reversal rule in Missouri

2009To be entitled to a reversal on a claim of plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that the trial court’s action was not only erroneous, but also that the error “so substantially impacted upon his rights that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will result if the error is left uncorrected.” Broom, 281 S.W.3d at 358-59 .

1997In support of his claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite elements for the creation of a partnership, specifically, that the parties had agreed to divide the profits and bear the losses of the accounting firm, Lofgren cites us to Brotherton *84 v. Kissinger, 550 S.W.2d 904 (Mo.App.1977), and Nesler .

1918In the Sublett Case, 191 Mo. 1 . c. 173, we held that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction which told the jury that the testimony of the prosecutrix must be strongly corroborated by clear proof; and in the Grugin Case, 147 Mo. 1 . c. 56, it was held sufficient ground for a reversal that an instruction singled out a particular fact for the consideration of the jury.

1918In the Sublett Case, 191 Mo. 1 . c. 173, we held that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction which told the jury that the testimony of the prosecutrix must be strongly corroborated by clear proof; and in the Grugin Case, 147 Mo. 1 . c. 56, it was held sufficient ground for a reversal that an instruction singled out a particular fact for the consideration of the jury.

1913Co., 186 Mo. 300 .]” In Beebe v. Transit Co., 206 Mo. 1 . c. 441, this court cites with approval from Judge Dillon, in Jones v. Yeager, 2 Dillon, 68, this: “In the application of these principles to the evidence, you will first inquire whether the boilers in this case were unsafe or unfit for use, and, if so, whether the defendant knew it, or as a reasonable man, having a due .regard for the safety of his employees, ought to have known it; for, if he ought, his neglect in this respect would be equivalent in imposing liability to actual knowledge; , and in the next place you must inquire, and,

1913Co., 186 Mo. 300 .]” In Beebe v. Transit Co., 206 Mo. 1 . c. 441, this court cites with approval from Judge Dillon, in Jones v. Yeager, 2 Dillon, 68, this: “In the application of these principles to the evidence, you will first inquire whether the boilers in this case were unsafe or unfit for use, and, if so, whether the defendant knew it, or as a reasonable man, having a due .regard for the safety of his employees, ought to have known it; for, if he ought, his neglect in this respect would be equivalent in imposing liability to actual knowledge; , and in the next place you must inquire, and,

1913This would mean a reversal of the rule imposing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, since the defendant, in order to prevent the jury from making him the victim of conjecture, would be forced to assume the burden of showing that his negligence did not produce the injury. [Dunphy v. Stock Yards Co., 118 Mo. App. 1 . c. 516; Trigg v. Ozark Co., 187 Mo. 227 ; Goransson v. Mfg.

1913Co., 186 Mo. 300 .]” In Beebe v. Transit Co., 206 Mo. 1 . c. 441, this court cites with approval from Judge Dillon, in Jones v. Yeager, 2 Dillon, 68, this: “In the application of these principles to the evidence, you will first inquire whether the boilers in this case were unsafe or unfit for use, and, if so, whether the defendant knew it, or as a reasonable man, having a due .regard for the safety of his employees, ought to have known it; for, if he ought, his neglect in this respect would be equivalent in imposing liability to actual knowledge; , and in the next place you must inquire, and,

1913This would mean a reversal of the rule imposing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, since the defendant, in order to prevent the jury from making him the victim of conjecture, would be forced to assume the burden of showing that his negligence did not produce the injury. [Dunphy v. Stock Yards Co., 118 Mo. App. 1 . c. 516; Trigg v. Ozark Co., 187 Mo. 227 ; Goransson v. Mfg.

1905Neither cam, his attorney. [Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 416 ; Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. l. c. 258, 259; 2 Freeman on Executions (2 Ed.), sec. 340; Shaw v. Padley, 64 Mo. 519 .] The other deed of trust to the Bank of Versailles was given as security for a pre-existing indebtedness.

1905Neither cam, his attorney. [Gott v. Powell, 41 Mo. 416 ; Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. l. c. 258, 259; 2 Freeman on Executions (2 Ed.), sec. 340; Shaw v. Padley, 64 Mo. 519 .] The other deed of trust to the Bank of Versailles was given as security for a pre-existing indebtedness.

1890Sweet v. Maupin (1877), 65 Mo. 65 ; Henry v. Lowe (1880), 73 Mo. 98 .

1884The question was likewise presented for determination in Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo. 563, 568 .