15 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1916–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coleman v. City of Richmondgreen2 sentences2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t 2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t | 7 | 8 |
Grosso v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t 2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t | 7 | 7 |
Coleman v. City of Richmondgreen2 sentences2000See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va.App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1988) (citing Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941)), reh’g denied, 6 Va.App. 296 , 368 S.E.2d 298 (1988). 2000See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va.App. 459, 463 , 364 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1988) (citing Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941)), reh’g denied, 6 Va.App. 296 , 368 S.E.2d 298 (1988). | 2 | 2 |
New York v. Ferbergreen2 sentences2002For example, the Supreme Court stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999): “The traditional rule is that ‘a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.’ New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 2002For example, the Supreme Court stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 , 120 S.Ct. 483 , 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999): "The traditional rule is that `a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). | 1 | 2 |
McDonald v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t 2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t | 1 | 1 |
Singson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t 2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t | 1 | 1 |
Tjan v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t 2007See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 325, 329 , 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (2006)2 (“[W]e will only consider the constitutionality of Code § 18.2-361(A) as applied to appellant’s conduct.”); Singson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 724, 734 , 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (2005) (defendant lacks standing to challenge statute generally); Tjan v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 698, 706 , 621 S.E.2d 669, 673 (2005) (same); see also Grosso v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 839 , 13 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1941) (“It is well settled that one challenging the constitutionality of a provision in a statute has the burden of showing t | 1 | 1 |
Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.green2 sentences2002For example, the Supreme Court stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999): “The traditional rule is that ‘a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.’ New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 2002For example, the Supreme Court stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 , 120 S.Ct. 483 , 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999): "The traditional rule is that `a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Broadrick v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2002For example, the Supreme Court stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 (1999): “The traditional rule is that ‘a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.’ New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 2002For example, the Supreme Court stated in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38 , 120 S.Ct. 483 , 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999): "The traditional rule is that `a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not before the Court.' New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 , 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Peery v. Virginia Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmersgreen2 sentences1999Courts uphold acts of the legislature when their constitutionality is debatable, and the burden is upon the assailing party to prove the claimed invalidity.” Peery v. Virginia Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 203 Va. 161, 165 , 123 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1961). *477 A. Right to Privacy Appellant first contends the prohibition of consensual heterosexual sex under Code § 18.2-361 abridges his constitutional right to privacy. 2 Before considering this argument, we note that generally, a litigant may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her. 1999Courts uphold acts of the legislature when their constitutionality is debatable, and the burden is upon the assailing party to prove the claimed invalidity.” Peery v. Virginia Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 203 Va. 161, 165 , 123 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1961). *477 A. Right to Privacy Appellant first contends the prohibition of consensual heterosexual sex under Code § 18.2-361 abridges his constitutional right to privacy. 2 Before considering this argument, we note that generally, a litigant may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McCreery v. McCreery
green
2 sentences2013McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352 , 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977). 2013McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352 , 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Dombrowski v. Pfister
green
1 sentence2008The United States Supreme Court has often expressed the reason for allowing this exception: This "exception to the usual rules governing standing," Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. [479,] 486 [ 85 S.Ct. 1116 (1945) ], reflects the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Commonwealth v. Hicks
green
2 sentences2008In that case the majority applied the United States Supreme Court's exception to the standing rule reciting that "in the context of a First Amendment challenge, a litigant may challenge government action granting government officials standardless discretion even if that government action as applied to the litigant is constitutionally permissible." Id. at 55 , 563 S.E.2d at 678 . 2008In that case the majority applied the United States Supreme Court's exception to the standing rule reciting that "in the context of a First Amendment challenge, a litigant may challenge government action granting government officials standardless discretion even if that government action as applied to the litigant is constitutionally permissible." Id. at 55 , 563 S.E.2d at 678 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Santillo v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2005Before conducting a constitutional analysis, we noted that, “generally, a litigant may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.” Id. at 477 , 517 S.E.2d at 737 . 2005Before conducting a constitutional analysis, we noted that, “generally, a litigant may challenge the constitutionality of a law only as it applies to him or her.” Id. at 477 , 517 S.E.2d at 737 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Powell v. Tarry's Adm'r
green
1 sentence1916It was his province to settle questions of dispute between counsel with regard to the evidence, and he “cannot require counsel to agree upon a statement of the evidence as a condition precedent, nor plead lack of time or memory as justification . . of refusal to certify the same.” (Powell v. Terry, 77 Va. 250 ), Dillard & McCorkle v. Thomas Dunlop, 83 Va. 755 , 3 S. E. 383 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Dillard & McCorkle v. Dunlop
green
2 sentences1916It was his province to settle questions of dispute between counsel with regard to the evidence, and he “cannot require counsel to agree upon a statement of the evidence as a condition precedent, nor plead lack of time or memory as justification . . of refusal to certify the same.” (Powell v. Terry, 77 Va. 250 ), Dillard & McCorkle v. Thomas Dunlop, 83 Va. 755 , 3 S. E. 383 . 1916It was his province to settle questions of dispute between counsel with regard to the evidence, and he “cannot require counsel to agree upon a statement of the evidence as a condition precedent, nor plead lack of time or memory as justification . . of refusal to certify the same.” (Powell v. Terry, 77 Va. 250 ), Dillard & McCorkle v. Thomas Dunlop, 83 Va. 755 , 3 S. E. 383 . | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.