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8 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 2002–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wiegandgreen2 sentences2007Because there was "some expectation of privacy in an automobile," and a dog sniff intrudes upon this privacy interest "to some degree," we held that the police "cannot conduct a narcotics-detection dog sniff around a motor vehicle stopped for a routine equipment violation without some level of suspicion of illegal activity." Id. at 134 . 2007Because there was “some expectation of privacy in an automobile,” and a dog sniff intrudes upon this privacy interest “to some degree,” we held that the police “cannot conduct a narcotics-detection dog sniff around a motor vehicle stopped for a routine equipment violation without some level of suspicion of illegal activity.” Id. at 134 . | 2 | 6 |
State v. Pikegreen2 sentences2006While the officer need not have probable cause, the officer may not be motivated by ‘mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn.1996)). 2002While the officer need not have probable cause, the officer may not be motivated by “mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” State v. Pike, 551 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (Minn.1996). | 2 | 2 |
Berkemer v. McCartygreen2 sentences2004We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop. 468 U.S. at 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138 . 2004We of course do not suggest that a traffic stop supported by probable cause may not exceed the bounds set by the Fourth Amendment on the scope of a Terry stop. 468 U.S. at 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Donald H. Jonesgreen2 sentences2004United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir.2001); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220 , 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (2003); see also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn.2002) (concluding that "Terry principles are appropriately applied * * * when a motor vehicle is stopped for a routine equipment violation."). [3] While courts have been guided by the Supreme Court's analogy to a Terry stop in Berkemer , this analogy was qualified by the Court in a footnote explaining that [n]o more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmos 2004United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir.2001); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220 , 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (2003); see also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn.2002) (concluding that “Terry principles are appropriately applied * * ⅜ when a motor vehicle is stopped for a routine equipment violation.”). 3 While courts have been guided by the Supreme Court’s analogy to a Terry stop in Berkemer , this analogy was qualified by the Court in a footnote explaining that [n]o more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosph | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gonzalezred2 sentences2004United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir.2001); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220 , 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (2003); see also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn.2002) (concluding that “Terry principles are appropriately applied * * ⅜ when a motor vehicle is stopped for a routine equipment violation.”). 3 While courts have been guided by the Supreme Court’s analogy to a Terry stop in Berkemer , this analogy was qualified by the Court in a footnote explaining that [n]o more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosph 2004United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir.2001); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220 , 273 Ill.Dec. 360 , 789 N.E.2d 260, 265 (2003); see also State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn.2002) (concluding that “Terry principles are appropriately applied * * ⅜ when a motor vehicle is stopped for a routine equipment violation.”). 3 While courts have been guided by the Supreme Court’s analogy to a Terry stop in Berkemer , this analogy was qualified by the Court in a footnote explaining that [n]o more is implied by this analogy than that most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosph | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond
green
2 sentences2005This reliance on the limited intrusiveness of a drug-detection dog sniff was reaffirmed in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 , 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), where the Court held that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic checkpoint was not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics.” We employed the Place-Edmond rationale in Wiegand where we held that a drug-detection dog sniff of a vehicle stopped for a routine equipment violation was not a search under the Fou 2005This reliance on the limited intrusiveness of a drug-detection dog sniff was reaffirmed in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 , 121 S.Ct. 447 , 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000), where the Court held that a dog sniff of a vehicle at a traffic checkpoint was not a search because it “does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics.” We employed the Place-Edmond rationale in Wiegand where we held that a drug-detection dog sniff of a vehicle stopped for a routine equipment violation was not a search under the Fou | 2 | 2005–2006 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2007We concluded that principles from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were appropriately applied to the context of a motor vehicle stop, and we said that the Terry principles authorized the balancing of the level of intrusiveness of the use of the dog “against the importance of the governmental interest at stake.” Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 133-34 . 2007We concluded that principles from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), were appropriately applied to the context of a motor vehicle stop, and we said that the Terry principles authorized the balancing of the level of intrusiveness of the use of the dog “against the importance of the governmental interest at stake.” Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 133-34 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Florida v. Royer
green
2 sentences2004The court thus examined the scope of the initial stop and its duration, emphasizing that an “ ‘investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Id. at 135 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). 2004The court thus examined the scope of the initial stop and its duration, emphasizing that an “ ‘investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Id. at 135 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Place
green
2 sentences2002In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search that requires probable cause. 2 Id. at 707 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 . 2002In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search that requires probable cause. 2 Id. at 707 , 103 S.Ct. 2637 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Kyllo v. United States
green
2 sentences2002However, a dog sniff around a motor vehicle stopped only for a routine equipment violation is intrusive to some degree. 10 A dog sniff detects something that the public generally cannot detect, cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , and something that, in this case, was purposefully hidden from view. 2002However, a dog sniff around a motor vehicle stopped only for a routine equipment violation is intrusive to some degree. 10 A dog sniff detects something that the public generally cannot detect, cf. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , and something that, in this case, was purposefully hidden from view. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.