jury unanimity requirement in Texas

2014See Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. Crim.

2013Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. Crim.

2021See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 766 n.14, 867–68 (2010) (“The Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.”); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 , 634 n.5 (1991) (“[A] state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous jury verdict.”); see also Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

2018See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 766 n.14, 867–68 (2010); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991); see also Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

2022See Williams v. State, No. 02-20-00104-CR, 2021 WL 5227167 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting argument “that unanimity is required under [Section 21.02] as to the underlying offenses and that the trial court erred by not including such an instruction in the charge”); Heide v. State, No. 02-20-00056-CR, 2021 WL 2460734 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 17, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that Section 21.02 does not violate a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict); Salinas v. S

2016To the extent Bleil also argues that the jury did not have to be unanimous as to the sexual offenses committed by Crick, "Texas intermediate courts have routinely held that the individual acts of sexual abuse are manner and means, not an element of the offense, and section 21.02 does not violate the jury unanimity requirement.” Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 312 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. refd), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 436 , 187 L.Ed.2d 293 (2013). 21 .Cf.

2025We have previously held that § 21.02(d) does not violate the jury-unanimity requirement because the individual “acts of sexual abuse are merely the manner and means of committing an element of the offense.” Reckart v. State, 323 S.W.3d 588, 601 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d); see also Perez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 369 , 381 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

2024We have previously held that § 21.02(d) does not violate the jury-unanimity requirement because the individual “acts of sexual abuse are merely the manner and means of committing an element of the offense.” Reckart v. State, 323 S.W.3d 588, 601 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d).

2016Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

2016However, this does not mean the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant committed the crime in “one specific way.” Holton v. State, __S.W.3d__, 2015 WL 4878608, at *3 (Tex.App. – El Paso Aug. 14, 2015, no pet.) (citing Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 404 ); see also Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).

2015See Fulmer, - 15 - 04-14-00100-CR 401 S.W.3d at 313 ; Casey, 349 S.W.3d at 829 ; Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 872–73; Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 737 ; Render, 316 S.W.3d at 857–58.

2013Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 737 ; accord Casey, 349 S.W.3d at 829 ; Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 872-73 ; Render, 316 S.W.3d at 857-58 . 1 Thus, Texas intermediate courts have routinely held that the individual acts of sexual abuse are manner and means, not an element of the offense, and section 21.02 does not violate the jury unanimity requirement.

2016In order to satisfy the jury unanimity requirement, every juror must agree that “the defendant committed the same, single, specific criminal act.” Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745 ).

2015In order to satisfy the jury unanimity requirement, every 6 juror must agree that “the defendant committed the same, single, specific criminal act.” Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745 ).

2012See Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. refd); see also Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 433 (“[Because precedent clearly holds that, for the purposes of jury unanimity, the variant means of murder comprise only one offense, there is no violation of the unanimity requirement in this case.”).

2012See Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, 63 pet. ref‘d); see also Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 433 (―[B]ecause precedent clearly holds that, for the purposes of jury unanimity, the variant means of murder comprise only one offense, there is no violation of the unanimity requirement in this case.‖).

2021Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. Crim.

2021Id. at 715 .

2024In Jacobsen v. State, this Court considered the constitutionality of section 21.02 with the above questions in mind and concluded that the statute does not violate the jury unanimity requirement. 325 S.W.3d at 736-39 .

2013Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 737 ; accord Casey, 349 S.W.3d at 829 ; Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 872-73 ; Render, 316 S.W.3d at 857-58 . 1 Thus, Texas intermediate courts have routinely held that the individual acts of sexual abuse are manner and means, not an element of the offense, and section 21.02 does not violate the jury unanimity requirement.

2016In order to satisfy the jury unanimity requirement, every juror must agree that “the defendant committed the same, single, specific criminal act.” Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745 ).

2015In order to satisfy the jury unanimity requirement, every 6 juror must agree that “the defendant committed the same, single, specific criminal act.” Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 404 (citing Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745 ).

