litigant challenge in Michigan

2021Although we emphasized that the rule applies to challenges made in a later case, we have elsewhere explained that “[c]ollateral attacks encompass those challenges raised other than by initial appeal . . . .” People v Ingram, 439 Mich 288 , 291 n 1 (1992).5 In Ferranti, we concluded that a child- 5 See also In re Hill, 501 Mich 1047, 1048 (2018) (MCCORMACK, J., dissenting) (“The collateral bar rule requires a litigant to challenge a trial court’s erroneous decision in a direct appeal of that decision and forbids an attack in a different (collateral) proceeding.”), citing, inter alia, People v H

2016To support her argument that the court rule should be interpreted to include the denial of a motion to change a child’s school, plaintiff relies on Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 152 ; 507 NW2d 788 (1993), in which the appellant-mother challenged the trial court’s denial of her motion to enroll the child in a program for gifted students.

2016To support her argument that the court rule should be interpreted to include the denial of a motion to change a child’s school, plaintiff relies on Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 152 ; 507 NW2d 788 (1993), in which the appellant-mother challenged the trial court’s denial of her motion to enroll the child in a program for gifted students.

2007To argue otherwise would have required a litigant to challenge the very definition of the legal phrases “limitations period” and “statute of limitations.” O’Brien, supra. If I were following these road maps, I would have ended up remanded (or, more likely, reversed) in Marquette, with many of my appellate colleagues.

1983In S C Gray, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich App 789 ; 286 NW2d 34 (1979), this Court stated that it is presumed that a trial judge is fair and impartial, and a litigant who would challenge that has a heavy burden.

1983In S C Gray, Inc v Ford Motor Co, 92 Mich App 789 ; 286 NW2d 34 (1979), this Court stated that it is presumed that a trial judge is fair and impartial, and a litigant who would challenge that has a heavy burden.

1979Mahlen Land Corp v Kurtz, 355 Mich 340 ; 94 NW2d 888 (1959).

1979Mahlen Land Corp v Kurtz, 355 Mich 340 ; 94 NW2d 888 (1959).

1971“It is not permissible for a litigant to challenge his opponent in the presence of the trier of fact to waive a legal right.” Oakland County v. Schoenrock (1971), 33 Mich App 365, 368 .

1971"It is not permissible for a litigant to challenge his opponent in the presence of the trier of fact to waive a legal right." Oakland County v. Schoenrock (1971), 33 Mich App 365, 368 .

1928L. p. 1024, it is said: “Again, it is clear, whether any statute directly controls the subject or not, that a litigant can not by rule of court be deprived of a substantial right, or so embarrassed in its exercise that he may be deprived without his fault of its benefit. ” In Saylor v. Taylor, 77 Fed. 476 , the district court had made a rule regulating the priority of claims in admiralty in that district.