what might happen to a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, and might wrongly assume he or she would walk free, like a defendant found not guilty for other reasons. {Id. at p. 554.) The Moore court concluded “the danger of an erroneous assumption during jury deliberations overshadows any possible invitation to speculate on matters likely to be discussed anyway.” {Ibid.) We have declined to apply Moore outside its original context (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th

2005(Id. at pp. 552-554.) Without an appropriate instruction, the Moore court reasoned, the jury likely would speculate on what might happen to a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, and might wrongly assume he or she would walk free, like a defendant found not guilty for other reasons. {Id. at p. 554.) The Moore court concluded “the danger of an erroneous assumption during jury deliberations overshadows any possible invitation to speculate on matters likely to be discussed anyway.” {Ibid.) We have declined to apply Moore outside its original context (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th

1989Basing his argument on authorities preceding the original opinion in Wright (I), supra, 43 Cal.3d 399 , appellant contends that he was entitled to his proposed instruction which related eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt (People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ]), and which modified a flawed instruction (People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 671 ]; People v. Coates (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 675 ]).

1989Basing his argument on authorities preceding the original opinion in Wright (I), supra, 43 Cal.3d 399 , appellant contends that he was entitled to his proposed instruction which related eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt (People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ]), and which modified a flawed instruction (People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 671 ]; People v. Coates (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 675 ]).

1989Basing his argument on authorities preceding the original opinion in Wright (I), supra, 43 Cal.3d 399 , appellant contends that he was entitled to his proposed instruction which related eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt (People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ]), and which modified a flawed instruction (People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 671 ]; People v. Coates (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 675 ]).

1989Basing his argument on authorities preceding the original opinion in Wright (I), supra, 43 Cal.3d 399 , appellant contends that he was entitled to his proposed instruction which related eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt (People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ]), and which modified a flawed instruction (People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 671 ]; People v. Coates (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 675 ]).

1989Basing his argument on authorities preceding the original opinion in Wright (I), supra, 43 Cal.3d 399 , appellant contends that he was entitled to his proposed instruction which related eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt (People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ]), and which modified a flawed instruction (People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 671 ]; People v. Coates (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 675 ]).

1989Basing his argument on authorities preceding the original opinion in Wright (I), supra, 43 Cal.3d 399 , appellant contends that he was entitled to his proposed instruction which related eyewitness identification to reasonable doubt (People v. West (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 606, 609 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 36 ]), and which modified a flawed instruction (People v. Aho (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 671 ]; People v. Coates (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 665, 671 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 675 ]).