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25 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1945–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tecce, T. v. Hally, J.green2 sentences2020See Tecce v. Hally, 106 A.3d 728, 732 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“Pennsylvania’s appellate courts have held, without apparent exception, that the failure to object to unsworn testimony subjects a litigant to waiver”). 2016See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Tecce v. Hally, 106 A.3d 728, 732 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“It is axiomatic that, to preserve an objection for appeal, the objection must be raised before the trial court. … [T]he failure to object to unsworn testimony subjects a litigant to waiver.”) (Footnote Continued Next Page) -4- J-S09012-16 to make the ordered payments and violated the order volitionally. | 5 | 5 |
City of Philadelphia v. Whitegreen2 sentences2014See City of Philadelphia v. White, 727 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Morra v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 667 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995); Godding v. Swanson, 173 Pa.Super. 575 , 98 A.2d 210, 213 (1953). 7 A proceeding that is so fundamentally flawed as the one that occurred here offends fundamental fairness and demands correction. 2014See City of Philadelphia v. White, 727 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. Commw. 1999); Morra v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 667 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa. Commw. 1995); Godding v. Swanson, 98 A.2d 210, 213 (Pa. Super. 1953).7 _______________________ (Footnote Continued) obligation to ensure that hearings proceed on a record. | 2 | 2 |
Godding v. Swansongreen2 sentences2014See City of Philadelphia v. White, 727 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Morra v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 667 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995); Godding v. Swanson, 173 Pa.Super. 575 , 98 A.2d 210, 213 (1953). 7 A proceeding that is so fundamentally flawed as the one that occurred here offends fundamental fairness and demands correction. 2014See City of Philadelphia v. White, 727 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Morra v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 667 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995); Godding v. Swanson, 173 Pa.Super. 575 , 98 A.2d 210, 213 (1953). 7 A proceeding that is so fundamentally flawed as the one that occurred here offends fundamental fairness and demands correction. | 2 | 2 |
Morra v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2014See City of Philadelphia v. White, 727 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Morra v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 667 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995); Godding v. Swanson, 173 Pa.Super. 575 , 98 A.2d 210, 213 (1953). 7 A proceeding that is so fundamentally flawed as the one that occurred here offends fundamental fairness and demands correction. 2014See City of Philadelphia v. White, 727 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. Commw. 1999); Morra v. Com., Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 667 A.2d 468, 469 (Pa. Commw. 1995); Godding v. Swanson, 98 A.2d 210, 213 (Pa. Super. 1953).7 _______________________ (Footnote Continued) obligation to ensure that hearings proceed on a record. | 2 | 2 |
Jones, H., Aplt. v. Ott, R.green2 sentences2020We outlined the procedure for ensuring a challenge is preserved. “[A]bsent a specific contemporaneous objection[,] a litigant must file a proposed point for charge [pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 226(a)], the trial court must rule upon that instruction, and the litigant must challenge the ruling in its post-trial motion.” Jones, 191 A.3d at 791 . 2019Accord Jones v. Ott, 191 A.3d 782, 791 (Pa. 2018) (plurality) (“[I]n order to preserve a jury-instruction challenge for appeal - absent a specific contemporaneous objection - a litigant must file a proposed point for charge, the trial court must rule upon that instruction, and the litigant must challenge the ruling in its post-trial motion.”). | 1 | 2 |
UGI Utilities, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Reviewgreen1 sentence2021Moreover, specifically as to the GPS data and Claimant’s foundational challenge thereto, we note that our decision in UGI Utilities, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 851 A.2d 240, 251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), requires that any claim that a foundation is inadequate be raised and preserved by the litigant at the hearing at the point in the hearing when the evidence’s admissibility is under consideration. | 1 | 1 |
Kull v. Guissegreen1 sentence2021Sovereign Immunity Even if a litigant states a claim for negligence, “sovereign immunity protects Commonwealth officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties from civil liability,” Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 2310), unless it has been waived by the General Assembly. | 1 | 1 |
Faherty v. Graciasgreen2 sentences2018Wapner, 903 A.2d at 571 (finding failure to preserve a jury-charge challenge when requesting party acquiesced to an alternate jury instruction which made it “unnecessary for the court to rule”); Faherty, 874 A.2d at 1249 (“[A] trial judge’s ruling against a proposed charge will indeed preserve the issue for review. 2018Wapner , 903 A.2d at 571 (finding failure to preserve a jury-charge challenge when requesting party acquiesced to an alternate jury instruction which made it "unnecessary for the court to rule"); Faherty , 874 A.2d at 1249 ("[A] trial judge's ruling against a proposed charge will indeed preserve the issue for review. | 1 | 1 |
Thomas Jefferson University v. Wapnergreen2 sentences2018Wapner, 903 A.2d at 571 (finding failure to preserve a jury-charge challenge when requesting party acquiesced to an alternate jury instruction which made it “unnecessary for the court to rule”); Faherty, 874 A.2d at 1249 (“[A] trial judge’s ruling against a proposed charge will indeed preserve the issue for review. 2018Wapner , 903 A.2d at 571 (finding failure to preserve a jury-charge challenge when requesting party acquiesced to an alternate jury instruction which made it "unnecessary for the court to rule"); Faherty , 874 A.2d at 1249 ("[A] trial judge's ruling against a proposed charge will indeed preserve the issue for review. | 1 | 1 |