2021See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 766 n.14, 867–68 (2010) (“The Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.”); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 , 634 n.5 (1991) (“[A] state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous jury verdict.”); see also Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

2018See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 766 n.14, 867–68 (2010); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991); see also Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

2021See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 766 n.14, 867–68 (2010) (“The Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a unanimous jury verdict in state criminal trials.”); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 , 634 n.5 (1991) (“[A] state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to a unanimous jury verdict.”); see also Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

2018See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 , 766 n.14, 867–68 (2010); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 630 (1991); see also Romero v. State, 396 S.W.3d 136, 147 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

2017See Bonilla v. State, 452 S.W.3d 811, 831-33 (Tex. Crim.

2017See Bonilla v. State , 452 S.W.3d 811 , 831-33 (Tex. Crim.

2012See Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 712 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. refd); see also Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 433 (“[Because precedent clearly holds that, for the purposes of jury unanimity, the variant means of murder comprise only one offense, there is no violation of the unanimity requirement in this case.”).

2012See Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 712 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, 63 pet. ref‘d); see also Bundy, 280 S.W.3d at 433 (―[B]ecause precedent clearly holds that, for the purposes of jury unanimity, the variant means of murder comprise only one offense, there is no violation of the unanimity requirement in this case.‖).

2015See Fulmer, - 15 - 04-14-00100-CR 401 S.W.3d at 313 ; Casey, 349 S.W.3d at 829 ; Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 872–73; Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 737 ; Render, 316 S.W.3d at 857–58.

2013Jacobsen, 325 S.W.3d at 737 ; accord Casey, 349 S.W.3d at 829 ; Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 872-73 ; Render, 316 S.W.3d at 857-58 . 1 Thus, Texas intermediate courts have routinely held that the individual acts of sexual abuse are manner and means, not an element of the offense, and section 21.02 does not violate the jury unanimity requirement.

2025Richardson, moreover, in dicta distinguishes the case before it—a review of a statute related to engaging in continuing criminal enterprise—and the type of statute we consider now, noting that statutes that address crimes against children “may well respond to special difficulties of proving individual underlying criminal acts” and “their special subject matter indicates they represent an exception.” Id. at 821. 20 Additionally, at least one federal court has analyzed the issue before us and determined that Section 21.02(d) did not run afoul of the jury unanimity requirement.

2024Id. at 821 . 9

2025See 483 S.W.3d 557 (Tex. Crim.

2025Nor is the jury unanimity requirement “violated . . . when the 4 “[A]ll alleged jury-charge error must be considered on appellate review regardless of preservation in the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim.

2022See Williams v. State, No. 02-20-00104-CR, 2021 WL 5227167 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting argument “that unanimity is required under [Section 21.02] as to the underlying offenses and that the trial court erred by not including such an instruction in the charge”); Heide v. State, No. 02-20-00056-CR, 2021 WL 2460734 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 17, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that Section 21.02 does not violate a defendant’s right to a unanimous jury verdict); Salinas v. S

2021See Kitchens, 823 S.W.2d at 259 (in appeal in which appellant was charged with capital murder under alternate theories, “appellant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to prove murder in the course of aggravated sexual assault as alleged in the indictment”).

2019See Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666 , 678–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). 28 as predicate offenses, such as sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and certain indecency with a child offenses—“are not themselves elements of the offense [of continuous sexual abuse], but are merely evidentiary facts, the manner and means by which the actus reus element is committed.” Id.

2019See Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666 , 678–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). 28 as predicate offenses, such as sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and certain indecency with a child offenses—“are not themselves elements of the offense [of continuous sexual abuse], but are merely evidentiary facts, the manner and means by which the actus reus element is committed.” Id.

2016See Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 354 .

2016See Phillips, 130 S.W.3d at 354 .

2016Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 151-52 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (setting out three specific circumstances under which the trial court may single out a particular item of *213 evidence in the charge without making an impermissible comment). 22 .

2016However, this does not mean the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant committed the crime in “one specific way.” Holton v. State, __S.W.3d__, 2015 WL 4878608, at *3 (Tex.App. – El Paso Aug. 14, 2015, no pet.) (citing Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 404 ); see also Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).