Nealy v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2000See also Nealy, supra, 695 A.2d at 793 (“[W]e find persuasive several well-reasoned federal decisions which have held that, because § 8371 authorizes the imposition of punitive damages, the seventh amendment to the federal constitution entitles a plaintiff to demand a jury trial in federal court.”)(Emphasis added.) ¶ 19 We thus hold that a litigant to a claim under Section 8371 does not have the right to demand a jury trial. 2000See also Nealy, supra, 695 A.2d at 793 (“[W]e find persuasive several well-reasoned federal decisions which have held that, because § 8371 authorizes the imposition of punitive damages, the seventh amendment to the federal constitution entitles a plaintiff to demand a jury trial in federal court.”)(Emphasis added.) ¶ 19 We thus hold that a litigant to a claim under Section 8371 does not have the right to demand a jury trial. | 1 | 1 |
Morreale v. Princegreen2 sentences1992Compare Morreale v. Prince, 436 Pa. 51 , 258 A.2d 508 (1969), (admission of evidence that a litigant was in a bar before a motor vehicle accident, without proof of intoxication, was so prejudicial as to require a new trial). 1992Compare Morreale v. Prince, 436 Pa. 51 , 258 A.2d 508 (1969), (admission of evidence that a litigant was in a bar before a motor vehicle accident, without proof of intoxication, was so prejudicial as to require a new trial). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schoen v. Elsasser
green
2 sentences1972Eebuttal is proper where facts discrediting the proponents witnesses have been offered: Wigmore on Evidence, 2d edition, volume 4, page 20, section 1873. ‘For matters properly not evidential until the rebuttal, the proponent has a right to put them in at that time, and they are therefore not subject to the discretionary exclusion of the trial court’: Ibid., page 25, section 1873.” (Emphasis in original.) Schoen v. Elsasser, 315 Pa. 65, 66 , 172 A. 301 (1934). 1966In Schoen v. Elsasser, 315 Pa. 65 , this Court said: “A litigant has the privilege of offering rebuttal testimony, and where the evidence proposed goes to the impeachment of the testimony of his opponent’s witnesses, it is admissible as a matter of right. | 2 | 1966–1972 |
Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board
green
1 sentence2026Id. at 190 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Khan v. State Board of Auctioneer Examiners
green
1 sentence2018"To constitute a lawful exercise of the state's police power, social and economic legislation must first be directed toward a valid state objective." Khan , 842 A.2d at 946 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Smith
green
1 sentence2008Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848 (Pa.Super.2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lehman v. Pennsylvania State Police
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
GMH Associates, Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group
green
1 sentence2002GMH Associates, Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group, 752 A.2d 889 (Pa.Super.2000). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
AM. BOOKSELLERS ASS'N, INC. v. Rendell
green
2 sentences1995A litigant may challenge the validity of an ordinance on the grounds of over-breadth as it applies to persons not before the court. “[T]he doctrine of overbreadth accords standing by reason of the chilling effect that a particular law might have upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 555 , 481 A.2d at 928 . 1995A litigant may challenge the validity of an ordinance on the grounds of over-breadth as it applies to persons not before the court. “[T]he doctrine of overbreadth accords standing by reason of the chilling effect that a particular law might have upon the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 555 , 481 A.2d at 928 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Fleming v. Rhodes
green
1 sentence1981E.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100 (1947); White v. Philadelphia, supra. Those affected by the Act are municipal corporations that own or operate utilities and their ratepaying landlord customers. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Norris Tool & MacHine Co. v. Rosenlund
green
1 sentence1948We think moral sanction requires us to thrust through the corporation to the real identity (Sunseri v. Sunseri et al., 358 Pa. 1, 4 ; Norris Tool & Machine Co. v. Rosenlund et al., 355 Pa. 560, 565 ; Edirose Silk Mfg. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Sunseri v. Sunseri
green
1 sentence1948We think moral sanction requires us to thrust through the corporation to the real identity (Sunseri v. Sunseri et al., 358 Pa. 1, 4 ; Norris Tool & Machine Co. v. Rosenlund et al., 355 Pa. 560, 565 ; Edirose Silk Mfg. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
United States v. County of Allegheny
red
1 sentence1945J. 343) to intervene in an appeal from this same Board on the ground that it was the actual party in interest since it would have been obliged to reimburse the nominal taxpayer if the assessment were sustained; the right of intervention thus upheld was not passed upon when the case was heard in this court on appeal ( 347 Pa. 191 , 32 A. 2d 236 ) but the United States was recognized as the real litigant and its claim sustained in the appellate proceedings in the federal Supreme Court ( 322 U. S. 174 ). | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Mesta Machine Company Case
green
2 sentences1945J. 343) to intervene in an appeal from this same Board on the ground that it was the actual party in interest since it would have been obliged to reimburse the nominal taxpayer if the assessment were sustained; the right of intervention thus upheld was not passed upon when the case was heard in this court on appeal ( 347 Pa. 191 , 32 A. 2d 236 ) but the United States was recognized as the real litigant and its claim sustained in the appellate proceedings in the federal Supreme Court ( 322 U. S. 174 ). 1945J. 343) to intervene in an appeal from this same Board on the ground that it was the actual party in interest since it would have been obliged to reimburse the nominal taxpayer if the assessment were sustained; the right of intervention thus upheld was not passed upon when the case was heard in this court on appeal ( 347 Pa. 191 , 32 A. 2d 236 ) but the United States was recognized as the real litigant and its claim sustained in the appellate proceedings in the federal Supreme Court ( 322 U. S. 174 ). | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.